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ABSTRACT 
MNTRODUCTION 
Dividend in the normal ifce of word refers to that oortion of the net earnings which 
is distributed by the coniipany among its shareholders. The shareholders, as 
investors, are interested in'maxtptiizifigthelF returns at a given level of risk or 
minimizing their risk at a given level of returns, and together wants to maximize 
returns with minimizing risk and thereby to maximize their wealth. This is the 
essence of desirability of dividends from the investor's point of view. 
On the other hand, a company needs to provide funds to finance its long-term 
growth. If a company pays out most of the profit it earns, then for business 
requirements and further expansions, it will have to depend upon outside sources 
such as issues of debts or new equity shares. So, dividends in a firm are paid 
according to the policies and decisions of the management regarding the retrained 
earning of the firm. 
Among all the corporate financial decisions few are as strategically 
important as dividend decisions. Corporate dividend policy plays an important 
role and affects the capital structure as well future dividends. From the micro 
concept, as long as there are investment projects with returns exceeding those that 
are required (in general, mostly. Weighted Average Cost of Capital) it will use 
retained earnings and the amount of senior serenities will support to finance these 
projects. If the firm has retained earnings left over after financing all acceptable 
investment opportunities these earnings then will be distributed to the 
shareholders in the form of cash dividends. If otherwise there won't be any 
dividends .The treatment of dividend policy as a passive residual determined 
solely by the availability of acceptable investment proposals implies that the 
dividends are immaterial and irrelevant; the investors are rather indifferent 
between dividends and retention by the firm. 
From the macro standpoint, dividend decisions have implications not only 
at the level of individual firms, but at the macro economic level as well. At the 
individual firm level, dividend is the first, if not the only indicator of the firm's 
performance. Indeed, the objective of modern joint Stock Company is to generate 
a steady stream of dividends to its shareholders. Higher and regular dividend 
payment are sure to enhance the market vale of the firm and the reputation of its 
management. 
On the other hand, such a policy may mean less availability of internal 
fiinds and more dependence on external sources for reinvestment and expansion 
purposes. Thus while determining dividend payments, a prudent management 
strikes a balance between shareholders preference and the firm's long-term 
interest, safeguarding the firms control. 
Again from the macro economic point of view, dividend policies of 
individual firms when combined together play a significant role in determining 
overall rates of saving and investment as well as patterns of flow of funds in the 
economy. Further, dividend policies also level other social economic implications. 
If shareholders are concentrated only in a few economic brackets, these changes in 
the dividend income will affect the overall income distribution as well as factor 
shares.. Exceptionally high dividend payments or abnormally low dividend 
payments under such conditions might lead to less efficient resource allocation in 
the economy as a result of changed consumption patterns. 
Recognizing the importance of dividend policies of corporations and their 
bearing on resource allocation and income distribution in the economy, this 
project attempts to explore the possible factors that determine the dividend 
behavior in the Indian corporate sector. 
BASIC THEORETICAL PREMISE 
Basically both theoretical and empirical researchers in dividends are 
struggling to answer this so called "dividend puzzle" expressed in the study 
carried out by Black (1976) asking questions like "why do corporates pay 
dividends?" and "why do investors pay attention to dividends?" this investigation 
is based on certain general and specific theoretical premises and considerations as 
summarized hereunder: 
A. Theories 
1) Dividend Irrelevance Theory 
Inertia Theory 
The 'Bird In Hand' Theory 
The Market Value Maximization Theory 
Theory Of Signaling Or Information Content Effect 
Theory of Information Asymmetry 
Agency Cost Theory 
Management Agency Objective Theory 
Theory of Behavioural Finance 
Theory of Investment Imperatives and Free Cash Flow 
Theory of Transparency Versus Manipulations 
Theory of Contractual Constraints 
B) Considerations 
Consideration Of Transaction Cost 
Consideration of Differential Taxes 
Consideration of Diversification of Investment Portfolio 
Consideration of Operational and Structural Compulsions 
II- RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This research study has these three principal objectives: 
i) To study the trend in dividend payout in the various sectors of the 
engineering industry over a time period, 
ii) To analyze the influence of sector specific characteristics on dividend 
payment pattern, 
iii) a) To study the motivation of the Indian engineering industry for 
formulating their respective dividend policies. 
(b) To study the perception and attitude of the investing community 
regarding and towards the dividend policies & practices adopted by the 
management. 
3.4 METHODOLOGY 
Data and statistical tools identification : 
I. To fulfill these three objectives enumerated above the study relied both on 
primary and secondary data. Analysis, and interpretation of objectives (i) & (ii) 
were based on secondary data collected from CAPITALFNE & CMIE databases. 
Renowned economic and business journals like Capital Market, Dalai 
Street, Economic Times, ET 500, ICFAI'S, TOP 500 were consulted and top 500 
performing companies were identified. Out of these top 500 companies, only the 
engineering concerns in the following sectors and numbers were chosen. 
a) Automotives: 15 nos. 
b) Auto components / Ancillaries: 31 nos. 
42 
35 
10 
30 
10 
10 
nos. 
nos. 
nos. 
nos. 
nos. 
nos. 
c) Engineering Industry / Machine building: 
d) Chemical / Petro chemical /paints: 
e) Consumer Durables / White goods: 
f) Steel /Ferro alloys: 
g) Non ferrous metals / alloys: 
h) Electronic / Telecom / IT Hardware: 
TOTAL 183 nos. 
For the first objective, dividend payment history of these industries over a 
time horizon of 12 years (1994-2006) were collected from CMIE & 
CAPITALINE data bases and trend analysis has been done. The performing 
industries were categorized into different dividend payment slabs in the ascending 
order and presented in a tabular form with an accompanying bar chart. 
More over, linear and logarithmic time series regression has been done to 
evolve a theoretical pattern of the trend in dividend payments in different sectors 
over these 12 years. For each and every "time series regression", goodness of fit 
by conducting "chi square test" has been checked and its appropriateness of the 
linear or logarithmic fit has been established. 
For the second objective, correlation analysis and linear and non linear 
regression models have been developed involving seven identified factors and the 
dividend payout. Using extended Ms Excel Software under windows 2000 for 
each regression model the corresponding goodness of fit has been tested. Using 
"chi square" varlate, and for each correlation co-efficient, the significance has 
been tested using 't' statistic. 
The sector specific factors identified as having potential influence on 
dividend payout are summarized as follows: 
Internal wealth creation in terms of net worth. 
External wealth creation in terms of market capitalization. 
Fixed cost and depreciation in terms of book values of plant and 
machinery, 
iv. Determining internal control in terms of promoter's equity. 
V. Determining dominance and dictates of financial institutions in terms of 
institutional holdings, 
vi. Liquidity, internally, in terms of net cash inflow, 
vii. Liquidity externally, in terms of interest paid. 
Apart fi-om the computation of the correlation co-efficient with its 
significance, with respective regression equations, a multi variate regression 
equations involving five of the above seven factors as independent variables and 
the dividend payment as a single dependent variable has been developed and its 
goodness of fit established. 
The entire regression computation and their "chi square test" for each 
independent variable have been presented in tabular form. The line graphs for 
each regression equation including the multi variate one has been plotted. 
For the third objective, which is based on primary data collected from the 
corporate finance managers and the investors as respondents, statistical analysis in 
terms of tables and pie charts / bar charts have been done for those questions 
which pertains to the background of the respondents. 
The rest of the questions were considered for hypotheses testing. The 
hypotheses were designed to address the objective. 
II. TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF DATA COLLECTION 
Specific Information 
a) Instrument Development 
Two sets of questions were designed, one for the corporate finance 
decision makers and other one for the investors. 
b) Pilot Study 
Pilot studies were conducted to check the reliability, validity and 
consistency of the questionnaire in addressing the objectives. For the first 
questionnaire concerning corporate financial decision makers, twelve corporate 
executives and two academicians were respondents by personal approach in 
Bangalore. For the second questionnaire, fifteen equity investors and two 
academicians were respondents by personal approach in Bangalore. 
Reliability measurement was conducted in terms of 'Chronbach Alpha', 
and for further confidence in the validity and reliability of the instruments. Alpha 
value was computed after collecting the actual data. The two Alpha values, so 
evolved an almost identical. 
c) Sample Selection 
There are two sets of respondents one is Corporate Manager and the other 
is investors. For that purpose, the sample fiame is also two sets. 
I. Sample Frame: Economic Times (ET) 500 for corporate sectors equity 
investors who are the customers of investment bankers all over India. 
II. Sample Unit: Engineering industry comprising of eight sectors and 
individual investors of three categories i.e. salaried, professionals and 
businessmen. They are the sample elements also. 
III. Sampl ing Element: Corporate firm' s Managers/Executi ves. 
IV. Sample Size: 183 companies in engineering industry under ET 500 and 
1000 investors all over India. 
V. Types of Samples: Non-Probability (a) Judgmental for corporate 
respondents, multi-stage for investors. The stages are as follows: 
i. At the first stage a list of investment bankers was made 
which includes the following: 
1. Bajaj Capital 
2. Karvy Consultants 
3. Way to Wealth 
4. ICICI Director 
These investment bankers have got their client base all over India. 
ii. The client bases of the above listed investment bankers 
were consulted and only the equity investors were chosen 
as respondents, 
iii. Equity investors belong into either of the three categories 
i.e. (a) Salaried, (b) Professionals, and (c) Businessmen 
were chosen proportionally in numbers from all over India 
in the same proportion as in the client base. 
As has been explained in the previous sections secondary data have been 
collected from company specific literature, industry survey reports, financial press 
and CMIE & CAPITALINE DATA from the library of Indian Institute of 
Management, Bangalore; Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore: and other 
institutes in and around Bangalore. 
For primary data collection, a questionnaire for the Higher Level corporate 
finance executives was designed, locally administered to get responses to test 
reliability and consistency and then, after it was found reasonably reliable and 
consistent it was administered all over India. The questionnaire contains twenty-
eight close ended and one open ended question. For the close-ended question the 
respondents were given five alternatives i.e. 
Strongly agree: S/A Moderately Disagree: MD 
Moderately agree: M/A Strongly Disagree: SD 
Neither Agree nor Disagree: NA-ND 
The questionnaire was administered personally, through courier or post. 
Totally eighty three (83) questionnaires which came back were found suitable for 
analysis. Similarly, a questionnaire having twenty-five close-ended questions were 
designed and one thousand in numbers were administered to the investors all over 
India. These investors were accessed through the client base of renowned " 
Investment Bankers' whose offices are in Bangalore and other branch offices all 
over India. Out of one thousand circulated only 477 were found fit for analysis. 
PLAN OF ANALYSIS 
As for plan of analysis, as has been explained already, data are analysed by 
tables, pie charts/graphs, bar charts and myriad statistical tests, viz. 'Kolmogorov-
Smimov one sample test', 'Chi-Square test', 't' test for statistical inferences. 
Reliability and Validity of Questionnaire by 'Chronbach Alpha Test' 
A sincere attempt has been made to establish the reliability and validity of 
the two questionnaires by 'chronbach alpha test. 
As both the questionnaires have been designed in groups to address 
various hypotheses, the reliability and consistency also have been tested by 
dividing the questionnaire in homogeneous groups and the alpha value has been 
computed by using 'SPSS' software for each group. An average "alpha value" has 
been computed for each of the two individual questionnaires. 
Formation & Testing of Hypotheses 
For fulfillment of the third objectives which is based only on primary data 
collected from the finance managers and investors, totally sixteen hypotheses, 
nine for objective 3(a) and seven for objective 3(b) are formed as follows: 
Hypotheses Development 
HoA-1: Dividend policy is an active residual policy reflecting the competence 
and dexterity of the finance manager in managing profitability and liquidity 
together. 
HiA-1: Dividend policy is not an active residual policy and dose not reflect the 
competence and dexterity of the finance manager in managing profitability and 
liquidity together. 
HoA-2: For dividend, stability, continuity and growth are more important than the 
absolute value of the payout. 
HiA-2: For dividend, absolute value of the payout is more important than its 
stability, continuity and growth. 
HoA-3: The cost structure, capital structure and share holding pattern of a 
company significantly influence its corporate dividend policy. 
HiA-3: The cost structure, capital structure and share holding pattern of a 
company do not significantly influence its corporate dividend policy. 
HoA-4: Dividend decision of a company concerns only its equity share holders. 
HiA-4: Dividend decision of a company dose not concern only its equity share 
holders. 
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HoA-5: The quantum of dividend payout of a company significantly and 
positively influences the liquidity of its share in the market. 
HiA-5: The quantum of dividend payout of a company dose not influence the 
liquidity of its share in the market significantly. 
HoA-6: The quantum of dividend payout of a company significantly and 
positively influences its market capitalization. 
HjA-6: The quantum of dividend payout of a company dose not significantly and 
positively influence its market capitalization. 
HoA-7: The products made and the services rendered by a company significantly 
influence its dividend policy. 
HiA-7: The products made and the services rendered by a company do not 
significantly influence its dividend policy. 
HoA-8: Within the framework of engineering industry, sector specificity of a 
company significantly influences its dividend policy. 
H|A-8: Within the framework of engineering industry, sector specificity of a 
company dose not significantly influence its dividend policy. 
HoA-9: Market performance of a company's share in terms of risk and returned is 
more of a technical issue and hence dividend payout dose not significantly 
influence it. 
HiA-9: Market performance of a company's share in terms of risk and returned is 
more of a fundamental issue and hence dividend payout dose significantly 
influence it. 
Hypotheses for Objective 
HoB-1: A company's fundamentals rather than market technicalities and more 
influence the investors' decision significantly. 
H]B-1: Market technicalities and more rather than a company's fundamentals 
influence the investors' decision significantly. 
HoB-2: A company's constancy of dividend payout in terms of its EPS & DPS 
records influences investors' decisions significantly. 
HiB-2: A company's constancy of dividend payout in terms of its EPS & DPS 
records dose not influence investors' decisions significantly. 
HoB-3: A company having dividend payout, stable and consistently increasing 
over time is significantly favoured by investors inspite of the dividend being 
moderate. 
HiB-3: A company having dividend payout, stable and consistently increasing 
over time is not favoured by investors if the dividend payout is moderate. 
HoB-4: Investors significantly prefer high dividend payout to its consistency. 
HiB-4: Investors significantly prefer consistency to high dividend payout. 
HoB-5: Investors significantly disfavour a consistent but moderate dividend 
payout. 
HiB-5: Investors significantly favour a consistent albeit moderate dividend 
payout. 
HoB-6: Investors significantly disfavour dividend payout as the right yard stick 
for judging performance of a company in engineering industry while taking 
investment decisions. 
HiB-6: Investors significantly favour dividend payout as the right yard stick for 
judging performance of a company in engineering industry while taking 
investment decisions. 
HoB-7: For investing in engineering industry, investors significantly prefer other 
fimdamentals to dividend. 
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HiB-7: For investing in engineering industry, investors significantly prefer 
dividend to other fundamentals. 
From the coded and quantized primary responses, 'Kolmogorov-Smimov 
one sample test' and 'chi square test' have been conducted to test the validity of 
the respective 'null hypotheses'. 
For each null hypotheses respective suitable alternate hypotheses has been 
formulated before testing. 
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The study covers eight identified sectors of Indian engineering industry 
spread all over India for a time horizon of twelve years i.e. 1994-2006. As is 
evident the sample size of 183 companies is heavily dominated by pure 
engineering industries lie BHEL, L«feT etc. 
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study suffers from certain limitations, which can be summarized as 
follows: 
i) The study does not cover the companies, which did not pay dividends 
during the 12 year period under study, although, in terms of market 
capitalization and sales they are very much with in the top 500 
performing company's i.e. the study does not cover exploring the 
reasons for non payment, 
ii) The study, by design, covers only engineering industry. The norms, 
traditions, practices and compulsions are different in other industries, 
iii) The study covers 183 companies only in engineering industry out of 
500 top most performing in all areas of business put together. The 
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smaller size companies in engineering industries have not been 
covered, 
iv) Sector wise 8 sectors of the engineering industries have been covered 
because they fall within the top 500 performing companies. There are a 
few other sector which falls under the engineering industries, but none 
of the companies are within the top 500 in sales and market 
capitalization and hence have not been considered, 
v) Out of 183 respondent companies in the chosen category only 83 
corporate responses could be analysed because a good number of 
questionnaires sent were not returned and a good number was partially 
filled, 
vi) As far as the responses from the investors are concerned, although the 
coverage has been through out India, less than half i.e. 477 out of 1000 
questionnaires sent could only the analysed, because that number only 
came back within a reasonable time. 
III-CONCLUSIONS 
From the foregoing discussion on the summarized findings and keeping in 
view the objectives of the research study, we can arrive at and consolidate our 
conclusions as follows: 
Modigliani and Miller (M-M) hypothesis concerning dividend irrelevance 
is applicable to the Indian capital market as much as it is in its western counterpart 
and a company can be, otherwise, an excellent performer without paying dividend 
and hence dividend payment does not constitute an important dimension of 
excellence, and more so in engineering industry where there are myriad other 
dimensions to constitute yardsticks of excellence. 
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As far as dividend performance and trend in the engineering industry is 
concerned, post liberalization, dividend payment in engineering industry in India 
has been consistently growing fairly linearly with time albeit at a moderate pace. 
Notwithstanding, a few commonalities that can be evolved, every constituent 
sector of the engineering industry has its own reasons and peculiarities i.e. 
singularities for its dividend payment. Commonalities, whatsoever, that can be 
identified, do not seem to influence their dividend payment in a significant 
manner. 
As far as the perceptions, view points and outlook of the corporate 
managers are concerned they seem to be under the impression that higher dividend 
add higher value to the company in terms of trading volume, liquidity, share value 
and hence market capitalization, but market behaviour does not seem to subscribe 
to this view. In this sense investors' perceptions are more in tune with the market. 
Otherwise, there is not much of a discrepancy, between what the market 
data throw up and what the corporate managers think and feel. In other words, by 
and large, the corporate managers understanding and outlook towards dividends 
are in tune with the market. 
As far as dividend payments are concerned, managers in otherwise 
brilliantly performing companies are rendered passive functionaries comparatively 
and a new incumbent finance manager has to get accustomed with the dividend 
payment culture of his company and then try to innovate. 
Sound dividend decisions really demand agility, dexterity and ability to 
manage liquidity and profitability together as the compulsion of maintaining 
liquidity in the face of huge expansion / capital expenditure plans do affect 
dividend respectively as much as the abilities to sustain and grow. 
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When promoters stake is high in a closely held company, dividend payout 
seems to be limited disregarding the interest of the minority staice holders and it is 
also limited some times governed by statutory provisions and restrictive covenants 
of the financial institutions when they have a significant stake. 
As far as the investors' perceptions and preferences are concerned in a 
monopolistic competitive market in which the Indian engineering industry 
fiinctions, dividend decision is not a strategic weapon to beat the competition and 
dividend payment is not the right yard stick to judge the performance and 
dimensions of excellence for engineering industry. There are myriad more potent 
yard sticks like product differentiation, market leadership, product and services 
quality, reliability, brand equity, growth and diversification record, innovation, 
supportive culture, excellent human resources management etc. 
Investors also derive positive signals from consistency and growth rather 
than the absolute amount of dividends and they do track the company's EPS & 
DPS records along with the myriad other dimensions of excellence before putting 
their hard earned money into a company's equity. 
IV- SUGGSESTIONS 
As far as this section of this chapter is concerned, it is addressed to 
corporate finance managers and the investor community at large, to whomsoever, 
out of these, it may concern. 
Keeping in view the ultimate fact that the aim of corporate finance is to 
create value and hence, weahh for all the stake holders in the society e.g. the 
corporate with its employee base at any level, customers, investors and the 
regulators i.e. government, any misunderstanding in the stakes involved, on the 
part of the stake holders will only hamper the process of wealth and value 
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creation. Dividend decisions are no exception to this dictum. The following 
suggestions are humbly offered: 
i. Many of the companies in engineering industry in India are more than 
thirty years old and during this period, have built-up an established 
traditions and trend in dividend payments. So, it is suggested that any 
drastic change in dividend payment under exigencies of circumstances 
should be avoided. 
ii. Corporate manager should use dividend as a strategic weapon to win 
over the competitor only after all other strategic avenues are tested and 
exhausted. We have found in this research study that, in the almost 
perfect and highly developed Indian capital market, fundamental 
strengths like innovation, product differentiation, brand equity, product 
range expansion and diversification, excellent human relations 
management track record are far more impressive in creating value 
than dividend. So, value creation should be attempted in any of the 
areas where a company has core competence rather than dividend 
payment. 
iii. When the mobility of the company's share is suddenly sluggish due to 
unforeseen shifts in market mood, declaration of interim dividend may 
bring about a higher mobility. 
iv. Despite having high and some times out of tune profits, it is more 
advisable to declare a lower dividend only to maintain continuity in 
growth even when this out of tune profit disappears. 
V. To extract the maximum benefit of signaling effect the management 
should publicize fundamental strengths and highlight how the dividend 
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declared supplement and compliment rather than substitute the 
fundamental parameters. 
vi. For closely held companies the majority may have their way, but 
nevertheless the minority must have their say, hence their interest 
should not be over looked while declaring dividend. Hence, by 
adopting dividend policy minority share holders should be protected. 
vii. If a particular company's shares enjoy a higher price-earning ratio in 
the market, for a company under engineering industry perennially 
suffering from liquidity and cash flow problem, can, as well declare 
scrip dividends / bonus shares as a viable alternative rather than 
skipping dividend. 
viii. Finance managers in a particular sector of the engineering industry 
should identify the market leader in that segment and establish a 
benchmark dividend practice in keeping with that of the leader. 
ix. To give credence to the 'bird in the hand theory' despite there being a 
huge capital expenditure forthcoming, best efforts should be made to 
maintain dividend payments, however meager and thorough publicity 
should be given to the importance and necessity of the capital 
expenditure. 
X. Maintenance of liquidity and capital investment plans do affect 
dividend restrictively. As capital investment is needed for growth and 
liquidity is needed for day to day running a balance between the two 
should be maintained to continue dividend payment as far established 
tradition. 
xi. For dividend payout consistency is important rather than the absolute 
amount for signaling effect. For dividend payment, consistency should 
be given priority over absolute amount for signaling effect. 
V- SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
After objective analysis of the work done so far in the research project, 
there are many more areas related with dividend payment that can be undertaken. 
In the following few areas have been identified for further research. 
1. This study is engineering sector specific. There are a number of other 
sectors for which the study may be extended further namely, construction, 
refractory, and service sector. 
2. This study is mainly concerned with large engineering organizations. 
There is a further scope to study small and medium size companies. 
3. Non dividend paying companies have not been studied. A similar study 
can be conducted to probe into the motivation of the management as to 
why they do not declare dividend and also the attitude and perception of 
investors towards these categories of companies under engineering and 
other industries. 
4. The companies dividend and inter-relationship with the P-value of its share 
can be studied. A regression relation can be evolved between the p-value 
of the company's share in the market and its dividend payment. 
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PREFACE 
Corporate dividend decisions appear to be the most intriguing compared 
to the other two major financial decisions, i.e. financing and investment that a 
professional corporate manager has to take. Interestingly, out of these three, 
dividends seem to be the most innocent, simple and straight forward, in the sense 
that when a profit is made, the whole of it or a part of it is distributed among the 
shareholders. 
But, in actual practice, the ground realities are quite otherwise; and this 
decision is adjudged the most complicated and challenging financial decision in 
corporate parlance. The reason for this also, ironically, is not very far to seek. 
Financing decisions, involving design of capital and finance structures 
have a sense of certainty and stability, unless, of course, there is a drastic 
variability in interest rates and myriad other related variables, at least, for a few 
years. And, so, has the investment decision. 
Technology dictates the manufacturing process which, in turn, dictates the 
plant and machinery. Once they are acquired, the corporate entity is under a fixed 
cost and the accompanying depreciation structure which continues for several 
years. 
In contrast, dividends, borne out of profitability but paid out of liquidity, is 
a real challenge to the competence and dexterity of the finance manager mainly 
because, profitability and liquidity move opposite to each other. And, almost in 
each financial year, the scenario may change, calling for fi-esh decisions. 
Moreover, almost all the stakeholders in the corporate world view and 
interpret a dividend declaration differently depending upon their interest and stake 
involved in the concerned corporate entity. 
This research project attempts to unravel certain confounding issues 
pertaining to dividend decisions, albeit confining it to only the engineering 
industry. 
At the very outset, it appears that engineering industry, as a class by itself, 
should pose certain unique challenges to its corporate managers in the matters of 
dividend payments in the sense that it has, characteristically, high fixed cost, 
elaborate plant and machinery, longer operating, cash and working capital cycle, 
high debt to equity ratio, heavy term loans from financial institutions under 
stringent and sometimes highly restrictive covenants. 
This research study handles the problem from three angles, i.e. from the 
markets, depending upon historical data and statistics, from the corporate 
managers' perspective and view points, and thirdly, from the investors 
communities perspective and outlook. Obviously, the first angle of approach 
depends upon published data gathered from the financial press and the 
commercial databases and second and the third on the primary data collected 
through questiormaires, designed meticulously addressing the two classes of 
respondents, i.e. the corporate finance managers and the investors. 
The corresponding findings are no less confounding. As far as the capital 
market is concerned, it is found that, a good number of high performing and 
renowned companies in the engineering industry do not pay any dividend at all, 
and that fact has, in no way, affected their performance adversely. On the other 
hand, those who pay, range from meager to moderate to high dividends and 
growing steadily over the years reckoned from the aftermath of economic 
liberalization in 1994. 
By delving into the corporate managers' perspective, it is found that, 
dividends, can, at times, be used as strategic weapon to outsmart competitors and 
it, indeed, tests the competence and dexterity of the finance managers. According 
to them, interest payments and net cash inflow are the principal deterrents, but 
nevertheless, dividend payments do, indeed boost the value of the company in 
terms of higher liquidity, higher share value and higher market capitalization. 
Though, intriguingly, there is no concrete evidence in the market to support this 
view. 
The third approach, i.e. from the point of view of the investors, they prefer 
stability and continuity rather than going by sensation created by high dividend 
declaration and subsequently bringing in drastic variation in tune with the 
profitability and other such compelling circumstances. They do track the profit 
and the dividend payment records of the companies targeted for investment for 
sometimes. 
But, as far as the engineering industry is concerned, they have many 
reasons to favour or disfavour it other than dividends. These reasons can be 
anything like diversity and depth of product range, product/services qualities and 
features, brand equity, professionalism and transparency in management, human 
resources management records, etc. When compared with the corresponding 
market responses, it is found that, investors' perceptions are more in tune with the 
market rather than with those of the company bosses. 
This research work does more than just adequate justice to the topic in 
terms of usage of statistical tools and techniques in analyzing data and deriving 
inferences and conclusions. The reliability and consistency of the questionnaires 
have been tested by the "Cronbach Alpha" test and validated before being 
administered at large. The analysis is replete with the usage of techniques like 
correlation, regression- both linear and exponential, presentations like Pie-charts, 
Bar-charts, Graphs, Tables, etc. and inferential techniques like "Kolmogorov-
Smimov One Sample Test", 't', 'Z' and Chi-Square tests to test sixteen 
hypotheses in total. 
Asim Kumar Bandyopadhyay 
Flat No: A-401, Sangeeta Apartments, 
162/1, 5* Cross, Malleshwaram, 
Bangalore: 560 003. India. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Dividend in the normal use of word refers to that portion of the net 
earnings which is distributed by the company among its shareholders. The 
shareholders, as investors, are interested in maximizing their returns at a given 
level of risk or minimizing their risk at a given level of returns, and together wants 
to maximize returns with minimizing risk and thereby to maximize their wealth. 
This is the essence of desirability of dividends from the investor's point of view. 
On the other hand, a company needs to provide funds to finance its long-term 
growth. If a company pays out most of the profit it earns, then for business 
requirements and further expansions, it will have to depend upon outside sources 
such as issues of debts or new equity shares. So, dividends in a firm are paid 
according to the policies and decisions of the management regarding the retrained 
earning of the firm. 
Among all the corporate financial decisions few are as strategically 
important as dividend decisions. Corporate dividend policy plays an important 
role and affects the capital structure as well future dividends. From the micro 
concept, as long as there are investment projects with returns exceeding those that 
are required (in general, mostly. Weighted Average Cost of Capital) it will use 
retained earnings and the amount of senior serenities will support to finance these 
projects. If the firm has retained earnings left over after financing all acceptable 
investment opportunities these earnings then will be distributed to the 
shareholders in the form of cash dividends. If otherwise there won't be any 
dividends .The treatment of dividend policy as a passive residual determined 
solely by the availability of acceptable investment proposals implies that the 
dividends are immaterial and irrelevant; the investors are rather indifferent 
between dividends and retention by the firm. 
From the macro standpoint, dividend decisions iiave implications not only 
at the level of individual firms, but at the macro economic level as well. At the 
individual firm level, dividend is the first, if not the only indicator of the firm's 
performance. Indeed, the objective of modem joint Stock Company is to generate 
a steady stream of dividends to its shareholders. Higher and regular dividend 
payment are sure to enhance the market vale of the firm and the reputation of its 
management. 
On the other hand, such a policy may mean less availability of internal 
funds and more dependence on external sources for reinvestment and expansion 
purposes. Thus while determining dividend payments, a prudent management 
strikes a balance between shareholders preference and the firm's long-term 
interest, safeguarding the firms control. 
Again from the macro economic point of view, dividend policies of 
individual firms when combined together play a significant role in determining 
overall rates of saving and investment as well as patterns of flow of funds in the 
economy. Further, dividend policies also level other social economic implications. 
If shareholders are concentrated only in a few economic brackets, these changes in 
the dividend income will affect the overall income distribution as well as factor 
shares.. Exceptionally high dividend payments or abnormally low dividend 
payments under such conditions might lead to less efficient resource allocation in 
the economy as a result of changed consumption patterns. 
Recognizing the importance of dividend policies of corporations and their 
bearing on resource allocation and income distribution in the economy, this 
project attempts to explore the possible factors that determine the dividend 
behavior in the Indian corporate sector. 
BASIC THEORETICAL PREMISE 
Basically both theoretical and empirical researchers in dividends are 
struggling to answer this so called "dividend puzzle" expressed in the study 
carried out by Black (1976) asking questions like "why do corporates pay 
dividends?" and "why do investors pay attention to dividends?" this investigation 
is based on certain general and specific theoretical premises and considerations as 
summarized hereunder: 
A. Theories 
1) Dividend Irrelevance Theory 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) are of the view that the dividend policy of a 
company has no effect on the value of shares and value of the firm because its 
effects on the price of shares is offset exactly by other means of financing and is 
therefore irrelevant, of course in a world without market imperfections like taxes, 
transactions costs and asymmetric information. 
However, since the capital market is neither perfect nor complete, this 
dividend irrelevance proposition needs to be researched vigorously, especially 
focusing on the effects of taxes, information contents, agency cost and 
institutional constraints. 
Inertia Theory 
According to Lintner (1956) corporate managements generally believe that 
most stock holders prefer a reasonably stable rate of dividend and that markets put 
a premium on stability and gradual growth in rate. The principal device used to 
achieve this stable pattern was a practice or policy of changing dividends in any 
given period by only a part of the amount, which were indicated by changes in 
current financial figures. Further partial adjustments in dividend rates were made 
in subsequent years if still warranted. This policy of progressive, continuing 
partial adoption tends to stabilize dividend distribution, there by minimizing 
adverse stockholders reaction together with avoiding uncertainty regarding future 
developments. 
The *Bird In Hand' Theory 
Bhattacharya (1979) in his theory holds that the dividends i.e., bird in hand 
is preferred to retained earnings i.e., a bird in the bush, because the later might 
never materialize as future dividends and, as such, it may fly away. 
This 'bird in hand' theory also argues that the expected stream of future 
dividends will be discounted at a lower rate than the expected capital gains, and 
this proposition led to the Gordon's model of dividends valuation. 'Bird in hand '. 
theory, in essence conveys that dividends are certain and capital gains are 
uncertain, risk averse investors will therefore prefer dividends and this preference 
adds value to the firm. 
The Market Value Maximization Theory 
According to Fama and Babjak (1968); Fisher and Jensen; Richard Rok (1969) 
and French (2000) modem finance theory is built on the belief that firms should 
be managed to create the maximum value i.e., some of the values and Equity and 
Debt. In theory value maximization is appealing because it is associated with 
efficient allocation of resource, provided of course that the capital market operates 
efficiently enough That is, it rewards the most those firms, which channel their 
resources to their best uses. 
Theory Of Signaling Or Information Content Effect 
Ramasastry, Kose and Joseph Williams (1987); Benartizi, Michaely and 
Thaler (1997) and Sant & Cowan (1994) in the end of 1980s analyzed the issue of 
signaling effect of dividends in stock price. Some theorists and analyst realized 
and showed empirically that the price of a firm's stock would generally rise when 
its current dividend was unexpectedly increased and conversely that the price 
would fall when its current dividends are cut. Based on these facts, firms would 
only raise their dividends when future earnings are expected to rise enough, 
otherwise they have to be reduced to the original level. Thus a dividend increase 
signals to the market that the firm is expected to do well. 
Theory of Information Asymmetry 
Asquith, Paul and Mullins (1983); Healey, and Palepu (1988) propounded 
that managers often have greater information about the value of their companies 
than investors because they spend much of their time analyzing the firm's 
products, markets, strategies and investment opportunities. After all they have 
more timely information about current operating performance and better access to 
the firm's specific information useful to forecasting earnings. 
If a company announces a change in dividends, investors will draw some 
inference fi-om this announcement about the profitability of the firm's investment 
opportunities and adjust the stock prices accordingly, because managers only raise 
there dividend when fiiture earnings are expected to rise, dividend increase 
indicates good information about the firm. Therefore, dividend serves as a signal 
to investors regarding the firm's current and future performance. 
Agency Cost Theory 
Jensen, Michael and Meckling (1976); and John & William (1985) theorized 
agency cost models which begins with the agency problem emphasized by Jensen 
Meckling (1976). This theory has roots in manager's prerogative to information. 
Dividend payments yield a non-monetary benefit by reducing agency cost. One 
important agency problem is that managers are better informed about the firm's 
prospects than share holders. As a result of this information imbalance, managers 
may divert corporate assets for their perquisite consumption or other benefits or 
over invest to build empires. 
As emphasized by Easterbrook (1984), dividends provides the definite 
benefits of taking cash out of the hands of managers and are thus a potentially 
powerful tool for agency problems. For a given level of investment, dividends 
force firm's to obtain funds from financial intermediaries or capital market where 
monitoring is arguably more effective. The agency cost theory of dividends is 
based on an informational hierarchy rising from stockholders to commercial 
banks, investment banks, and other external financiers to the firm. 
Management Agency Objective Theory 
Deangelo, Deangelo and Skinner (1992); Barclay, Michael, Smith and 
Watts (1995) propounded that the inter play of managerial and shareholders 
perceptions and motivation in distributing dividends when taken into 
consideration by Sarma (1990). The sole motive of an entrepreneurial activity is 
maximization of rate of return gross of taxes. But with the increasing dominance 
of the joint stock corporations and the associated characteristics of separation of 
ownership and control, it is now fairly recognized that there exist other equally 
important motives such as sales maximization and expansion of business and there 
by increasing the market value of the firm. 
The latter's objectives are also in line with the managing agency system of 
operation identified as a characteristic feature of Indian companies. The separation 
of ownership and control also means that the objectives and performances of the 
firm's management need not coincide with those of its shareholders. From the 
shareholders point of view, their performances depends mainly on their income 
level and their degree of understanding of corporate stock dealing and associate 
tax implications. 
Theory of Behavioural Finance 
Kalay (1992) developed a model based on behavioural theory professing 
that investors want dividends because of self-control i.e, to restrict themselves 
from consuming too much in the present. 
So to say, investors don't want to dip into the capital and therefore only 
allow them to consume current income such as dividends. This tendency is 
especially strong among elderly or retired investors having less or no income from 
profession. It is a mater of behavioural life cycle and they rely heavily on their 
income from securities holdings. 
Theory of Investment Imperatives and Free Cash Flow 
Rozeff (1994); Reddy, Subba (2002) and Gugler (2003) professed free cash 
flow theory stating that free cash is that flow which remains after all positive NPV 
projects are undertaken. Increasing dividends by a firm with this over investment 
problem will reduce the cash that would otherwise be wanted in negative NPV 
projects. 
8 
Similarly reducing dividends by such firms will be considered as increasing 
the probability that more negative NPV projects are under taken. Market considers 
increasing dividends as value adding while decreasing dividends as reducing value 
of the firm 
Theory of Transparency Versus Manipulations 
Brealey (1994); Dewenter, Kathryn and Warther, Vincent (1998) and 
Fluck, Zsuzsanna (1998) propounded that an important reason for companies to 
pay dividends may be that companies that pay healthy dividends are relatively 
honest and transparent and less subject to accounting manipulations. Healthy 
dividend payments do indicate that companies are generating real earnings rather 
than cooking up the books. 
Theory of Contractual Constraints 
Raghuram and Zingales (1995); Zingales (1995); JaflFrey6 1986) and Kunt, 
Asii 8c Maksimovic (1998) professed that when a company obtained loans funds 
from debenture holders or term lending institution this terms of issue or contract 
of loan may contain restrictions on dividend payments designed to ensure that the 
firm will have enough funds to meet its obligations to the loan providers. 
B) Considerations 
Consideration Of Transaction Cost 
Kevin (1992); Mahapatra, Sahu (1993), Allen & Michaely (1997) and 
Mohanty (1999) advanced a rational argument in favour of dividend in terms of 
transaction costs. An investor who wants to receive a regular income from his 
security holding has a choice between buying dividend-paying stocks and cashing 
in the dividends and buying non-dividend paying stocks and regularly selling a 
part of his portfolio. 
For a small individual investor, the transaction cost of cashing in the 
dividends may be significantly smaller than thee transaction cost associated in 
selling a part of the stocks. 
Consideration of Differential Taxes 
Poterba & Summers (1984); John & Willams (1985) and Narasimhan & 
Asha (1997) professed that in some capitalist countries including U.S dividends 
are taxed higher than capital gains and thereby encouraging capital gain rather 
than dividends. On the other hand, tax system in India till recently was favourable 
for dividends vis-a-vis capital gains. So in countries where tax system favours 
dividends than capital gain, the investor prefers to get dividends rather than capital 
gains. 
Consideration of Diversification of Investment Portfolio 
Mervyn (1977); Mohanty (1999) and Pandey (2002) propounded that 
investors may have a desire to diversify their investment portfolios. As such, they 
would like the firm to distribute earnings that they may be able to invest in other 
firms. So the value of the firm will be higher if it pays dividends rather than 
retains it. 
Consideration of Operational and Structural Compulsions 
Aharony, Josepy & Swary (1980); Paul & Mullins (1983) and Brennan, 
Michael & Thakor (1990) propounded the concept of dividend policy in terms of 
investor's preference, taste and perception, market value maximization, macro-
economic implication, signaling of financial health, surplus generation, 
transparency, etc,. All these factors are by and large, outside the firm. 
Nevertheless, there are, of course, certain inside-the-firm operational and 
structural compulsions that dictate continuity of dividend payments or 
alternatively earning retentions, the outside implications notwithstanding. 
Understandably these factors are sector, industry and firm specific, albeit some 
kind of generalization can be attempted. 
One school of thought suggests that current dividends are primarily 
determined by past dividends and also by current earnings. This model identifies 
fifteen variables like firm size, capital and recurring cost for plant and equipments, 
external financing, stock dividend, earning stability and ownership by control 
groups. Primarily the issue is whether there should be a change in dividend 
payments at all, and if there should be how large the change should be. 
Moreover, dividend is determined by net profit after tax, amortization 
recoveries, sales changes, liquidity index and past profits, shift in anticipation of 
ftiture earnings and will inversely relate to 'persistent changes ' in the volume of 
sales. 
For manufacturing industries, apart from cash flow net of taxes and past 
years dividend as common factors, we have to contend with depreciation, 
investment demand, individual taxes, interest rates, sales changes and corporate 
liquidity as the main factors effecting dividend. 
Even during the time of financial distress, corporations with good track 
records of dividend payment tend to cut dividends rather than omitting dividends 
in order not to alter the image of the corporation. Consequently, due to sticky 
dividend policy, any change in the dividend policies is interpreted as a change in 
the management's expectations of futures earnings. 
Pertinent to mention here that, a study based on aggregate time series 
analysis on RBI data covering the periods 55-56 and 65-66 and four major 
industrial groups i.e., agriculture and allied activities, mining and quarrying, 
processing and manufacturing of metals and chemicals and their products as well 
as to selected industries in the public limited sector finds that variables 
determining dividends are: 
i. With profits net of taxes and lagged dividends as explanatory 
variables. 
ii. With net cash flow substituting net profits. 
iii. With depreciation entered as a separate explanatory variables rather 
than as part of capacity variables. 
Cash flow is found to be a more appropriate approximation of the capacity 
variables for industries such as cotton textiles, iron and steel, paper, electricity 
generation and supply, where as depreciation has a separate effect in the case of 
Jute textiles and engineering industries. 
One more study conducted in 1985, covered 68 companies - 12 each in 
chemicals and electrical goods, 14 in general engineering and 15 each in sugar and 
cotton textiles. Majority of companies considered the dividend decisions to be 
primary and active, decision variable in their financial policymaking. 
The study also revealed that only half of the companies under examination 
were able to follow a stable dividend policy. The dividend decision of most 
companies was mainly governed by net current earnings after tax and 'lagged 
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dividend'. Curiously enough, the study pointed out that none of the companies 
were following the policy of paying a fixed percentage of net current earnings 
after tax as dividend to shareholders. 
The present study is specifically concerned with the dividend practices 
trend and the rationale in the engineering sector in particular. From the foregoing 
discussions pertaining to manufacturing industries in general, we can crystallize 
the compulsions of engineering industries in particular. 
Engineering industries are characterized by high-fixed cost structure and 
high break -even level of operation, lower operating leverage, high depreciation, 
longer operating cycle, longer cash cycle, lower receivable turnover and high 
capital gearings. In this light, the study will concentrate on the dividend decisions 
in engineering sector. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
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2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Dividend pay-out decision has always been a subject of interest to 
financial analysts, academicians and researchers for about five decades now. The 
researchers are interested in studying the extent to which the earning of a 
company are distributed as dividend among the shareholders as also the retained 
earnings. 
Researches have typically used data on variables such as, dividend pay-out 
ratio and dividend yields to investigate theories of earnings pay-out. At least, in 
some cases, it may be more appropriate to look at earnings retention, rather than 
more common dividend variables. 
Following the publication of Modigliani and Miller's two seminal papers 
on dividend policy, there has been a considerable amount of researches into what 
determines dividend policy. These theories may be better investigated by looking 
at the firm's retention polices rather than dividend polices. This is particularly 
true, specifically for engineering industries, where there is no dearth of positive 
NPV projects crying for attention and adequate funding. 
The stable and sustainable national and sectoral growth crucially hinges on 
economic unit's own saving. From the point of view of risk and cost, their own 
savings are the best source of finance for the companies. There are no transaction 
and bankruptcy costs associated with the retained profits of companies. Internal 
finance has an advantage of easy availability and it effectively represents infusion 
of additional equity capital. The use of retained earnings, in contrast to external 
equity eliminates issue costs and loses on account of under pricing. Thus a 
corporate retained earnings are a very important source of finance for the firms. 
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The retention ratio of joint stock companies in India, particularly that of 
public limited companies has been relatively low in many years. In contrast with 
the theoretical expectation and unlike in many other countries the reserves and 
surpluses (internal resource) have not been having the first rank in the "pecking 
order" of choice of financing by the Indian companies. Therefore, a study of 
factors, which influence the decision of companies to retain part of their net 
earnings can throw light on this issue. 
2.2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
Information Asymmetry 
Dividend payout has been an issue of interest in the financial literature. 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that information asymmetry between an 
'insider' and 'outsider' may lead to agency cost. One of the mechanisms, they 
suggest to reduce 'outsiders' expropriation is to reduce free cash flows available 
to managers through high payouts by the firm. Dividends are referred as reward 
for providing finances to a firm in the literature, as without any dividend payout, 
shares would not have any value. Dividend payout policy has been the primary 
puzzle in the economics of corporate finance since the work of Black (1976). The 
dividend literature has primarily relied on two lines of hypothesis: signaling and 
agency cost. 
The cash flow hypothesis asserts that insiders have more information about 
firms' future cash flow than do outsiders, and they have incentive to signal that 
information to outsiders. Dividends can be an ideal device for limiting rent 
extraction of minority shareholders. Large shareholders, by granting dividends, 
may signal their unwillingness to exploit them. Dividend payout, however 
guarantee, equal payout for both insider and outsider equity holders. Corporate 
governance in India differs dramatically from the dominant form of corporate 
governance in US, UK or other developed economies. Even within India, 
corporate governance is not homogenous: some firms operate within industrial 
groups while others are independent. Group firms differ in depth and breadths of 
inter firm relationship than stand alone ones. Ownership structure in India differs 
from most of Anglo-Saxon countries like the US and UK. In India, large 
shareholders (especially directors and corporate) have ample incentives and 
ability to control. Empirical research on corporate governance and dividend 
payout policy has mostly concentrated using data from United States. In USA, 
regulated and dispersed shareholding leave salient agency problem between 
managers and shareholders. In emerging markets, widely held corporations are in 
the minority and mostly held in few hands (block shareholders). 
Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) and Gugler (2003) investigated the 
relationship between dividends, ownership structures and control rights for 
German and Austrian firms, respectively. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) find large 
shareholding of the largest owner reduces the dividends payout ratio, while 
shareholding by the second larger owner increases it. Gugler (2003) documents 
the evidence that state controlled firms engage in dividend smoothing, while 
family controlled firms do not. The behavior of the bank and foreign controlled 
firm lies in between state controlled and family controlled firms, consistent with 
the expected "ranking" of information asymmetries and managerial agency cost 
hypothesis. 
The literature on signaling hypothesis builds upon the pioneering work of 
the Bhattacharya (1979), who derived the existence conditions for a non-
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dissipative signaling model and show that dividends are signals for future cash 
flows, under the assumption that outside investors have imperfect information 
about the firm's profitability and the cash dividends are taxed at a higher rate than 
capital gains. Miller and Rock (1985) extend the standard finance model of the 
firms dividend by allowing the firms manager 'insider' to know more about the 
firm's financial health than 'outside' investors. They show that a consistent 
signaling equilibrium exists under asymmetric information. Healy and Palepu 
(1988) examine whether dividend policy changes convey information about the 
future earnings substantiated by cash. They find that investors interpret 
announcements of dividend initiations and omissions as manager's forecast of 
future earning changes. Brennan and Thakor (1990) develop a theory of choice for 
distribution of cash from firm to shareholders. They show that a majority of a 
firm's shareholders may support a dividend payment for small distribution, 
despite the preferential tax treatment of capital gains for individual investors. 
For larger distributions as open market stock re-purchase, and for the 
largest distributions tender offer re-purchases is likely to be preferred by a 
majority of shareholders. 
In case of India, Kevin (1992) shows that dividend stability is a primary 
determinant of payout while profitability is only of secondary importance. 
Roy and Mahajan (2003), provide regulatory oversight on dividends 
payout and suggests that regulation of dividend payout should address the inherent 
conflict of interest between shareholders and lenders to address the issue of 
information asymmetry between the insiders and the outsiders. 
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The empirical evidence concerning the possible association of owners and 
payout policy is extremely limited, nearly none in case of emerging economies. 
Most of the studies have tried to explain these phenomena of dividends and 
institutional shareholders in developed countries. 
In a recent study Short, Keasey, and Duxbury (2002) examine the link 
between dividend policy and institutional ownership for UK firms. They find a 
positive association between dividends and institutional shareholders and negative 
association with managerial ownership. In emerging markets like India, Korea, 
Taiwan, China etc., the institutional setup is quite different than those of the 
developed countries. Aivazian, Booth, and Cleary (2003) finds that emerging 
market firms exhibit dividend behavior similar to those of US. However, the 
authors do not consider the corporate governance issues. Manos (2003), using data 
from India, estimates the cost minimization model of dividends and finds that 
government ownership, insider ownership, risk, debt, and growth opportunities, 
have a negative impact on the payout ratio, whereas institutional ownership, 
foreign ownership and dispersed ownership have a positive impact on the payout 
ratio. However, his analysis is based on cross-sectional data. 
Large shareholders, like other emerging markets, characterize Indian 
corporate firms ownership structure. Majority control gives the largest shareholder 
incentive and control over key decisions, like dividend payout. The dominance of 
large shareholders may affect the dividend payout in several ways. There have 
been changes in the taxation policy for dividend during the sample period, which 
gives us an opportunity to test the tax-preference theory and its implications for 
the dividend payout in case of an emerging economy, India. 
19 
The Indian Corporate Sector has large number of corporate firms, lending 
it to large sample statistical properties. It is large by emerging market standards 
and the contribution of the industrial and manufacturing sectors (value added) is 
close to that of in several advanced economies. Unlike several other emerging 
markets, firms in India, typically maintain their shareholding pattern (dominant 
group) over the period of study, making it possible to identify the ownership 
affiliation of each sample firm with clarity. It is by and large a hybrid of the 
"outsider systems" and the "insider systems" of corporate governance. The legal 
framework for all corf)orate activities including governance and administration of 
companies, disclosures, share-holders rights, dividend announcements has been in 
place since the enactment of the Companies Act in 1956 and has been fairly 
stable. The listing agreements of stock exchanges have also been prescribing on-
going conditions and continuous obligations for companies. 
India has a well-established regulatory framework for more than four 
decades, which forms the foundation of the corporate governance system in India. 
Numerous initiatives have been taken by Stock Exchange Board of India (SEBI) 
to enhance corporate governance practice, in fijlfillment of the twin objectives: 
investor protection and market development, for example: streamlining of the 
disclosure, investor protection guidelines, book building, entry norms, listing 
agreement, preferential allotment disclosures and lot more. 
Economists have proposed a number of explanations of the dividend 
puzzle. Of these, particularly popular is the idea that firms can signal future 
profitability by paying dividends (Bhattacharya (1979), John and Williams (1985), 
Miller and Rock (1985), Ambarish, John, and Williams (1987)). Empirically, this 
theory had considerable initial success, since firms that initiate (or raise) dividends 
20 
experience share price increases, and the converse is true for firms that eliminate 
(or cut) dividends (Aharony and Swary (1980), Asquith and Muilins (1983)). 
Recent results are more mixed, since current dividend changes do not help predict 
firms' future earnings growth (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996) and 
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997)). Another idea, which has received only 
limited attention until recently (e.g., Easterbrook (1984), Jensen (1986), Fluck 
(1998a, 1998b), Myers (1998), Gomes (1998), Zwiebel (1996)), is that dividend 
policies address agency problems between corporate insiders and outside 
shareholders. According to these theories, unless profits are paid out to 
shareholders, they may be diverted by the insiders for personal use or committed 
to unprofitable projects that provide private benefits for the insiders. As a 
consequence, outside shareholders have a preference for dividends over retained 
earnings. Theories differ on how outside shareholders actually get firms to 
disgorge cash. The key point, however, is that failure to disgorge cash leads to its 
diversion or waste, which is detrimental to outside shareholders' interest. The 
agency approach moves away from the assumptions of the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem by recognizing two points. First, the investment policy of the firm cannot 
be taken as independent of its dividend policy, and, in particular, paying out 
dividends may reduce the inefficiency of marginal investments. Second, and more 
subtly, the allocation of all the profits of the firm to shareholders on a pro-rata 
basis cannot be taken for granted, and in particular the insiders may get 
preferential treatment through asset diversion, transfer prices and theft, even 
holding the investment policy constant. In so far as dividends are paid on a pro-
rata basis, they benefit outside shareholders relative to the alternative of 
expropriation of retained earnings. 
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The presence of information asymmetry may also mean that managers 
need to signal their ability to generate higher earnings in future with the help of 
high dividend payouts (Bhattacharya, 1979, John and Williams 1985, and Miller 
and Rock, 1985). However, the credibility of signals depends on the cost of 
signaling - the cost being loss of financial flexibility. High payout results in 
reduction of free cash flow when in fact the firm needs more funds to pursue high 
growth opportunities. 
Following Fama and French (2001), several attempts have been made to 
analyze the impact of profitability, size and growth on the dividend payout of 
firms. 
Similarly, following Healy and Palepu (1988) an attempt has also been 
made to analyze the signaling hypothesis, i.e. earnings information conveyed by 
dividend initiations and omissions. Since, initiations and omissions construe 
extreme dividend events, changes in dividends i.e., increases and decreases and 
the information that they convey is also examined following DeAngelo, DeAngelo 
and Skinner (1992). 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1992) analyse the relationship between 
dividends and losses and the information conveyed by dividend changes about the 
earnings performance. They examine the dividend behaviour of 167 NYSE firms 
with at least one annual loss during 1980-95 and those of 440 firms with no losses 
during the same period, where all the firms had a consistent track record often or 
more years of positive earnings and dividends. They find that 50.9% of 167 firms 
with at least one loss during 1980-95 reduced dividends, compared to 1% of 440 
firms without losses. Their findings support signaling hypothesis in that dividend 
changes improve the ability to predict future earnings performance. 
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Glen et al. (1995) study the dividend policy of firms in emerging markets. 
They find that firms in these markets have a target dividend payout rate, but less 
concerned with volatility in dividends over time. They also find that shareholders 
and governments exert a great deal of influence on dividend policy and observe 
that dividends have little signaling content in these markets. 
Benartzi, Michaely, Thaler (1997) analyzes the issue of whether dividend 
changes signal the fiiture or the past. For a sample of 7186 dividend 
announcements made by NYSE or AMEX firms during the period 1979-91, they 
find a lagged and contemporaneous relation between dividend changes and 
earnings. Their analysis also shows that in the two years following dividend 
increases, earnings changes are unrelated to the sign and magnitude of dividend 
changes. 
The notion that financial decisions convey information about the firm 
value was proposed by Leiand and Pyle (1977) and Bhattacharya (1979) in 
adaptations of the Spence (1973) signaling model. Which has extended Akerlof s 
seminal work (Akerlof, G. 1970) to Job Market? Though from the accounting 
point of view there are some differences between stock split and bonus issue, the 
economic impact is the same. 
Agency Cost 
Substantial literature in the field of corporate finance (Linter (1956), 
Lintner (1962), Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985)), suggests that 
corporate dividend policy is designed to reveal earnings prospects of a firm to 
their investors. Recent empirical evidence in favor of this model are mixed. Fama 
and Babiak (1968) argues that the firms, a priori, set their target dividend level 
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and try to stick to it. In addition to the signaling approach, there may be 
interrelation between dividend payout policy and agency cost (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Easterbrook (1984)). Dividend payout policy is an outcome the 
conflict between the insiders and the outsiders (issues related with corporate 
governance and ownership structure). 1 Jensen and Meckling (1976), RozefF 
(1982), and Easterbrook (1984) presents agency cost explanations for changes in 
dividend payout, while analyzing whether dividends can act as a method to align 
manager's interests with those of investors. They argue that firm pays dividend in 
order to reduce agency costs as payment of dividends reduce the discretionary 
funds available to managers. Jensen (1986) documents that in presence of free 
cash flows, the firms pay dividends or retire their debts to reduce the agency cost 
of free cash flow. Kalay (1982) investigate a large sample of bond indentures 
focusing on conflict between shareholders and bond holders on the dividend 
decision. The paper finds that the stockholders do not pay themselves as much 
dividends as they are allowed to. Jensen, Solberg, and Zom (1992) examine the 
determinant of cross-sectional differences in insider ownership, debt, and dividend 
policy. The authors' find that firms with higher insider ownership chooses lower 
level of debt and dividends. Han, Lee, and Suk (1999) test the agency cost based 
hypothesis, which predicts, dividend payout to be inversely related to the degree 
of institutional ownership and the tax based hypothesis, predicting the dividends 
to be positively related with the institutional ownership. They provide support for 
the tax-based hypothesis, suggesting a "dividend clientele" for institution's 
preference for higher dividends. 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shieifer, and Vishny (2000) argue that the 
dividends play a basic role in limiting insider expropriation because they remove 
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the corporate wealth from insider control. They find that corporations in countries 
with strong legal protection of minority shareholders pay higher dividends. 
Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) relate dividends rates to the discrepancy that 
exists between the shareholder's ownership rights (O) and its control rights (C) as 
Claessens, Simeon, Fan, and Larry (1999) used. The 0/C ratio is used as a 
measure of the corporation's vulnerability to insider expropriation within a group 
of corporations. They find that significantly the corporations that are tightly 
affiliated pay higher dividends to a business group. By contrast, for corporations 
not tightly affiliated to a group is associated with significantly lower dividend 
rates. They provide evidence on the expropriation that takes place within business 
groups and on the differences in expropriation between Europe and Asia. 
Fenn and Liang (2001) analyze how corporate payout policy is affected by 
managerial stock incentives. They find that managerial stock incentives mitigate 
the agency costs for firms with excess cash flow problems. They also find a strong 
negative relationship between dividends and management stock options. 
Although the Indian Corporate Sector is a mix of government and private 
firms (which are again a mix of firms owned by business group families, and 
multi nationals and stand alone firms), it has not suffered fi-om the cronyism that 
has dominated some of the developing economies. An empirical examination of 
the relationship between the ownership structure, corporate governance and 
dividend payout using a large panel of Indian corporate firms over 1994-2000, has 
been conducted by Narasimhan, M.S. and S.Vijayalakshmi (2002). It is the first 
attempt to use the well-established dividend payout models to examine the impact 
of ownership structures on dividend payout policies in context of an emerging 
market. 
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It has been found that ownership is one of the important variables that 
influence the dividend payout policy. However, the relationship is different for 
different class of owners and at different levels. This suggests that the ownership 
structure does not influence dividend pay out policy of the firm uniformly. The 
results support the hypothesis that the interest alignment between different classes 
of owners influences the dividend payout policy. 
Further research may extend the present use of dividend payout models to 
examine the influence of ownership identity in case of other emerging economies. 
Examining the influence of board structure on dividend payout policy would be an 
interesting exercise, however, this is left for future research. 
The so-called dividend puzzle (Black 1976) has preoccupied the attention 
of financial economists at least since Modigliani and Miller's (1958, 1961) 
seminal work. This work established that, in a frictionless world, when the 
investment policy of a firm is held constant, its dividend payout policy has no 
consequences for shareholder wealth. Higher dividend payouts lead to lower 
retained earnings and capital gains, and vice versa, leaving total wealth of the 
shareholders unchanged. Contrary to this prediction, however, corporations follow 
extremely deliberate dividend payout strategies (Lintner (1956)). This evidence 
raises a puzzle: how do firms choose their dividend policies? In the United States 
and other countries, the puzzle is even deeper since many shareholders are taxed 
more heavily on their dividend receipts than on capital gains. The actual 
magnitude of this tax burden is debated (see Poterba and Summers (1985) and 
Allen and Michaely (1997)), but taxes generally make it even harder to explain 
dividend policies of firms. 
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It has been found by many researchers that dividend policies vary across 
legal regimes in ways consistent with a particular version of the agency theory of 
dividends. Specifically, firms in common law countries, where investor protection 
is typically better, make higher dividend payouts than firms in civil law countries 
do. Moreover, in common but not civil law countries, high growth firms make 
lower dividend payouts than low growth firms. These results support the version 
of the agency theory in which investors in good legal protection countries use 
their legal powers to extract dividends from firms, especially when reinvestment 
opportunities are poor. 
Conflicts of interest between corporate insiders, such as managers and 
controlling shareholders, on the one hand, and outside investors, such as minority 
shareholders, on the other hand, are central to the analysis of the modern 
corporation (Berle and Means (1932), Jensen and Meckling (1976)). The insiders 
who control corporate assets can use these assets for a range of purposes that are 
detrimental to the interests of the outside investors. Most simply, they can divert 
corporate assets to themselves, through outright theft, dilution of outside investors 
through share issues to the insiders, excessive salaries, asset sales to themselves or 
other corporations they control at favorable prices, or transfer pricing with other 
entities they control (see Shleifer and Vishny (1997) for a discussion). 
Alternatively, insiders can use corporate assets to pursue investment strategies that 
yield them personal benefits of control, such as growth or diversification, without 
benefitting outside investors (e.g., Baumol (1959), Jensen (1986)). 
What is meant by insiders varies from country to country. In the United 
States, U.K., Canada, and Australia, where ownership in large corporations is 
relatively dispersed, most large corporations are to a significant extent controlled 
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by their managers. In most other countries, large firms typically have shareholders 
that own a significant fraction of equity, such as the founding families (La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shieifer (1999)). The controlling shareholders can 
effectively determine the decisions of the managers (indeed, managers typically 
come from the controlling family), and hence the problem of managerial control 
per se is not as severe as it is in the rich common law countries. On the other hand, 
the controlling shareholders can implement policies that benefit themselves at the 
expense of minority shareholders. Regardless of the identity of the insiders, the 
victims of insider control are minority shareholders. It is these minority 
shareholders that would typically have a taste for dividends. 
One of the principal remedies to agency problems is the law. Corporate 
and other law gives outside investors, including shareholders, certain powers to 
protect their investment against expropriation by insiders. These powers in the 
case of shareholders range from the right to receive the same per share dividends 
as the insiders, to the right to vote on important corporate matters, including the 
election of directors, to the right to sue the company for damages. The very fact 
that this legal protection exists probably explains why becoming a minority 
shareholder is a viable investment strategy, as opposed to just being an outright 
giveaway of money to strangers who are under few if any obligations to give it 
back. 
As pointed out by La Porta et al. (1998), the extent of legal protection of 
outside investors differs enormously across countries. Legal protection consists of 
both the content of the laws and the quality of their enforcement. Some countries, 
including most notably the wealthy common law countries such as the U.S. and 
the U.K., provide effective protection of minority shareholders so that the outright 
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expropriation of corporate assets by the insiders is rare. Agency problems 
manifest themselves primarily through non-value-maximizing investment choices. 
In many other countries, the condition of outside investors is a good deal more 
precarious, but even there some protection does exist. La Porta et al. (1998) show 
in particular that common law countries appear to have the best legal protection of 
minority shareholders, whereas civil law countries, and most conspicuously the 
French civil law countries, have the weakest protection. 
The quality of investor protection, viewed as a proxy for lower agency 
costs, has been shown to matter for a number of important issues in corporate 
finance. For example, corporate ownership is more concentrated in countries with 
inferior shareholder protection (La Porta et al.(l998), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
and Shleifer (1999)). The valuation and breadth of capital markets is greater in 
countries with better investor protection (La Porta et al. (1997), Demirguc- Kunt 
and Maksimovic (1998)). Finally, there is some evidence that good investor 
protection contributes to the efficiency of resource allocation and to economic 
growth more generally (Levine and Zervos (1998), Rajan and Zingales (1998)). 
This paper continues this research by examining the dividend puzzle using 
shareholder protection as a proxy for agency problems. 
In a world of significant agency problems between corporate insiders and 
outsiders, dividends can play a useful role. By paying dividends, insiders return 
corporate earnings to investors and hence are no longer capable of using these 
earnings to benefit themselves. Dividends (a bird in hand) are better than retained 
earnings (a bird in the bush) because the latter might never materialize as future 
dividends (can fly away). In addition, the payment of dividends exposes 
companies to the possible need to come to the capital markets in the future to raise 
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external funds, and hence gives outside investors an opportunity to exercise some 
control over the insiders at that time (Easterbrook (1984)). Unfortunately, there 
are no fully satisfactory theoretical agency models of dividends that derive 
dividend policies as part of some broad optimal contract between investors and 
corporate insiders, which allows for a range of feasible financing instruments. 
Instead, different models, such as Fluck (1998a, 1998b), Myers (1998), and 
Gomes (1998), capture different aspects of the problem. Moreover, the existing 
agency models have not yet fully dealt with the issues of choice between debt and 
equity in addressing agency problems, the choice between dividends and share 
repurchases, and the relationship between dividends and new share issues. They 
have attempted to distill from the available literature the basic mechanisms of how 
dividends could be used to deal with agency problems. In particular, they 
distinguished two very different agency "models" of dividends. 
The predictions of these models that they tested are necessarily limited by 
the fact that they do not look at all the financing and payout choices 
simultaneously. Perhaps most importantly in this regard, they do not examine 
share repurchases, which have been commonly taken as an alternative to paying 
dividends. However, the share repurchases are most common precisely in the 
countries where firms pay high dividends, such as the U.S. and the U.K. For 
example, between June 1997 and June 1998 there were 1,537 share repurchases in 
the world recorded by the Securities Data Corporation, of which 1,100 occurred in 
the United States. By market value, the U.S. accounted for 72 percent of world 
share repurchases during this period, and the U.S., U.K., Canada, and Australia 
combined accounted for 83 percent. In some civil law countries, share repurchases 
are even illegal or heavily taxed (The Economist, August 15, 1998).I If share 
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repurchases are complementary to dividends, rather that a substitute for them, our 
evidence only underestimates the difference in total cash payouts to shareholders 
between civil and common law countries. 
Under the first view, dividends are an outcome of an effective system of 
legal protection of shareholders. Under an effective system, minority shareholders 
use their legal powers to force companies to disgorge cash, thus precluding 
insiders from using too high a fraction of company earnings to benefit 
themselves.2 Shareholders might do so by voting for directors who offer better 
dividend policies, by selling shares to potential hostile raiders who then gain 
control over non dividend paying companies, or by suing companies that spend 
too lavishly on activities which only benefit the insiders. In addition, good 
investor protection makes asset diversion legally riskier and more expensive for 
the insiders, thereby raising the relative attraction of dividends for them. The 
greater the rights of the minority shareholders, the more cash they extract from the 
company, other things equal. 
It is important to recognize that this argument does not rely on minority 
shareholders having specific rights to dividends per se, but rather on their having 
more general rights of voting for directors and protesting wealth expropriation. A 
good example from the United States is Kirk Kerkorian forcing Chrysler 
Corporation to disgorge its cash by paying dividends in 1995- 1996. As a large 
shareholder in Chrysler, Kerkorian had no specific rights to dividends, but used 
the voting mechanism to put his associates on the board and then force the board 
to sharply raise dividends. Another good example is Velcro Industries, the 
producer of the famous "touch fastener" incorporated on the island of Curacao in 
the Netherlands Antilles, "where shareholders have no right of dissent" (Forbes, 
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October 15, 1990). Two-thirds of the shares of Velcro Industries are controlled by 
the Cripps family that runs Velcro (Forbes, May 23, 1994). In 1988, despite 
having a large cash reserve, the company suspended dividends "for the 
foreseeable future," (Forbes, October 3, 1988), delisted itself from the Montreal 
Stock Exchange, and aggressively wrote down assets to slash earnings, evidently 
to "buy out Velcro minority holders cheap" (Forbes, May 23, 1994). The share 
price dived and, in 1990, with dividends remaining at zero, the Crippses offered to 
repurchase minority shares at slightly above the market price. 
Minority shareholders sued in New York. "When a New York judge ruled 
that the U.S. was the proper jurisdiction, secretive Sir Humphrey Cripps decided 
to call off his offer rather than go under the light of U.S. court of law" (Forbes, 
May 23, 1994). The company subsequently resumed its dividend payments. This 
case illustrates that, in a high protection country like the U.S., in contrast to a low 
protection country like the Netherlands, shareholders are able to extract dividends 
from companies in virtue of their ability to resist oppression rather than having 
any specific dividend rights per se. 
In a cross-section of countries with different quality of shareholder 
protection, the implication that better protection is associated with higher dividend 
payouts is testable. There is one further implication of this theory. Consider a 
country with good shareholder protection, and compare two companies in that 
country: one with good investment opportunities and growth prospects, and 
another with poor opportunities. Shareholders who feel protected would accept 
low dividend payouts, and high reinvestment rates, from a company with good 
opportunities, since they know that when this company's investments pay off, 
they could extract high dividends. In contrast, a mature company with poor 
investment opportunities would not be allowed to invest unprofitably. As a 
consequence, with good shareholder protection, high growth companies should 
have significantly lower dividend payouts than low growth companies, in contrast, 
if shareholder protection is poor, we would not necessarily expect such a 
relationship between payouts and growth since shareholders may try to get what 
they can - which may not be much - immediately. This also is a testable 
implication. 
In an alternative agency view, dividends are a substitute for legal 
protection.4 This view relies crucially on the need for firms to come to the 
external capital markets for funds, at least occasionally. To be able to raise 
external funds on attractive terms, a firm must establish a reputation for 
moderation in expropriating shareholders. One way to establish such a reputation 
is by paying dividends, which reduces what is left for expropriation. For this 
mechanism to work, the firm must never want to "cash in" its reputation by 
stopping dividends and expropriating shareholders entirely. The firm would never 
want to cash in if, for example, there is enough uncertainty about its future cash 
flows that the option of going back to the capital market is always valuable 
(Bulow and Rogofr(l 989)). 
A reputation for good treatment of shareholders is worth the most in 
countries with weak legal protection of minority shareholders, who have little else 
to rely on. As a consequence, the need for dividends to establish a reputation is the 
greatest in such countries. In countries with stronger shareholder protection, in 
contrast, the need for a reputational mechanism is weaker, and hence so is the 
need to pay dividends. This view implies that, other things equal, dividend payout 
ratios should be higher in countries with weak legal protection of shareholders 
than in those with strong protection.5 Additionally, on this view, firms with better 
growth prospects also have a stronger incentive to establish a reputation since they 
have a greater potential need for external finance, other things equal. As a result, 
firms with better growth prospects might choose higher dividend payout ratios 
than firms with poor growth prospects. However, firms with good growth 
prospects also have a better current use of funds than firms with poor growth 
prospects. The relationship between growth prospects and dividend payout ratios 
is therefore ambiguous. 
Referring to the two alternative agency models of dividends as "the 
outcome model" and "the substitute model" the outcome model predicts that 
dividend payout ratios are higher in countries with good shareholder protection, 
other things equal. The substitute model predicts the opposite. The outcome model 
further predicts that, in countries with good shareholder protection, companies 
with better investment opportunities should have lower dividend payout ratios. 
The substitute model does not make this prediction. In fact, it makes a weak 
prediction that, in countries with poor shareholder protection, firms with better 
investment opportunities might pay out more to maintain reputations. 
Rozeff (1994) models payout ratios as a function of three factors: flotation 
costs of external funding, agency cost of outside ownership and financing 
constraints as a result of higher operating and financial leverage. 
Several theories have been proposed in explaining why companies pay 
dividends. While many earlier studies point out the tax-preference theory, more 
recent studies emphasize signaling and agency cost rationale of dividend 
payments. However, the dividend puzzle is yet unresolved and the words of 
Brealey (1992) poses the dividend policy decision as "What is the effect of a 
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change in cash dividends, given the firm's capital-budgeting and borrowing 
decisions?" In other words, he looks at dividend policy in isolation and not as a 
by-product of other corporate financial decisions. 
Narasimhan and Vijayalakshmi (2002) analyze the influence of ownership 
structure on dividend payout and find no influence of insider ownership on 
dividend behavior of firms. However, it is still not clear as to what is the dividend 
payment pattern of firms in India and why do they initiate and omit dividend 
payments or reduce or increase dividend payments. 
Narasimhan and Vijayalakshmi (2002) analyze the influence of ownership 
structure on dividend payout of 186 manufacturing firms. Regression analysis 
shows that promoters' holding as of September 2001 has no influence on average 
dividend payout for the period 1997-2001. 
Differential Taxes 
Taxation policy is a key determinant of payout in developed countries (see 
Short, Keasey, and Duxbury (2002)). In case of India, taxation policy is different 
than those of developed countries. In India, dividends have been taxed at a flat 
rate of 10% for quite some time, which has been removed recently. Dividend 
payout may be beneficial, if used to offset tax liability against the capital loss, as 
after dividend payments, the prices of stocks fall. The signaling perspectives 
suggest that insiders use dividends as a signal of firm's future earnings. Most of 
the signaling and agency cost models assumes that there is separation of 
ownership and control and finance is raised externally through capital markets. 
However, the characteristic of financing in India is different than those of the 
developed nations. In India, most of the financing comes from financial 
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institutions, and these lenders also have equity holding (in general) in the firm 
concerned. Hence, they have access to insider information as well. This reduces 
the importance of dividends as a signal of firms' financial health. 
Economists are divided on the effects of taxes on the valuation of 
dividends (Poterba and Summers (1985). The so-called traditional view holds that 
heavy taxation of dividends at both the corporate and personal levels -- at least in 
the United States -- is a strong deterrent to paying out dividends rather than 
retaining the earnings. There are two important objections to this view. 
One objection, raised by Miller and Scholes (1978), states that investors 
have access to a variety of dividend tax avoidance strategies that allow them to 
effectively escape dividend taxes. This objection does not closely correspond to 
what investors actually do (Feenberg (1981)). Another objection, the so-called 
new view of dividends and taxes (e.g., King (1977), Auerbach (1979)), holds that 
cash has to be paid out as dividends sooner or later, and therefore paying it earlier 
in the form of current dividends imposes no greater a tax burden on shareholders 
than does the delay. According to this theory, taxes do not deter dividend 
payments. Harris et al. (1997) support this new view. In our empirical work, we 
include a measure of the tax disadvantage of dividends based on Poterba and 
Summers (1984, 1985) to assess the effect of taxes on dividend policies. Appendix 
A summarizes in detail our treatment of the tax effects of dividends, and also 
presents the data on taxes that we use in the empirical work. 
Dr. Y. Subba Reddy examined the dividend behavior of Indian corporate 
firms over the period 1990 - 2001 and attempted to explain the observed behavior 
with the help of trade-off theory, and signaling hypothesis. Analysis of dividend 
trends for a large sample of stocks traded on the NSE and BSE indicate that the 
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percentage of companies paying dividends has declined from 60.5 percent in 1990 
to 32.1 percent in 2001 and that only a few firms have consistently paid the same 
levels of dividends. Further, dividend-paying companies are more profitable, large 
in size and growth doesn't seem to deter Indian firms from paying higher 
dividends. Analysis of influence of changes in tax regime on dividend behavior 
shows that the tradeoff or tax-preference theory does not appear to hold true in the 
Indian context. Test of signaling hypothesis reinforces the earlier findings that 
dividend omissions have information content about future earnings. However, 
analysis of other non-extreme dividend events such as dividend reductions and 
non-reductions shows that current losses are an important determinant of dividend 
reductions for firms with established track record and that the incidence of 
dividend reduction is much more severe in the case of Indian firms compared to 
that of firms traded on the NYSE. 
Black (1976) notes that in the presence of taxes, investors "prefer smaller 
dividends or no dividends at all". According to Kalay (1982), in the absence of 
restraining covenants, shareholders can transfer wealth from bondholders by 
paying off dividend to themselves either by selling existing assets or by reducing 
investment or by using proceeds of a senior debt. 
Narasimhan and Asha (1997) observe that the uniform tax rate of 10 
percent on dividend as proposed by the Indian union budget 1997-98, alters the 
demand of investors in favor of high payouts. 
There have been several changes in the tax regime in the last few years. 
The union budget 1997-98 made dividends taxable at the hands of company 
paying them and not in the hands of investors receiving them. 
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Similarly there have been changes in the capital gains tax and exemption 
of dividend income under Section 80 L of the income Tax Act 1961. Ail these 
changes have implications for the dividend policy of corporate firms. According 
to tax-preference or trade-ofFtheory, favorable dividends tax should lead to higher 
payouts. 
Narasimhan and Asha (1997) discuss the impact of dividend tax on 
dividend policy of firms. They observe that the uniform tax rate of 10 percent on 
dividend as proposed by the Indian union budget 1997-98, alters the demand of 
investors in favor of high payouts rather than low payouts as the capital gains are 
taxed at 20 percent in the said period. 
India operates a classical company tax system in which companies are 
taxed separately from the investors receiving the profits in form of dividends. 
Firms pay differential rate of corporate tax on their profits and shareholders pay 
income tax on the dividend income received. 
This leads to twice taxation of profit earned by firm, one in the hands of 
company through corporate tax and other in hands of investors, in form of income 
tax. In such a case an investor should prefer to get less dividends paid and 
earnings to be retained by firm, as they can always get the amount by selling the 
shares in equity market, in form of'home made dividend' (Black (1976). 
Investment Imperative and Free Cash Flow 
Dividend changes appear to signal contemporaneous and lagged earnings 
performance rather than the future earnings performance. From the practitioners' 
viewpoint, dividend policy of a firm has implications for investors, managers and 
lenders and other stakeholders. For investors, dividends - whether declared today 
38 
or accumulated and provided at a later date - are not only a means of regular 
income, but also an important input in valuation of a firm3. Similarly, managers" 
flexibility to invest in projects is also dependent on the amount of dividend that 
they can offer to shareholders as more dividends may mean fewer funds available 
for investment. 
Lenders may also have interest in the amount of dividend a firm declares, 
as more the dividend paid less would be the amount available for servicing and 
redemption of their claims. However, in a perfect world as Modigliani and Miller 
(1961) have shown, investors may be indifferent about the amount of dividend as 
it has no influence on the value of a firm. Any investor can create a 'home made 
dividend' if required or can invest the proceeds of a dividend payment in 
additional shares as and when a company makes dividend payment. Similarly, 
managers may be indifferent as fiinds would be available or could be raised with 
out any flotation costs for ail positive net present value projects. But in reality, 
dividends may matter, particularly in the context of differential tax treatment of 
dividends and capital gains. Very often dividends are taxed at a higher rate 
compared to capital gains. This implies that dividends may have negative 
consequences for investors4. Similarly, cost of raising funds is not insignificant 
and may well lead to lower payout, particularly when positive net present value 
projects are available. Apart from flotation costs, information asymmetry between 
managers and outside investors may also have implications for dividend policy. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984), in the presence of information asymmetry 
and flotation costs, investment decisions made by managers are subject to the 
pecking order of financing choices available. Managers prefer retained earnings to 
debt and debt to equity flotation to finance the available projects. Information 
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asymmetry between agents (managers) and principals (outside shareholders) may 
also lead to agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). One of the mechanisms of 
reducing expropriation of outside shareholders by agents is high payout. High 
payout will result in reduction of free cash flow available to managers and this 
restricts the empire building efforts of managers. 
In the Indian context, a few studies have analyzed the dividend behavior of 
corporate firms. Mahapatra and Sahu (1993) find cash flow as a major 
determinant of dividend followed by net earnings. 
Bhat and Pandey (1994) undertake a survey of managers' perceptions of 
dividend decision and find that managers perceive current earnings as the most 
significant factor. 
Mohanty (1999) finds that firms, which issued bonus shares, have either 
maintained the pre-bonus level or only decreased it marginally there by increasing 
the payout to shareholders. 
Bemsterin (1998) expresses concern over the decline in payout over a 
period of time in the US market. He observes that given the 'concocted' earnings 
estimates provided by firms, the low dividend payout induces reinvestment risk 
and earnings risk for the investors. He asserts that"... try calculating the historical 
correlation between payout ratios in year t and earnings growth over t + 5. The 
correlation coefficient is positive and statistically significant". 
Fama and French (2001) analyze the issue of lower dividends paid by 
corporate firms over the period 1973-1999 and the factors responsible for the 
decline. In particular they analyze whether the lower dividends were the effect of 
changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay on the part of firms. They 
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observe that proportion of companies paying dividend has dropped from a peai< of 
66.5 percent in 1978 to 20.8 percent in 1999. They attribute this decline to the 
changing characteristics of firms: "The decline in the incidence of dividend payers 
is in part due to an increasing tilt of publicly traded firms toward the 
characteristics - small size, low earnings, and high growth - of firms that typically 
have never paid dividends". 
Baker, Veit and Powell (2001) study the factors that have a bearing on 
dividend policy decisions of corporate firms traded on the Nasdaq. The study, 
based on a sample survey (1999) response of 188 firms out of a total of 630 firms 
that paid dividends in each quarter of calendar years 1996 and 1997, finds that the 
following four factors have a significant impact on the dividend decision: pattern 
of past dividends, stability of earnings, and the level of current and future 
expected earnings. The study also finds statistically significant differences in the 
importance that managers attach to dividend policy in different industries such as 
financial versus non-financial firms. 
Ramachandran (2001) analyzes the variation in dividend yield for 21 
emerging markets (including India) for the period 1992-99. His macroeconomic 
approach using country risk data finds evidence for pecking order hypothesis -
lower dividends are paid when higher growth is expected. The study also finds 
that political risk factors have no significant impact on dividend payments of firms 
in emerging markets. 
Lee and Ryan (2002) analyze the dividend signaling-hypothesis and the 
issue of direction of causality between earnings and dividends - whether earnings 
cause dividends or vice versa. For a sample of 133 dividend initiations and 165 
dividend omissions, they find that dividend payment is influenced by recent 
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performance of earnings, and free cash flows. They also find evidence of positive 
(negative) earnings growth preceding dividend initiations (omissions). 
Kevin (1992) analyzes the dividend distribution pattern of 650 non-
financial companies which closed their accounts between September 1983 and 
August 1984 and net sales income of one crore rupees or more. He finds evidence 
for a sticky dividend policy and concludes that a change in profitability is of 
minor importance. 
Mahapatra and Sahu (1993) analyze the determinants of dividend policy 
using the models developed by Lintner (1956), Darling (1957) and Brittain (1966) 
for a sample of 90 companies for the period 1977-78 - 1988-89. They find that 
cash flow is a major determinant of dividend followed by net earnings. Further, 
their analysis shows that past dividend and not past earnings is a significant factor 
in influencing the dividend decision of firms. 
Bhat and Pandey (1994) study the managers' perceptions of dividend 
decision for a sample of 425 Indian companies for the period 1986-87 to 1990-91. 
They find that on an average profit-making Indian companies have distributed 
about one-third of their net earnings and that the average dividend payout ratio is 
43.6 percent. They also find that the average dividend payout ratio is 54 percent 
for the sample of both profit making and loss-making companies and the average 
dividend rate is in the range of 14.3 percent to 19.2 percent. They also observe 
variation in dividend policy of different industries. 
Further, a survey of these 425 companies has been attempted. How ever, 
only 31 questionnaires have been received and of these they find 28 amenable for 
ftirther analysis. Their analysis of the respondents shows that managers perceive 
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current earnings as the most significant factor influencing their dividend decision 
followed by patterns of past dividends. They also find two other variables 
increasing equity base and expected future earnings to have significant influence. 
However, they find industry to have the least influence on the dividend, which has 
been contrary to the expectations. 
Mishra and Narender (1996) analyze the dividend policies of 39 state-
owned enterprises (SOE) in India for the period 1984-85 to 1993-94. The find that 
earnings per share (EPS) is a major factor in determining the dividend payout of 
SOEs. 
Mohanty (1999) analyzes the dividend behavior of more than 200 firms for 
a period of over 15 years. He finds that in most bonus issue cases firms have 
either maintained the pre-bonus level or only decreased it marginally there by 
increasing the payout to shareholders. The study also finds that firms that declared 
bonus during 1982-1991 showed higher returns to their shareholders compared to 
firms which did not issue bonus shares but maintained a steady dividend growth. 
He finds evidence for a reversal of this trend in the 1992- 1996 period. He 
attributes such a reversal in trend to the changed strategy of multi-national 
corporations (MNCs) and their reluctance to issue bonus shares. 
Jijo Lukose P. J. and S Narayan Rao investigated the operating 
performance behavior around bonus distribution for a large sample of firms listed 
on Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) to examine the relevance of signaling 
hypothesis in India. Previous work in this area with Indian data sets has focused 
on share price behavior around bonus issue. Consistent with the signaling 
hypotheses, bonus issuers exhibit superior operating performance relative to 
control films with simiJar pre-event performance. The operating performance of 
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firms issuing bonus shares is superior to their industry peers both prior to and 
subsequent to the bonus issue. We linlc the impact of corporate control mechanism 
on signaling by documenting the relationship between ownership-structure and 
post bonus issue operating performance. Further, we examine announcement 
return and its relation with firm specific variables. 
Inertia Theory 
Mahapatra and Sahu (1993) do not find evidence in support of the Linter's 
model, whereas Mishra and Narender (1996) find support for the Linter's model 
in case of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Bhat and Pandey (1994) find that 
payment of dividends depend on current and expected earnings as well as the 
pattern of past dividends. Dividends are used in signaling the future prospects, and 
dividends are paid even if there is profitable investment opportunity. Mohanty 
(1999) attempts to examine the behavior of payout after the bonus issue. He finds 
that bonus-issuing firms yielded greater returns to their shareholders than those 
that did not make any bonus issue but maintained a steadily increasing dividend 
rate. Reddy (2002) examines the dividend behavior and attempts to explain the 
observed behavior with the help of a trade-off theory and signaling hypothesis. 
The paper supports earlier finding that dividend omissions have information 
content about fijture earnings, but do not find any evidence in support of the tax-
preference theory. 
Lintner (1956) finds that firms pay regular and predictable dividends to 
investors, where as the earnings of corporate firms could be erratic. This implies 
that shareholders prefer smoothened dividend income. Bernstein (1998) observes 
that given the 'concocted' earnings estimates provided by firms, the low dividend 
payout induces reinvestment risk, and earnings risk for the investors. 
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In the Indian scene, empirical researchers have documented the 
announcement return and cash dividend performance after bonus payment. One 
recent study by Mohanty (1999) finds that most of the companies either keep the 
same dividend rate after the bonus payment or decrease it less than 
proportionately (after considering bonus payment) thereby increases the cash 
flows to the shareholders. Obaidullah (1992) and Rao (1994) document positive 
stock market reaction to equity bonus announcement. Rao (1994) estimated 
cumulative abnormal return of 6.31% around the three days of bonus 
announcement. But so far no studies have been reported regarding the after-bonus 
operating performance of the firm. 
Behavioral Finance 
Baker, Powell and Veit (2002) survey different streams of research work 
on dividends. Fischer Black (Black 1976) may well apply in today's context: "The 
harder we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces 
that just don't fit together". 
One of the striking aspects that have been noticed in recent periods is the 
lower dividend paid by corporate firms in the US. Fama and French (2001) 
analyze the issue of lower dividends paid by corporate firms over the period 1973-
1999 and the factors responsible for such a decline. They attribute the decline to 
changing firm characteristics of size, earnings and growth. However, it is to be 
seen whether the change towards lower dividends is a permanent feature or will 
there be reversal. A decline in dividends, according to Fama and French, could be 
due to lower transaction costs, improved corporate governance mechanisms, and 
the increasing preference towards capital gains. 
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Academic research generally interprets the positive stock market reaction 
to split announcements as a response to managers signaling favourable inside 
information (Brennan and Copeland 1988; McNicholas and Dravid, 1990; 
Brennan and Hughes 1991). As per the signaling hypothesis, the declarations of 
bonus issues convey favorable private information about the future earnings to the 
investors. Managers have superior information about the future earnings, because 
there may be asymmetric information between managers and investors. Bonus 
issues should credibly signal such information if it is costly for firms without 
favourable information to imitate. For a signaling device to be valid there should 
be a cost associated with sending false signals; i.e. it should be prohibitively 
costly for firms with below average expected performance to mimic the signaling 
decisions of those firms enjoying above-average performance. 
Grinblatt et al (1984) examine stock splits and stock dividends under the 
traditional signaling model and point out that it can be considered as a costly 
signal. In case of stock dividends, the reduction in retained earnings will restrict 
the firm's ability to pay cash dividends if the firm does not anticipate increased 
earnings. They also propose another explanation that stock splits call attention to 
the firm (attention getting device) while under priced firms find such reassessment 
is in their interest, over priced firms do not. While presenting their transaction cost 
model Brennan and Hughes (1991) also argue that managers with favorable 
information will find it advantageous to have independent third parties produce 
information about their firms for investors. Another reason may be the indirect 
costs associated with false signaling such as loss of reputation. Managers who 
develop reputations for truthful signaling are likely to be believed the next time 
they signal. Here market uses post-split earnings changes to sort managers into 
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those that signal truthfully and those that signal falsely (Pilotte and Manuel, 
1996). Grinblatt et al. (1984), maintain that given the costs associated with stock 
splits and stock dividends, if managers possess unfavourable information about 
future growth, they may decide against increasing the number of shares even if 
they perceive the stock price to be 'too high' because they anticipate that, when 
this information is disclosed, stock prices will revert to the normal price anyway. 
In general, companies increase the number of shares outstanding only when they 
are confident that future-operating performance will be good enough to move 
share prices upward or at least to cope with market expectations4. Another 
variation of this argument attaches more importance to 'the implied promise of 
higher dividends', as mangers are reluctant to cut dividend per share (Nayak and 
Prabhala, 2001). The liquidity hypotheses has its base in 'trading range 
hypotheses' (Copeland (1979), Lakonishok and Lev (1987)) which argues that 
firms prefer to keep their share price within a popular price range. 
There are a number of empirical studies on market reaction to stock 
dividend announcements and earnings behaviour associated with stock splits and 
stock dividends. 
Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984) provide empirical evidence 
indicating that stock prices, on average, react positively to stock dividend and 
stock split announcements. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) analyse the behavior of 
two major indicators of corporate performance, viz. growth in earnings and in 
cash dividends. The sample firms exhibited 
Ikenbeny et al (1996) also combine the information content hypothesis to 
trading range explanation in a similar fashion. 
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Survey of managers" view on stock dividends/stock splits sliow that a vast 
majority regards it as a means to keep their stock's price with in an optimal 
trading range (Baker and Gallagher (1980) somewhat higher growth in earnings 
compared to 'control firms' within the same industry and similar asset size. 
Asquith, Healy and Palepu (1989 report companies that split their stocks have 
large earnings increase for several years before the split, as well as in the year of 
the split. Further, the stock price reaction to the split announcement is proportional 
to earnings increases in prior years. McNichols and Dravid (1990) provide 
evidence that firms signal their private information about future earnings by their 
choice of split factor. Another empirical regularity reported recently is the market 
inefficiency, specifically long run under reaction to stock dividend announcement 
(Ikenberry et al., (1996) and Desai and Jain (1997). 
"Every investment is made on the expectation and assumption that it will 
yield some returns. Equity investment is not an exception to this. Every equity 
investor anticipates a good rate of return in the form of dividend to be declared by 
the company. So, every company pays higher attention in formulating its own 
dividend policy. Dividend decision is one of the most important decisions in the 
field of Financial Management. Dividend policy determines the relationship 
beitween a company and the capital market. Payment of dividend enhances the 
market price of the shares thereby increasing the wealth of the shareholders. 
Payment of dividend conveys to shareholders the information relating to the 
profitability of the firm. Economic studies generally show that the dividends act as 
booster of the shareholder's confidence signalizing that the company is being 
managed well and its future is safe. 
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2.3 IDENTIFYING THE RESEARCH GAP THROUGH 
LITERATURE SURVEY 
When we scan through the entire gamut of literature pertaining to the 
factors and considerations that have been governing the corporate dividend payout 
pattern the world over, by and large, most of these studies are not specific about 
the types of industries, particularly engineering industries or knowledge based 
industries. Most of the studies concentrate on dividend motivation with an eye on 
its impact on the market, rather than the internal and external compulsions of a 
particular type of industry. 
Hence this study is intended to fill this research gap, specifically 
highlighting the internal and external compulsions pertaining to engineering 
industries in India. 
These compulsions in a nutshell can be summerised as: 
1. Wealth creation internally as the net worth. 
2. Wealth creation externally as the market capitalization. 
3. Fixed cost and depreciation in terms of the book value of plant and 
machinery. 
4. Determining retention of internal control in the form of promoters equity. 
5. Determining the dictates of financial institution in terms of institutional 
holding. 
6. Liquidity, internally, in terms of net cash flow. 
7. Liquidity, externally, in terms of interest paid. 
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Secondary data pertaining to these relevant factors have been collected 
from renowned business and economic publications and primary data through 
questionnaires designed to address these parameters and concerned officials and 
investors in the corporate sector and the capital market being the target 
respondents. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Dividend payout decision has always been a subject of interest among 
financial analysts academicians and researchers as they are interested in studying 
the extent in which the earnings of a company are distributed as dividend among 
the shareholders as also the retained earnings. The dividend decision is an integral 
part of a company's financial decision making, as it is explicitly related to the 
other two major decisions, the investment decision and the financial decision. 
Dividend decision involves deciding as to how much dividend should be 
paid (payout ratio) and the form in which it should be paid to the shareholders. 
The decision is taken in the light of the investment opportunities available and 
alternative financing options. A zero dividend payout ratio is common for young 
and rapidly growing companies with good investment opportunities. 
On an average, dividend payout in India has decreased to thirty percent at 
present from 60 percent thirty years ago. However, companies may also be 
discouraged from paying higher dividend when these are doubly taxed- once in 
the hands of the company and again in the hands of the shareholders 
3.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
Dividend is that part of the net earnings which is free from creating 
mandatory reserves and meant for distribution among the shareholders who 
wishes to maximize their wealth while simultaneously minimizing their risk. 
A company needs funds to finance its sustainability and growth. If the 
company pays out most of the profits it earns, then for business requirements and 
farther expansion it will have to depend upon outside sources such as issue of 
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debts or new equity shares. So, dividends in a form are paid according to the 
policies and decisions of the management regarding the retained earnings of the 
firm. 
Among all the corporate financial decisions few are as strategically 
important as dividend decisions. Corporate dividend policy plays an important 
role and affects the capital structure as well as future dividends. 
From the micro concept as long as there are investment projects with 
returns exceeding those that are required (in general mostly weighted average cost 
of capital) it would use retained earnings and the amount of senior securities will 
support to finance these projects. 
If the firm has retained earnings left over after financing all acceptable 
investment opportunities, these earnings then would be distributed to the 
shareholders in the form of cash dividends, if otherwise there won't we any 
dividends. The treatment of dividend policy as a passive residual, determine solely 
by the availability of acceptable investment proposals implies that the dividends 
are immaterial and irrelevant; the investors are rather indifferent between 
dividends and retention by the firm. 
On the other hand, higher and higher dividend payments are sure to 
enhance the market value of the firm and the reputation of the management, but 
such a policy may mean less availability of internal funds and more dependence 
on external sources for reinvestment and expansion purposes. Thus, while 
determining dividend payments a prudent management strikes a balance between 
share holders preference and a firm's long term interest, safeguarding the firm's 
control. 
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Engineering industries are characterised by heavy plants and machineries. 
longer operating cycles, high depreciation, capital structure loaded with high term 
loans and high interest to pay, and sometimes due to this, higher restriction on 
paying dividends imposed by financial institutions. 
This research study is aimed at identifying these factors and investigate 
into the extent of their influence on the dividend payout from the fact and 
happenings in the market and, on the other hand, from the opinions, view points of 
both corporate mangers and investors. 
3.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
This research study has these three principal objectives: 
i) To study the trend in dividend payout in the various sectors of the 
engineering industry over a time period. 
ii) To analyze the influence of sector specific characteristics on dividend 
payment pattern. 
iii) a) To study the motivation of the Indian engineering industry for 
formulating their respective dividend policies. 
(b) To study the perception and attitude of the investing community 
regarding and towards the dividend policies & practices adopted by the 
management. 
3.4 METHODOLOGY 
Data and statistical tools identification : 
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I. To fulfill these three objectives enumerated above the stud\ relied both on 
primary and secondary data. Analysis, and interpretation of objectives (i) & (ii) 
were based on secondary data collected from CAPITALINE &. CMIE databases. 
Renowned economic and business journals like Capital Market, Dalai 
Street, Economic Times, ET 500, ICFAI'S, TOP 500 were consulted and top 500 
performing companies were identified. Out of these top 500 companies, only the 
engineering concerns in the following sectors and numbers were chosen. 
a) Automotives: 15 nos. 
b) Auto components / Ancillaries: 
c) Engineering Industry / Machine building: 
d) Chemical / Petro chemical /paints: 
e) Consumer Durables / White goods: 
f) Steel /Ferro alloys: 
g) Non ferrous metals / alloys: 
h) Electronic / Telecom / IT Hardware: 
TOTAL 183 nos. 
For the first objective, dividend payment history of these industries over a 
time horizon of 12 years (1994-2006) were collected from CMIE & 
CAPITALINE data bases and trend analysis has been done. The performing 
industries were categorized into different dividend payment slabs in the ascending 
order and presented in a tabular form with an accompanying bar chart. 
More over, linear and logarithmic time series regression has been done to 
evolve a theoretical pattern of the trend in dividend payments in different sectors 
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31 
42 
35 
10 
30 
10 
10 
nos. 
nos. 
nos. 
nos. 
nos. 
nos. 
nos. 
over these 12 years. For each and every "time series regression", goodness of fit 
by conducting "chi square test" has been checked and its appropriateness of the 
linear or logarithmic fit has been established. 
For the second objective, correlation analysis and linear and non linear 
regression models have been developed involving seven identified factors and the 
dividend payout. Using extended Ms Excel Software under windows 2000 for 
each regression model the corresponding goodness of fit has been tested. Using 
"chi square" variate, and for each correlation co-efficient, the significance has 
been tested using 't' statistic. 
The sector specific factors identified as having potential influence on 
dividend payout are summarized as follows: 
i. Internal wealth creation in terms of net worth. 
ii. External wealth creation in terms of market capitalization. 
iii. Fixed cost and depreciation in terms of book values of plant and 
machinery. 
iv. Determining internal control in terms of promoter's equity. 
V. Determining dominance and dictates of financial institutions in terms of 
institutional holdings. 
vi. Liquidity, internally, in terms of net cash inflow. 
vii. Liquidity externally, in terms of interest paid. 
Apart from the computation of the correlation co-efficient with its 
significance, with respective regression equations, a multi variate regression 
equations involving five of the above seven factors as independent variables and 
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the dividend payment as a single dependent variable has been developed and its 
goodness of fit established. 
The entire regression computation and their "chi square test" for each 
independent variable have been presented in tabular form. The line graphs for 
each regression equation including the multi variate one has been plotted. 
For the third objective, which is based on primary data collected from the 
corporate finance managers and the investors as respondents, statistical analysis in 
terms of tables and pie charts / bar charts have been done for those questions 
which pertains to the background of the respondents. 
The rest of the questions were considered for hypotheses testing. The 
hypotheses were designed to address the objective. 
11. TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES OF DATA COLLECTION 
Specific Information 
a) Instrument Development 
Two sets of questions were designed, one for the corporate finance 
decision makers and other one for the investors. 
b) Pilot Study 
Pilot studies were conducted to check the reliability, validity and 
consistency of the questionnaire in addressing the objectives. For the first 
questionnaire concerning corporate financial decision makers, twelve corporate 
executives and two academicians were respondents by personal approach in 
Bangalore. For the second questionnaire, fifteen equity investors and two 
academicians were respondents by personal approach in Bangalore. 
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Reliability measurement was conducted in terms of "Chronbach Alpha". 
and for further confidence in the validity and reliability of the instruments. Alpha 
value was computed after collecting the actual data. The two Alpha values, so 
evolved an almost identical. 
c) Sample Selection 
There are two sets of respondents one is Corporate Manager and the other 
is investors. For that purpose, the sample frame is also two sets. 
I. Sample Frame: Economic Times (ET) 500 for corporate sectors equity 
investors who are the customers of investment bankers all over India. 
II. Sample Unit: Engineering industry comprising of eight sectors and 
individual investors of three categories i.e. salaried, professionals and 
businessmen. They are the sample elements also. 
III. Sampling Element: Corporate firm's Managers/Executives. 
IV. Sample Size: 183 companies in engineering industry under ET 500 and 
1000 investors all over India. 
V. Types of Samples: Non-Probability (a) Judgmental for corporate 
respondents, multi-stage for investors. The stages are as follows: 
i. At the first stage a list of investment bankers was made 
which includes the following: 
1. BajaJ Capital 
2. Karvy Consultants 
3. Way to Wealth 
4. ICICI Director 
58 
These investment bankers have got their client base all over India. 
ii. The client bases of the above listed investment bankers 
were consulted and only the equity investors were chosen 
as respondents. 
iii. Equity investors belong into either of the three categories 
i.e. (a) Salaried, (b) Professionals, and (c) Businessmen 
were chosen proportionally in numbers from all over India 
in the same proportion as in the client base. 
As has been explained in the previous sections secondary data have been 
collected from company specific literature, industry survey reports, financial press 
and CMIE & CAPITALINE DATA from the library of Indian Institute of 
Management, Bangalore; Indian Institute of Science, Bangalore: and other 
institutes in and around Bangalore. 
For primary data collection, a questionnaire for the Higher Level corporate 
finance executives was designed, locally administered to get responses to test 
reliability and consistency and then, after it was found reasonably reliable and 
consistent it was administered all over India. The questionnaire contains twenty-
eight close ended and one open ended question. For the close-ended question the 
respondents were given five alternatives i.e. 
Strongly agree: S/A Moderately Disagree: MD 
Moderately agree: M/A Strongly Disagree: SD 
Neither Agree nor Disagree: NA-ND 
The questionnaire was administered personally, through courier or post. 
Totally eighty three (83) questionnaires which came back were found suitable for 
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analysis. Similarly, a questionnaire having twenty-five close-ended questions were 
designed and one thousand in numbers were administered to the investors all over 
India. These investors were accessed through the client base of renowned ' 
Investment Bankers' whose offices are in Bangalore and other branch offices all 
over India. Out of one thousand circulated only 477 were found fit for analysis. 
3.5. PLAN OF ANALYSIS 
As for plan of analysis, as has been explained already, data are analysed by 
tables, pie charts/graphs, bar charts and myriad statistical tests, viz. 'Kolmogorov-
Smimov one sample test', 'Chi-Square test', 't' test for statistical inferences. 
Reliability and Validity of Questionnaire by 'Chronbach Alpha Test' 
A sincere attempt has been made to establish the reliability and validity of 
the two questionnaires by 'chronbach alpha test. 
As both the questionnaires have been designed in groups to address 
various hypotheses, the reliability and consistency also have been tested by 
dividing the questionnaire in homogeneous groups and the alpha value has been 
computed by using 'SPSS' software for each group. An average "alpha value" has 
been computed for each of the two individual questionnaires. 
Formation & Testing of Hypotheses 
For fulfillment of the third objectives which is based only on primary data 
collected from the finance managers and investors, totally sixteen hypotheses, 
nine for objective 3(a) and seven for objective 3(b) are formed as follows: 
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Hypotheses Development 
HoA-1: Dividend policy is an active residual policy reflecting the competence 
and dexterity of the finance manager in managing profitability and liquidity 
together. 
HiA-1: Dividend policy is not an active residual policy and dose not reflect the 
competence and dexterity of the finance manager in managing profitability and 
liquidity together. 
HoA-2: For dividend, stability, continuity and growth are more important than the 
absolute value of the payout. 
HiA-2: For dividend, absolute value of the payout is more important than its 
stability, continuity and growth. 
HoA-3: The cost structure, capital structure and share holding pattern of a 
company significantly influence its corporate dividend policy. 
HiA-3: The cost structure, capital structure and share holding pattern of a 
company do not significantly influence its corporate dividend policy. 
HoA-4: Dividend decision of a company concerns only its equity share holders. 
HiA-4: Dividend decision of a company dose not concern only its equity share 
holders. 
HoA-5: The quantum of dividend payout of a company significantly and 
positively influences the liquidity of its share in the market. 
HjA-S: The quantum of dividend payout of a company dose not influence the 
liquidity of its share in the market significantly. 
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HoA-6: The quantum of dividend payout of a company significantly and 
positively influences its market capitalization. 
HiA-6: The quantum of dividend payout of a company dose not significantly and 
positively influence its market capitalization. 
HoA-7: The products made and the services rendered by a company significantly 
influence its dividend policy. 
HiA-7: The products made and the services rendered by a company do not 
significantly influence its dividend policy. 
HoA-8: Within the framework of engineering industry, sector specificity of a 
company significantly influences its dividend policy. 
HiA-8: Within the framework of engineering industry, sector specificity of a 
company dose not significantly influence its dividend policy. 
HoA-9: Market performance of a company's share in terms of risk and returned is 
more of a technical issue and hence dividend payout dose not significantly 
influence it. 
HiA-9: Market performance of a company's share in terms of risk and returned is 
more of a fundamental issue and hence dividend payout dose significantly 
influence it. 
Hypotheses for Objective 
HoB-1: A company's fundamentals rather than market technicalities and more 
influence the investors' decision significantly. 
H|B-1: Market technicalities and more rather than a company's fundamentals 
influence the investors' decision significantly. 
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HoB-2: A company's constancy of dividend payout in terms of its EPS & DPS 
records influences investors' decisions significantly. 
HtB-2: A company's constancy of dividend payout in terms of its EPS & DPS 
records dose not influence investors' decisions significantly. 
HoB-3: A company having dividend payout, stable and consistently increasing 
over time is significantly favoured by investors inspite of the dividend being 
moderate. 
HiB-3: A company having dividend payout, stable and consistently increasing 
over time is not favoured by investors if the dividend payout is moderate. 
HoB-4; Investors significantly prefer high dividend payout to its consistency. 
HiB-4: Investors significantly prefer consistency to high dividend payout. 
HoB-5: Investors significantly disfavour a consistent but moderate dividend 
payout. 
HiB-5: Investors significantly favour a consistent albeit moderate dividend 
payout. 
HoB-6: Investors significantly disfavour dividend payout as the right yard stick 
for judging performance of a company in engineering industry while taking 
investment decisions. 
HtB-6: Investors significantly favour dividend payout as the right yard stick for 
judging performance of a company in engineering industry while taking 
investment decisions. 
HoB-7: For investing in engineering industry, investors significantly prefer other 
fundamentals to dividend. 
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H|B-7: For investing in engineering industry, investors significantly prefer 
dividend to other fundamentals. 
From the coded and quantized primary responses, 'Kolmogorov-Smimov 
one sample test' and 'chi square test' have been conducted to test the validity of 
the respective 'null hypotheses'. 
For each null hypotheses respective suitable alternate hypotheses has been 
formulated before testing. 
3.6 SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The study covers eight identified sectors of Indian engineering industry 
spread all over India for a time horizon of twelve years i.e. 1994-2006. As is 
evident the sample size of 183 companies is heavily dominated by pure 
engineering industries lie BHEL, L&T etc. 
3.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This study suffers from certain limitations, which can be summarized as 
follows: 
i) The study does not cover the companies, which did not pay dividends 
during the 12 year period under study, although, in terms of market 
capitalization and sales they are very much with in the top 500 
performing company's i.e. the study does not cover exploring the 
reasons for non payment. 
ii) The study, by design, covers only engineering industry. The norms, 
traditions, practices and compulsions are different in other industries. 
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iii) The study covers 183 companies only in engineering industry out of 
500 top most performing in all areas of business put together. The 
smaller size companies in engineering industries have not been 
covered. 
iv) Sector wise 8 sectors of the engineering industries have been covered 
because they fall within the top 500 performing companies. There are a 
few other sector which falls under the engineering industries, but none 
of the companies are within the top 500 in sales and market 
capitalization and hence have not been considered. 
v) Out of 183 respondent companies in the chosen category only 83 
corporate responses could be analysed because a good number of 
questionnaires sent were not returned and a good number was partially 
filled. 
vi) As far as the responses from the investors are concerned, although the 
coverage has been through out India, less than half i.e. 477 out of 1000 
questionnaires sent could only the analysed, because that number only 
came back within a reasonable time. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROFILE OF ENGINEERING 
SECTOR 
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This study is concentrating on engineering sector. So there is a need to 
give a brief profile of this sector to have an idea of performance. Furthermore, the 
engineering sector comprises a diverse type of manufacturing and processing, so 
the study is limited to certain selected industrial segments. 
In this chapter an attempt has been made to give a profile of engineering 
sector alongwith the profile of the selected industries namely, automobiles, auto 
component, chemical, consumer durables etc. 
During the last three years, the high grov^h in Indian economy has been 
driven by a sustained upturn by industry in general and the manufacturing sub 
sector in particular. Favourable demand conditions have encouraged investments 
across industries. Contributing factors have included adequate availability of 
credit, improved corporate results, improved external demands, capacity addition 
across industries and an improvement in competitiveness. 
The impact of high oil prices on growth has been limited, because of the 
incomplete pass through of rising international prices. However the growth of the 
engineering sector continues to be hampered by various factors such as higher 
import duties (including inverted duty structure), higher incidence of indirect 
taxes, sub optimal level of operation, low operational efficiency , high transaction 
costs, restrictive labour laws, low labour productivity, high cost of capital and 
inadequate infrastructure. Poor infrastructure, in particular, has been identified as 
a major constraint in the growth and employment generation capacity of the 
industrial sector. 
Looking forward, the robust performance of the industrial sector could 
strengthen in financial year 2007 because of surging demand strengthened by 
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increase in investment, consumption and exports. The growth momentum of the 
industrial sector is likely to be supported by the manufacturing sub sector. 
However increasing imports may impinge on the performance of the 
domestic industrial sector, as many of the industries are yet to achieve economy of 
scales and gain competitiveness in line with global standard. Persistently high 
crude oil prices, surging prices of some non-ferrous metals, hardening of interest 
rates and sluggish performance of the core sector could also pose down side risks. 
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4.2 PROFILE OF AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
The installed capacity for manufacture of four wheelers and two wheelers 
in India is estimated at between 1.70 to 1.80 million units and over 3 million units 
respectively. In terms of industry sales in units, two wheelers accounted for 78% 
of the total sales between April 2005 to February 2006, followed by passenger 
vehicles at 13% (of which passenger cars accounted for 80%), three wheelers at 
5% and the remaining 4% for commercial vehicles. 
Over all sales are driven by economic development, influenced by various 
variables such as interest rates, fiiel costs, demand for private transportation and 
regulatory changes. The two wheelers segment is expected to witness a healthy 
growth in demand in medium terms during financial year 2002 to 2005, two 
wheelers sales increased at a CAGR of 15% led by demand for motor cycle whose 
sale rose by 21%, even as scooter sales were stagnant (on a CAGR basis) and 
moped sales declined. 
During the nine months of financial year 2006 growth in two wheeler sales 
were driven by motorcycles and mopeds, while scooter volumes declined. Higher 
income, access to finance, improved fuel efficiency and falling prices are expected 
to drive two wheeler volumes in the domestic market over the medium term. With 
intense competition in the home market, players are focusing on exports, which 
may enable them to diversify revenue streams and enhance profitability. Various 
firms have announced expansion plans to cater to the growing domestic and 
export market. This may result in an increase in installed capacity to over two 
million units in the medium term. 
During 2002 to 2005, passenger vehicle sales increased at a CAGR of 19% 
due to higher disposable incomes, access to relatively low cost finance and 
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introduction of new models and variants at different price points. This was 
fallowed by a modest 6% growth in passenger vehicles. 
PERFORMANCE OF AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 
4.2.1 Production, Domestic Sale and Export of Automotive in Units 
Production 
Domestic Sales: 
Exports: 
2001-02 
5,37,6302 
5,22,5788 
1,84,680 
2002-03 
6,27,9967 
5,94,1535 
3,07,308 
2003-04 
7,24,3564 
6,81,0537 
4,79,919 
2004-05 
8,46,0648 
7,89,6475 
6,29,887 
CAGR 
(%) 
16.1 
15.3 
43.2 
SOURCE: Survey of Indian Engineering Industry; The Hindu; Aug 2006 
A mix of factors, including an increase in the price of select vehicles 
following higher raw material cost increase in interest rates and fuel prices have 
dampened growth. However, expectations of healthy GDP growth, increasing 
disposable income and resultant migration of households to higher income groups 
coupled with easy availability of finance would indicate a positive outlook for 
domestic sales in the medium term. 
Moreover, lower excise duty on small cars augers well, given that mini and 
compact segment cars account for around 75% of all domestic passenger car sales. 
In light of the expected healthy growth and relatively low penetration level for 
cars, coupled with export plans, various players have announced expansions. 
Some new players have announced plans to enter the market in the medium term. 
Thus, the installed capacity is expected to increase from 1.3 million units in FY 
2005 to 1.8 million units by FY 2008. 
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4.2.2 Top Five Performing Companies in Automotive Sector in Percentage 
Growth in 2006 over 2005 
Hindustan 
Motors 
162 
Bajaj Auto 
81 
Mahindra & 
Mahindra 
69 
Hero Honda 
Motors 
68 
Force Motors \ 
i 
1 
53 1 
1 SOURCE: Survey of Indian Engineering Industry; The Hindu; Aug 2006 
4.2.3 Year Wise Performance Of The Industry 
Years 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Sales 
(Rs Crores) 
38,385 
49,796 
59,100 
65,304 
Share Of 
Market-Cap(%) 
4.3 
4.4 
4.3 
4.6 
Market-Cap 
(Rs Crores) 
30,564 
55,570 
62,242 
83,621 
Nrt Profit 
(Rs Crores) 
1,718 
3,277 
4,159 
5,582 
SOURCE: Survey of Indian Engineering Industry; The Hindu; Aug 2006 
4.3 PROFILE OF AUTOMOTIVE COMPONENTS AND 
AUXILIARY INDUSTRIES 
The size of the Indian auto components industry is estimated at U.S $ 87 
billions. Production in value terms increased at a CAGR of 21.7% during FY 2001 
to FY2005. Based largely on the identity of the identity of the buyer, the market 
can be segmented into three categories: original equipment manufacturers (OEM) 
i.e., the vehicle manufacturers. Replacement (vehicle owner who buy parts for 
maintenance and repair) and exports, 
Proportionately, OEMs accounts for 55% of the demand, followed by the 
replacement market around 30% and balance exports that is 15%. 
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The Indian industry is expected to witness healthy growth in sales on the 
strength of the rapidly escalating export, even as domestic demand may be 
impacted in the short and medium term. Given that the export potential remains 
significant, the ability of the players to capitalize on their strength and overcome 
challenges assumes importance. 
The growth of auto component sales in the domestic market is linked to 
demand for automobiles, the segment specific demand is depended also on the 
OEM demand. More over, the domestic sales growth is likely to the led by 
volumes and realization may increase only modestly. In terms of segment specific 
expectation, while two wheelers are expected to witness healthy demand growth 
in the short term, the demand in passenger and commercial vehicles is expected to 
be lower. 
Increased outsourcing by global OEMs offers an opportunity for Indian 
players, not only in increasing traditional sales but also in diversifying revenue 
streams and reducing their dependence on the domestic market. Some Indian 
companies have already initiated steps to cater to the requirement of the global 
OEMs as well as tier-1 suppliers. While a host of companies started with 
supplying labour intensive components, a few have graduated to manufacturing 
technology intensive equipments. Some have emerged as partners and a few have 
even obtained 'flill services suppliers' status, for select components that includes 
presence across the entire gamut of operations including design, development, 
tooling, casting, machinery assembly and program management. 
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4.3.1 Year Wise Industry Performance 
Production (US $ mn) 
Exports (Rs Cr) 
2001 
3965 
625 
2002 
4470 
578 
2003 
5430 
760 
2004 
6730 
1020 
2005 
8700 
1400 
SOURCE: Survey of Indian Engineering Industry; The Hindu; Aug 2006 
According to ACMA-mckinsey study, given its strengths is manufacturing 
labour and skill intensive parts, India can grab around 3-4% share of the 
outsourcing market (estimated at US $ 700 billion) by 2015. 
While the opportunities are significant, the study suggest that Indian 
manufacturers face various issues that include the need: 
i. To invest in better facilities and technologies to be able to undertake large 
export orders. 
ii. For integration of oversees acquisition, especially for large players who 
have made acquisitions in the recent past to benefit from operational 
synergies in product mix, geographies and technology. 
iii. For exposure to product liability risk: Most MNC OEMs also enforce a 
product liability clause against defective components and any consequent 
line stoppage. 
IV. For higher lead time in winning international contract: In case of export 
contract from international OEMs the lead time from the request for 
quotation till the time of commencement of actual supplies can be as high 
as three to four years. 
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V. To remain cost competitive: To be able to commit to reduction in prices as 
required by global OEMs. 
vi. To able to deal with restrictive policies of technical or financial 
collaborators that may effect export. This includes procurement policies of 
automotive OEMs, which may opt from a multiple vendor policy to 
rationalisation of the vender base. Some OEMs have been availing of 
alternate sourcing strategies like reverse actions and so on. 
4.3.2 Top Performer in Auto Auxiliary Sector 
Companies 
Returns 
over last 
year in % 
Ennore 
Foundries 
300 
Ahmadnagar 
- Forgings 
293 
Auto Mobile 
Corporation 
OfGoa 
189 
Phoenix 
Lamps 
174 
Jaiswal's 
Neco 
165 
SOURCE: Survey of Indian Engineering Industry; The Hindu; Aug 2006 
4.3.3 Key Performance Parameters-Auto Ancillary 
Parameters: 
Years: 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
.Sales In 
Rs. Crores 
16,318 
13,223 
24,824 
32,566 
Net Profit 
Rs. Crores 
974 
1143 
1478 
1934 
Market Cap: Rs. 
Crores 
10593 
20809 
32484 
40922 
Share Of 
Market 
Cap % 
1.5 
1.6 
2.2 
2.2 
SOURCE: Survey of Indian Engineering Industry; The Hindu; Aug 2006 
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4.4 CHEMICAL AND PETRO-CHEMICAL INDUSTRIES 
I. Specialty Chemical 
In Mumbai in October 2004 prof Philip koetler, the high priest of 
marlceting said "while china represent brawn India represents brain". This 
observation is especially true in the chemical business where India has inherent 
strength in speciality and knowledge chemical segment. These segments, which 
account for as much as 40% of the patents registered in India, are expected to 
increasingly leverage India's knowledge base to gain competitive advantage in the 
future. 
The size of the global chemical industry is estimated to be US $ 1.85 
trillion. It is a high-tech R & D oriented industry.. Asia-pacific and china are 
taking an increasing share of global chemical production. The growth of the 
speciality chemical industry is closely linked with dynamism of other industries 
like electronics /electrical, textiles, construction, leather and plastic processing 
which are significant end users of this chemicals. 
Speciality chemicals form 25% of the global chemical industry and 
comprises about 50 segments- paints, coatings, pigments, additives, adhesives, 
sealant, additive for pharmaceuticals, lubricants, catalysts, fine chemicals, and 
water treatment chemicals among others. Product differentiation in this segment is 
high compared to the basic segment. Production units are smaller and have a 
greater degree of flexibility in terms of switch capacity. Unlike basic chemicals, 
demand is not strictly cyclical, needs lower capital investment, where as R&D 
investment are significantly higher. Product life cycle is also shorter. 
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Product innovations and customer specific solutions have become key to 
success in specialty chemicals. Increasing commoditization has also begun to 
drive specialty segment to shift a good part of its attention to reducing 
manufacturing and other operational costs. 
The chemical industry in India has a turn over of Rs. 1,26,000 crores 
constituting 6% of GDP and 12% of total exports. It has a potential to register 
CAGR of 15.5% to become a US$ 100 billion industry by 2010. The speciality 
chemical segment should grow even faster from about US$ 10.0 billion to jJS$ 27 
billion by 2010 with a CAGR of 8.16%. Traditionally y^ifif^^'Exirb'pt-ii^fi^ 
largest potential market. / V \^  • 1 " ^ ^ * -^-X' 
II. Paints: NfA. 
Indian paint industry is just more than 100 years old. TheTe are- fTDw 12 
players in the organized sector and over 2000 in the unorganized sector. While the 
organized sector holds 70% of the Rs. 7500 crore industry, balance is contributed 
by the unorganized sector. 
The major players are Asian paints, Goodlass Nerolac, Berger. ICI and 
Shalimar. Recently world leaders like AKZO Noble, PPG, Dupoint and BASF 
have setup base in India, with product ranges such as auto refinishes, powders and 
industrial coatings. Kansai paints of Japan entered into collaboration with 
Goodlass Nerolac in 1984 and now its holding company. PPG has a joint venture 
with Asian paints. 
In the 90's, helped by a growing economy, the paint industry has recorded 
a healthy growth of 12-13% annually. This was mainly due to the drastic 
reduction in excise duty from a staggering 40% to 16%. However the growth was 
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restricted to single digit during 2002-2003. There has been a revival in 2003-2004 
with a robust growth of 13%. Asian paints is the clear market leader. With the 
industry becoming complex, most of the companies have adopted BPR with IT 
being the key driver in re-engineering. 
III. Petro Chemicals: 
Significant increase in capacity has allowed India to enjoy a surplus 
position in most petro chemicals. The recent past has witnessed a low growth in 
demand for virgin grade polymers mainly on account of high prices. The fast 
rising global demand, coupled with slow growth in capacity has resulted in 
significant increase in global petro chemical margins. 
Internationally and in India, the key strategies in petro chemical complexes 
have been to increase capacities, concentrate on core business and gain access to 
cheap feed stock. As the business environment is cyclic in nature, growth has been 
pursued both by building assets and through M & As, usually the mode during the 
downward cyclical movements. 
Given its fast paced economic growth and the expansion of export oriented 
plastic processing and textile industries, Asia expects this sector to boom 
accounting for a significant proportion of the global market. Specifically, Indian 
petro chemical demand (in terms of ethylene, propylene and aromatic such has 
benzene, toluene and xylene) is expected into increase from the level of around 
6million tones to around 25 million tonnes over the next 20 years, there by 
triggering significant increase in capacity. However while growth in the 
downstream sectors-plastic processing and textiles is vital to its market growth, 
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the indigenous petro-chemical industry faces the threat of competition from its 
Chinese counter part. 
Over the longer term, the consumption of engineering polymers such as 
polycarbonate is expected to increase there by, boosting in turn the growth rate in 
the consumption of key down stream chemicals such as phenol. Indian 
manufacturers would do well, than to consider incorporating these hitherto 
neglected products in their manufacturing process. 
Planned additional capacity scheduled to become operational before 2007 
is likely to cause a marginal decline in world wide operating rates. This may see a 
margin declining from the very high levels witnessed in the resent past, but these 
would continue to be higher than the average levels witnessed during the petro 
chemical cycle. The continuation of reasonably high margins in the global market 
in the short & medium term would also result in continued high profitability for 
the Indian companies. 
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4.5 PROFILE OF CONSUMER DURABLE INDUSTRY 
The consumer durable and semi durable industry in India is dynamic and 
highly competitive. This Rs.25,000 crore core industry in India is dominated by 
\fNC's and can be segregated into consumer electronics (TV, VCD ,DVD 
players and audio systems ) and consumer appliances, which is also known as 
white goods like refrigerators, washing machines, air conditioners, microwave 
ovens, vaccum cleaners and dish washers. 
Over the years, the demand for consumer durables has kept pace with 
rising income level, double income families, changing life styles, easy availability 
of credit and increase in the number of nuclear families, increasing consumer 
awareness and introduction of new models. While CTVs and refrigerators have 
been around for many years, washing machine, micro wave oven, air conditioners 
and vaccum cleaners are beginning to make their presence felt in the Indian 
household. The consumer durable segment was poised for decent growth in 2005-
2006 because of emerging opportunities and strong fundamental of the country's 
economy according to a survey by the federation of Indian chamber of commerce 
and industry. Quality products and superior technology and technology 
upgradation have helped the industry to achieve faster growth in terms of volume 
and higher realization in value term. 
Advancement in future technologies like the LCD panel and DVD recorder 
an the like will critically impact the industry. It is expected that by 2008, 33% of 
the world wide demand would be met by LCD and Plasma TVs. 
81 
4.6 PROFILE OF ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
The engineering /capital goods sector appears to be on a high growth path, 
driven b\ strong macro-tailwinds, such as investment in infrastructure as well as 
peaking of capacity utilization levels in several industries. Since the visibility in 
revenue and earning growth is high, the sector possibly deserves to continue to 
trade at a premium to the market. 
The engineering industry has not had it so good in almost a decade. After 
the hectic expansion activity in the mid 90's the industry has been sulking due to 
stagnant demand and Capital investments. 
Year 2003-04 was the turning point for the capital goods sector as 
industrial investments picked up. The governments impetus to develop 
infrastructure in the country in core areas such as power and road, rising global 
demand for commodities triggered by Chinese consumption and aggressive forays 
into overseas market are a few of the key demand drivers that set the engineering 
industry on the growth path. 
According to the centre for monitoring Indian economy (CMIE) the 
infrastructure sector will witness cumulative investments of Rs. 7,00,000 crores in 
the next 4 to 5 years. Companies across the value chain in the engineering 
industry have reported robust earnings. According to CMIE survey the out 
standing investment by industry in April 2004 stands at Rs 15.9 lakh crores. This 
could well sustain demands for capital goods manufacturers over the next couple 
of years. 
The top ranked capital goods company is BHEL followed by ABB and 
Crompton Greaves in terms of market capitalization. In terms of trailing 4 
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quarterly saies L&T ieads the pack. BHEL and ABB follows suit. In terms of net 
profit BHEL tops the list followed by L«fcT and ABB. Since L&T derives 
significant revenues from the construction business also, which is very cost 
competitive its profits are lower despite higher revenues. 
4,6.1 Top Five Engineering Companies In Terms Of Returns Over 2005 in % 
Lrcon Engg 
Company 
792 
Rpg 
Transmission 
573 
Sanghvi 
Motors 
502 
Manugraph 
Industries 
486 
Kirloskar 
Brothers 
476 
SOURCE: Survey of Indian Engineering Industry; The Hindu; Aug 2006 
4.6.2 Performance Parameters Of Engineering Industry Over Time 
Parameters 
Years 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
Market Cap 
In Rs. Crores 
26.975 
39.802 
53.845 
86.643 
Share Or 
Market Cap 
ln% 
3.8% 
3.1% 
3.7% 
4.7% 
Sales In 
Rs. Crores 
39.429 
30.006 
36.813 
49.733 
Net Profit In 
Rs. Crores 
2.219 
2.075 
2.783 
4.078 
SOURCE: Survey of Indian Engineering Industry; The Hindu; Aug 2006 
4.7 PROFILE OF STEEL INDUSTRIES 
Steel consumption is positively correlated to real GDP growth. In India for 
every 1% rise in GDP, there is an estimated 0.96% increase in steel consumption. 
As the nation progresses on the path to industrialization and given that investment 
in infrastructure has a close relation with demand for steel, a healthy growth in 
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steel consumption may be expected in the short to medium terms. For ever> I^ 'o 
rise in infrastructure, manufacturing and construction sector, steel consumption is 
expected to rise by 1.02%. 
Steel consumption is expected to grow at 9% per annum during the next 
five years. Increasing from around 33.40 million metric tons in FY 2005 to 56 
million metric tons in FY 2011. Demand growth is expected to be driven by 
anticipated growth in construction, automobile, oil and gas transportation and 
infrastructure sector. Currently India's steel consumption per capita is 37 kgm 
against the global average of 186 kgm. The estimated urban consumption pre 
capita is expected to increase from 77 kg at present to 165 kg in 2019-20, 
implying CAGR of 5%. Rural India's consumptions of steel is expected to 
increase from 2 kg per annum to 4 kg per annum by 2019-20 implying a CAGR of 
4.4% growth. 
On the supply side, finished steel production is expected to increase from 
around 42 mt in FY 2006 to 62 mt in FY 2011. Indian players have announced 
substantial new capacity in steel and expects an estimated installed capacity of 
around 60.mt by 2008. India has recently adopted a national steel policy (NSP) 
that envision overall production to grow 7.3% per annum to llO.mt by 2020. 
Considering the expected demand growth of 9% per annum a significant 
proportion of India's new capacity could be for export of higher value added 
products. 
India is characterized by several advantages such as increasing 
infrastructure spending, increasing per capita income and consumer spending, low 
interest rate and inflation, availability of low cost Iron ore and low labour cost. 
These advantages are countered to some extant by shortage of coking coal, cake 
84 
and scrap, high energy cost, infrastructure bottle necic. declining duty protection 
and poor labour productivity. 
However, Indian steel companies have taken effective steps to nullify 
these disadvantage. With rising steel prices, the profitability of the industry has 
improved, gearing level is declining and the interest coverage ratios are 
improving. While the duty protection level for the industry is declining it is 
unlikely to effect the Indian steel industry, given its low production cost and raw 
material availability. 
4.7.1 Production of Crude Steel in India Recorded & Forecast 
(in million metric tons) 
Production: 
Years: 
(Recorded) 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
Main 
Producers 
16.5 
18.0 
19.0 
20 
20 
Secondary 
Producers 
9.5 
10.0 
12.0 
12.5 
14.5 
Production: 
Years: 
(Forecast) 
2006 
2007 
2008 
2009 
2010 
2011 
Main 
Producers 
22 
24.5 
27 
29.5 
32.5 
35 
Secondary 
Producers 
15.9 
17.5 
19.25 
21.0 
23.0 
25.0 
SOURCE: Survey of Indian Engineering Industry; The Hindu; Aug 2006 
4.7.2 Per- Capita Consumption Of Crude- Steel In India (In Kgm) 
Years: 
Consumption 
2000 
38 
2001 
40 
2002 
42 
2003 
44 
2004 
46 
2005 
48 
SOURCE: Survey of Indian Engineering Industry; The Hindu; Aug 2006 
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4.8 PROFILE OF IT HARDWARE INDUSTRY 
Incorporating Computer, Networking and Telecom Hardware 
World wide for the past five decades of computer technology, hardware 
led and software followed. The hardware industry used to be the king and dictated 
the market for software to follow. With the rapid movement towards embedded 
technology, ensuring a healthy hardware segment is more important than ever 
before for IT industry. The decade 1986-96 was the golden period for Indian 
hardware industry. It was the time when India used to design manufacture and 
export hardware. 
Indian companies started excelling in networking devices. Companies 
made history by setting up fully automatic manufacturing capability for 
motherboards. From 1993-96, a significant percentage of Dell's Pentium 
motherboard were supplied out of India. 
But, the opening of the Indian economy and entry of global brands caught 
the Indian industry off-guard. India was under-prepared for the global competition 
from commodity servers and PC's on the one hand coupled with a massive 
squeeze for an ever increasing gray market on the other. While a lot of focus and 
attention was given to promote software exports, hardware manufacturing and 
development of infrastructure became a neglected area. Software has grown since 
at a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of 50% largely under vigorous 
government support, hardware has lagged behind just at 11 %. 
Despite all this, strong marked force has been at work and India is one of 
the fastest growing hardware market in the world today. Today the market is 
catered to by not just Indian brand manufacturers in India but MNC brand 
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manufactured here, as well, and there has been a record blooming for hardware 
exports. More than 3 million pieces were sold in 2003-2004. Today there are 
about lOcrore mobile subscribers in India. According to IDL estimation, India has 
a manufacturing potential of Rs.75000 Crores in electronic and IT hardware. 
The tax structure should provide a 10 years income tax holiday for the IT 
hardware industry. Depreciation rates on IT products or PC's should be increased 
to 100% from the existing levels. Excise duty for all imports should be reduced. 
IT products made in India need to be exempted from VAT by making distinction 
between finished goods imported for trading and those utilized in further 
manufacturing steps. This shows by no other state level less octroi / entry act as 
they impede interstate business. 
4.9 NON-FERROUS METAL INDUSTRY - ALLUMINIUM 
AND COPPER 
The strong demand for alluminium in the domestic and global market 
bolstered by the ongoing liberalization process has led to an unprecedented 
growth of the industry in the country. The most useful non-ferrous metal i.e, 
alluminium is in demand like never before. It is a phenomenon common to almost 
all the countries. As the for alluminium industry looks bright on account of 
recovery in the global economy and growing demand for allumina and aluminum 
in the domestic market, the coming years are likely to witness huge investment in 
both green field and brown field expansion. In 2004-05 domestic demand for 
aluminum increased by 12.5%. it is expected to remain strong during 2005-06 and 
is likely to grow by 8% over the previous years. 
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The most important player in Indian alluminium industry is national 
alluminium co Ltd (NALCO) in Orrisa, which is now a zero debt company. It is 
an integrated aluminum project generating with capacity of 95 lack tons of 
bauxite, 3.45 lack tons of aluminum and power generation of 900 MW. In the 
next five years, its turn over is poised to be over Rs.7000crores with profits of 
Rs.2000crores. 
As for as copper is concerned, India produces about 5.12lakh tons of 
refined copper per annum which represents 3% of the world production of 10.34 
million tons with consumption in India is around 2% of the world consumption of 
16.45 million tons. 
In India copper industry has seen extensive changes in the last couple of 
years not only in terms of demand and supply, but also in terms of government 
policies and marketing. This demand supply scenario however a massive shift 
over the last few years leading to a massive surge in copper prices at the 'London 
Metal Exchange' (LME). Indian copper industry in the past few years has taken 
substantial strides to make the country self sufficient in meeting the requirements 
of primary copper. 
Until a few years above the production capacity of 47500 tons of the lone 
indigenous producer of copper 'HCL' met 25-30% of the country's requirements 
while the rest was imported. After liberalization in 1992, to domestic players 
Starlite and 'Hindaico' based on imported collections entered the primary refined 
copper market in 1997 with production of I lakh tons each per annum 
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4.10 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The growth of Indian economy, in terms of the GDP, growing at the rate of 
approximately 9% per annum for the last five years (compared to around 5% 
before that), has been spurred by mostly services, IT and knowledge based 
sectors. This higher GDP growth has created for higher income growth in the 
upper middle class of the economy who are employed in these sectors. 
This higher income will in turn spur consumption, which in turn again will 
fuel the growth of the various sectors of the engineering industry. As has been 
observed and chronicled in this chapter, the growth of engineering industry in 
India has been spectacular during the last twelve years under study and this 
growth has been in keeping with the growth in the economy (GDP). 
As the growth in consumption, a company higher income, does not happen 
uniformly to all the types of goods and services. The growth and performance of 
engineering industry is also not uniformly distributed in all the sectors. The 
pattern of growth has been and will be in accordance with the pattern of growth of 
consumption. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DATA ANALYSIS & 
INTERPRETATION 
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This chapter is for the analysis of data collected from secondary sources. 
For the purpose of proper presentation, it has been divided into three sections 
namely A, B and C. 
In Section A, based on secondary data, time series pattern has been 
developed for all the selected eight sectors. Section B is devoted to the 
relationship between identified determining parameters and the dividend pay out. 
Finally, a Section C, the presentation and analysis is on the basis of primary data 
collected with the help of self-designed questionnaires for the corporates and 
investors. 
SECTION A 
This analysis is based on secondary data and covers a time horizon of 
twelve years spanning from 1994-95 to 2005-06. This specific time horizon has 
been chosen because Indian economy had just undergone drastic reforms in the 
form of liberalization, privatization and globalization (L-P-G) spearheaded by the 
then finance minister and the present Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh. 
This reform process started in 1991 and had a cascading effect and impact 
in almost all sectors of the economy including the manufacturing and service 
sector, as a cascading effect banking sector reform commenced in 1994 followed 
by insurance sector reforms, and as a result all areas of manufacturing sector 
including the entire gamut of engineering industry was affected positively. So this 
time horizon has been most aptly chosen, primarily, from among the companies 
listed in BSE and NSE, the top 500 have been short listed out of which only the 
engineering industries have been filtered out for analysis. 
Identification of the top five hundred have been done according to the 
judgment of the industrial unions like CII and the management / trade journals 
like ICFAI, Economic Times (ET500), Business standard, Capital Market and 
Dalai street journal. 
The engineering industries considered for studying their dividend pattern 
trends are spread into eight sectors as shown in the following table 5-a-l 
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Analysis And Interpretation: The table and the corresponding bar chart depict 
out of the top performing engineering industries in India, the single largest group 
or category amounting to more than thirty-eight percent don't pay any dividend at 
all. 
If we go farther to the micro level, to analyze the distribution of non-
dividend paying industries into various constituent sectors, we find that steel and 
Ferro-alloys and chemical/petrol-chemical /paints industry dominate the zero 
dividend paying category almost equally (about 25% each) being closely followed 
by engineering industries. (About 14%) 
If we go to the genesis and functioning of these three categories, we 
recognize the fact that they are characterized by heavy plant and machinery 
causing high fixed costs and they are capital intensive. Moreover the terms of 
payment and the trade practice prevailing in both the factor and product market 
may adversely affect their cash flows thereby jeopardizing liquidity. 
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Nevertheless, they are top performing companies in terms of mari<et capitalization 
and sales volume. 
But on the other hand, as far as the dividend paying companies are 
concerned, the dominant percentage of dividend paid is the "higher than 50 up to 
100%" category closely followed by "25% category and "100%-300%" in a 
balanced manner. 
On further scrutiny, we find that high dividend payers are dominated by 
engineering industry followed by auto components sectors. A part from the fact 
that the Indian auto component sector is a booming one in the non-IT category, 
some engineering industries deploy; physical land human resources in a balanced 
manner. Quite a few of them i.e. assembly industries are performing very well and 
hence they can share their success with shareholders. 
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Analysis And Interpretation: The table figures and the corresponding graphical 
representation of the secondary data indicate the following 
1. At the turn of the century and five years after the effective implementation 
of economic reforms the average dividend pay out in the entire gamut of 
the engineering industries in India used to be about 50% with the sole 
exception of electronic hardware in industries where in profitability 
suffered owing to continuously falling prices and keen competition in the 
market. 
2. On the higher side, the non-ferrous metal industry like aluminum, 
dividend pay out used to be almost double the average due to ever 
increasing demand and prices. 
3. The maximum growth in dividend payments over the years has been 
displayed by the automotive sector, closely followed by the engineering 
sectors. Where as, the average growth in dividend pay-out has been 
between two to three times in the past seven years in the overall industry, 
automotive sector has grown five times and engineering sector four times. 
The obvious reasons are the steady and steep rise in income of the middle 
and upper middle class resulting in higher and higher demand for 
automobiles. The engineering sector, of course, is accountable for 
continuous growth in infrastructure and rising exports. 
4. It is indeed very curious and interesting to note that the non-ferrous metal 
sector started at the higher point compared to the others, but the growth is 
not even twice and well below average. The reason may as well be that 
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they are continuously expanding tliere capacity incurring higiier and fixed 
cost and thereby pushing up their break even point further and further. 
If the dividend decision can be thought of as an active decision regarding 
the left over, the non-ferrous metal industries dominated by aluminum 
does not have much left over. 
5. The Compounded Average Growth Rate (CAGR) of the dividend pay out 
in the engineering industry has been approximately 16.2% over the past 
seven years. But the growth rate has been highest during the 2003-04 
period mostly spearheaded by the automotive sector. The effect of 
economic liberalization and globalization started showing its results during 
this period creating higher employment and income in the middle and the 
upper middle classes. 
5-A-2: Sector Wise Trend In The Form Of Time Series Regression Analysis 
Of Dividend Payout Pattern Of Indian Engineering Industries. 
Out of the eight sectors of engineering industries under consideration the 
respective dividend payouts have been averaged for each year and have been 
tabulated as shown below. 
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5-A-3: Time Series Trend Analysis with Test for Goodness of Fit for 
Automotive Sector. 
YEAR 
94-95 
95-96 
96-97 
97-98 
98-99 
99-00 
00-01 
01-02 
02-03 
03-04 
04-05 
05-06 
X 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Yo 
31.67 
37.89 
43.85 
35.45 
39.90 
52 
51 
73 
108 
148 
224 
241 
Yc 
26.4 
28.84 
34.67 
41.68 
50.11 
60.25 
68.9 
81.65 
104.71 
152.2 
195.8 
212.7 
Yo-Yc 
5.27 
9.05 
9.18 
-6.23 
-10.21 
-8.25 
-17.9 
-8.65 
3.29 
-4.2 
28.2 
28.3 
Chi-square 
Regressio 
(Yo-Yc)' 
27.7729 
81.9025 
84.2724 
38.8129 
104.2441 
68.0625 
320.41 
74.8225 
10.8241 
17.64 
795.24 
800.89 
n Statistics 
(Yo-Yc)'A'c 
1.052004 
2.839893 
2.430701 
0.931212 
2.080305 
1.129668 
4.650363 
0.916381 
0.103372 
0.1159 
4.061491 
3.76535 
24.07664 
LOGYo 
1.500648 
1.578525 
1.64197 
1.549616 
1.600973 
1.716003 
1.70757 
1.863323 
2.033424 
2.170262 
2.350248 
2.382017 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.9390969 
0.8819029 
0.8700932 
0.1140436 
12 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat 
Intercept 
X Variable 
1.3034848 
0.0824126 
0.070189 
0.0095368 
18.571082 
8.6415336 
100 
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Analysis and Interpretation: Cr itical value of the chi-square variant for 11 
degrees of freedom at 1% is 24.715. Hence, the time series regression for 
automobile sector indicates the logarithmic fitted trend, but it is expected that with 
future years the dividend may grow exponentially. 
Table 5-A-4: Time Series Trend Analysis With Test For Goodness Of Fit 
Auto Component/ Ancillary Sector. 
Year 
94-95 
95-96 
96-97 
97-98 
98-99 
99-00 
00-01 
01-02 
02-03 
03-04 
04-05 
05-06 
X 
-5.5 
-4.5 
-3.5 
-2.5 
-1.5 
-0.5 
0.5 
1.5 
2.5 
3.5 
4.5 
5.5 
Y 
0 
40 
43.09 
59.26 
58.27 
45.89 
43 
46 
60 
71 
89 
103 
104 
Y 
C 
33.565 
39.015 
46.5 
51.58 
55.365 
56.24 
58.31 
71.715 
77.165 
82.615 
94.64 
97.84 
Y -Y 
0 C 
6.435 
4.075 
12.76 
6.69 
-9.475 
-13.24 
-12.31 
-1.715 
-6.165 
6.385 
8.36 
6.16 
(Y -Y )2 
0 C 
41.409225 
16.605625 
162.8176 
44.7561 
89.775625 
175.2976 
151.5361 
137.241225 
38.007225 
40.768225 
69.8896 
37.9456 
(Y -Y )2A'C 
0 C 
1.233702518 
0.425621556 
3.501453763 
0.867702598 
1.621523074 
3.116955903 
2.598801235 
1.9137032 
0.492544871 
0.493472432 
0.738478445 
0.387833197 
17.39179279 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.8443787 
0.7129753 
0.6842728 
13.090203 
12 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat 
Intercept 
X Variable 
63.5425 
5.4557692 
3.7788162 
1.0946578 
16.815451 
4.9839952 
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FIG: &-A-4 
Analysis And Interpretation: The fitted trend indicates that in the auto 
component ancillary sector over the years the dividend pay out has grown almost 
linearly. 
103 
Table 5-A-5: Time Series Trend Analysis With Test For of Goodness of Fit 
for Engineering Industries Sector. 
Year 
94-95 
95-96 
96-97 
97-98 
98-99 
99-00 
00-01 
01-02 
02-03 
03-04 
04-05 
05-06 
X 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Yo 
30.37 
33.89 
57.27 
36.82 
43.87 
47 
40 
48 
63 
124 
171 
202 
a+bx 
1.416 
1.482 
1.548 
1.614 
1.68 
1.746 
1.512 
1.878 
1.744 
2.16 
2.076 
2.142 
Yc 
26.06 
30.33 
45.31 
41.11 
47.86 
55.71 
32.12 
55.63 
55.45 
144.35 
188 
219.78 
Yo-Yc 
4.31 
3.56 
11.96 
-4.29 
-3.99 
-8.71 
7.88 
-7.63 
7.55 
-20.35 
-17 
-17.78 
(Yo-
Yc)^  
18.576 
12.674 
143.04 
18.404 
15.92 
75.864 
62.094 
58.217 
57.003 
414.12 
289 
316.13 
(YoYc)'A'c 
0.7128 
0.4179 
3.157 
0.4477 
0.3326 
1.3618 
1.9332 
1.0465 
1.028 
2.8689 
1.5372 
1.4384 
16.282 
logb 
1.4824 
1.5301 
1.7579 
1.5661 
1.6422 
1.6721 
1.6021 
1.6812 
1.7993 
2.0934 
2.233 
2.3054 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Intercept 
X Vari I 
Coefficients 
1.349974067 
0.066224551 
Std Error 
0.091 
0.012 
0.859418337 
0.738599879 
0.712459867 
0.14898252 
tStat 
14.722 
5.315 
12 
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FIG : 5-A-5 
Analysis And Interpretation: For the engineering industry sector, dividend 
payout has increased exponentially with time or time, as independent variable has 
been a logarithmic function of dividend payments. It only indicates that dividend 
payment in this sector is going to increase in leaps and bounds in future 
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Table 5-A-6: Time Series Trend Analysis With Test for Goodness of Fit for 
Chemical, Petro Chemical and Paint Sector. 
YEARS 
94-95 
95-96 
96-97 
97-98 
98-99 
99-00 
00-01 
01-02 
02-03 
03-04 
04-05 
05-06 
Total 
X: TIME 
VARIABLE 
-5.50 
-4.50 
-3.50 
-2.50 
-1.50 
-0.50 
0.50 
+1.50 
+2.50 
+3.50 
+4.50 
+5.50 
0 
OBSERVED 
DIVIDEND 
PAY-OUT 
IN%(Yo) 
27.47 
29.63 
34.94 
38 
63 
48 
53 
77 
104 
126 
110 
99 
810.04 
CALCULATED 
DIVIDEND PAY-
OUT 
lN%{Yc) 
-18.93 
27.76 
36.6 
45.43 
54.26 
63.09 
71.92 
80.75 
89.58 
98.41 
107.24 
116.07 
Yo-Yc 
-8.54 
1.87 
-1.66 
-7.43 
8.54 
-15.09 
-18.92 
-3.75 
14.42 
27.59 
2.76 
-17.07 
(Yo-
Yc)^ 
72.93 
3.49 
2.7536 
55.20 
72.93 
227.70 
357.96 
14.06 
207.93 
761.20 
7.62 
291.38 
(Yo-Y(-)' 
Yc 
-8.53 
.126 
.075 
1.215 
1.344 
3.60 
4.98 
.174 
2.32 
7.73 
.071 
2.51 
15.615 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.9180365 
0.842791 
0.8270701 
14.416835 
12 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
10.126515 
8.8272028 
8.8729489 
1.2055963 
1.1412796 
7.321856 
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FIG: 5-A-6 
Analysis And Interpretation: It appears from the fitted graph that the time 
series of dividend payment in the chemical, petro chemical and paint sector 
follows a linear trend 
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Table 5-A-7: Time Series Trend Analysis with Test for Goodness of Fit for 
Consumer Durables 
YEARS 
94-95 
95-96 
96-97 
97-98 
98-99 
99-00 
00-01 
01-02 
02-03 
03-04 
04-05 
05-06 
TOTAL 
X: TIME 
VARIABLE 
-5.50 
-4.50 
-3.50 
-2.50 
-1.50 
-0.50 
0.50 
+1.50 
+2.50 
+3.50 
+4.50 
+5.50 
OBSERVED 
DIVIDEND 
PAY-OUT 
IN%(Yo) 
20.27 
25.47 
32.86 
28.82 
37.37 
59 
39 
47 
56 
54 
73 
62 
530.79 
CALCULA-
TED 
DIVIDEND 
PAY-OUT 
IN%(Yc) 
21.55 
25.672 
29.796 
33.92 
38.044 
42.168 
46.292 
50.416 
54.54 
58.66 
62.79 
66.91 
Yo-Yc 
-1.28 
-0.202 
3.64 
-5.10 
-.674 
16.832 
-7.292 
-3.416 
1.46 
-4.66 
10.21 
-4.91 
(Yo-Yc)' 
1.64 
.040 
9.39 
26.01 
.454 
283.32 
53.17 
11.67 
2.13 
21.72 
104.24 
24.11 
(Yo-Yc)' 
Yc 
.076 
.0015 
.315 
.766 
.012 
6.72 
1.15 
.231 
.039 
.370 
1.66 
.360 
11.694 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.9051317 
0.8192634 
0.8011897 
7.3254949 
12 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
17.757424 
4.1243706 
4.5085305 
0.6125887 
3.938628 
6.7326918 
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FIG: 5-A-7 
Analysis And Interpretation: It appears from the fitted graph that the time 
series of dividend payment in the consumer durables follows a linear trend 
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Table 5-A-8: Time Series Trend Analysis With Test for Goodness of Fit for 
Steel /Ferro- AIlovs Sector 
YEAR 
94-95 
95-96 
96-97 
97-98 
98-99 
99-00 
00-01 
01-02 
02-03 
03-04 
04-05 
05-06 
X 
-5.5 
-4.5 
-3.5 
-2.5 
-1.5 
-0.5 
0.5 
1.5 
2.5 
3.5 
4.5 
5.5 
Yo 
24.4 
23.9 
28.8 
36 
27.3 
26 
38 
30 
57 
85 
130 
133 
Yc 
18.94 
20.65 
24.27 
28.51 
33.5 
37.3 
42.65 
45.96 
63.83 
90.23 
117.5 
123 
Yo-Yc 
5.44 
3.24 
4.52 
7.47 
-6.24 
-11.3 
-4.65 
-15.96 
-6.83 
-5.23 
12.5 
10 
(Yo-Yc)' 
29.5936 
10.4976 
20.4304 
55.8009 
38.9376 
127.69 
21.6225 
254.722 
46.6489 
27.3529 
156.25 
100 
(YO-YC)VYC 
1.562492 
0.508358 
0.841796 
1.95724 
1.162316 
3.423324 
0.506975 
5.542245 
0.73083 
0.303146 
1.329787 
0.813008 
18.68152 
Regression 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
Statistics 
0.8303772 
0.6895263 
0.6584789 
23.676773 
12 
Coefficients 
-7.375 
9.3307692 
Standard Error 
14.572046 
1.9799512 
tStat 
-0.506106 
4.7126258 
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FIG: 5-A-8 
Analysis And Interpretation: It appears from the fitted graph that the time 
series of dividend payment in the steel / ferro- alloys sector follows a exponential 
trend 
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Table 5-A-9: Time Series Trend Analysis With Test for Goodness of Fit 
forNon-Ferrous Metals / Alloys Sector. 
YEARS 
94-95 
95-96 
96-97 
97-98 
98-99 
99-00 
00-01 
01-02 
02-03 
03-04 
04-05 
05-06 
TOTAL 
X:TIME 
VARIABLE 
-5,50 
-4.50 
-3.50 
-2.50 
-1.50 
-0.50 
0.50 
+1.50 
+2.50 
+3.50 
+4.50 
+5.50 
0 
OBSERVED 
DIVIDEND 
PAY-OUT 
IN % (Yo) 
38.62 
37.33 
57.29 
79.06 
72.27 
87 
100 
90 
98 
93 
129 
121 
1002.57 
CALCULA-
TED 
DIVIDEND 
PAY-OUT 
IN % (Yc) 
42.35 
49.85 
57.33 
64.82 
72.31 
79.80 
87.29 
94.78 
102.27 
109.76 
117.25 
124.74 
Yo-Yc 
-3.73 
-12.52 
-0.04 
14.24 
-0.04 
7.20 
12.71 
-4.78 
-4.27 
-16.76 
11.75 
-3.74 
(Yo-Yc)' 
13.91 
156.75 
.0.16 
202.77 
.0016 
51.84 
161.54 
22.85 
18.23 
281 
138 
13.98 
(Yo-Yc)' 
Yc 
.33 
3.14 
.0001 
3.13 
.0001 
.649 
1.85 
.030 
.178 
2.56 
1.18 
.112 
13.15 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.9397999 
0.8832239 
0.8715463 
10.298577 
12 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
34.864091 
7.4897552 
6.3383358 
0.8612102 
5.5005118 
8.6967791 
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NON-FERROUS METALS/ALLOYS 
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FIG: 5-A-9 
Analysis And Interpretation: It appears from the fitted graph that the time 
series of dividend payment in the non-ferrous metals / alloys sector follows a 
linear trend 
;13 
Table 5-A-lO: Time Series Trend Analysis With Test for Goodness of Fit for 
Electronic /Telecom HAV Sector 
Year 
94-95 
95-96 
96-97 
97-98 
98-99 
99-00 
00-01 
01-02 
02-03 
03-04 
04-05 
05-06 
X 
-5.5 
-4.5 
-3.5 
-2.5 
-1.5 
-0.5 
0.5 
1.5 
2.5 
3.5 
4.5 
5.5 
Yo 
26.23 
22.73 
25.67 
23.8 
33.82 
20 
33 
27 
50 
93 
138 
138 
Yc 
20.89 
21.65 
23.01 
26.67 
27.98 
29.64 
37.84 
39.445 
60.53 
83.56 
116 
132.7 
Reg 
Yo-Yc 
5.34 
1.08 
2.66 
-2.87 
5.84 
-9.64 
-4.84 
-12.445 
-10.53 
9.44 
22 
5.3 
ression Sta 
(Yo-Yc)-
28.5156 
1.1664 
7.0756 
8.2369 
34.1056 
92.9296 
23.4256 
154.878025 
110.8809 
89.1136 
484 
28.09 
tistics 
(Yo-Yc)-/Yc 
1.365035902 
0.053875289 
0.307501086 
0.308845144 
1.218927806 
3.135276653 
0.619069767 
3.926429839 
1.831833801 
1.066462422 
4.172413793 
0.211680482 
18.21735199 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.839424 
0.7046327 
0.675096 
0.1748991 
12 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
1.6073911 
0.0714365 
0.050489 31.836439 
0.0146258 4.884276 
14 
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FIG: 5-Ar10 
Analysis and Interpretation: It appears from the fitted graph that the time series 
of dividend payment in the electronic /telecom h/w sector follows a exponential 
trend 
15 
Table 5-A-ll: Time Series Trend Analysis With Test for Goodness of Fit for 
Overall Industry Sector 
Year 
94-95 
95-96 
96-97 
97-98 
98-99 
99-00 
00-01 
01-02 
02-03 
03-04 
04-05 
05-06 
X 
-5.5 
-4.5 
-3.5 
-2.5 
-1.5 
-0.5 
0.5 
1.5 
2.5 
3.5 
4.5 
5.5 
Yo 
29.88 
31.74 
42.49 
42.02 
45.27 
48 
50 
57 
76 
102 
134 
138 
Yc 
26.89 
28.58 
37.89 
42.485 
52.035 
61.585 
67.21 
73.54 
85.65 
99.785 
118.78 
122 
Yo-Yc 
2.99 
3.16 
4.6 
-0.465 
-6.765 
-13.585 
-17.21 
-16.54 
-9.65 
2.215 
15.22 
16 
(Yo-Yc)' 
8.9401 
9.9856 
21.16 
0.216225 
45.765225 
184.552225 
296.1841 
273.5716 
93.1225 
4.906225 
231.6484 
256 
(Yo-Yc)'/Yc 
0.332469319 
0.349391183 
0.558458696 
0.005089443 
0.879508504 
2.996707396 
4.406845707 
3.720038075 
1.0872446 
0.049167961 
1.950230679 
2.098360656 
18.43351222 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.9063662 
0.8214997 
0.8036497 
16.846443 
12 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
4.2457576 
9.5570629 
10.368269 
1.4087703 
0.4094953 
6.7839751 
16 
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FIG: 5-A-ll 
Analysis and Interpretation: It q>pears fix}in the fitted graph that the time series 
of dividend payment in the overall industry sector follows a linear trend. 
Concluding Remarks 
Dividend payment pattern of the eight identified sectors i.e. automotive, 
auto-components, engineering, steel/ferro alloys, non-ferrous metals, chemical/ 
petro-chemical/paint, consumer durable and electronic hardware has been 
investigated and time series regression analysis has been done. The growth has 
been linear in auto-components, chemical/petro-chemical consumer durables, and 
non-ferrous metals/aluminium sectors. The other four sectors have shown 
exponential trend. 
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SECTION B 
In this section is meant to satisfy the objectives of analysis of the influence 
of firm's specific characteristics on the dividend payment pattern. The purpose of 
any business enterprise is undoubtedly wealth creation for the stake holders in 
particular and the society, at large, in general. So the management's decision to 
pay dividends can't be an exception to this. And one of the measures for wealth 
creation in this world of business is market capitalization: 
Apart from the above-mentioned generality of purpose, there are certain 
identified factor specific to engineering industries that some times govern and 
some times restrains the dividend payments. This chapter is dedicated to 
identifying these general and industry specific factors that inspire, favor, 
encourage or restrain dividend payments and quantitatively explore the strength of 
the relationship between these identified factors and dividend payouts. 
Totally seven factors or variable, two general and five specific have been 
identified as follows: 
1. The dependent variables sector wise specific average dividend pay out 
2. And the independent variables as: 
i. Wealth creation, internally as the net worth. 
II. Wealth creation, externally as the market capitalization. 
III. Fixed costs and depreciation in terms of plant and machinery 
IV. Determining retention of internal control in terms of promoter's equity 
(PROM STAKE). 
V. Determining dictates of financial institutions in terms of institutional 
holdings (INST HLD). 
VI. Liquidity. Internally, in terms of net cash in flow (NCIF) 
VII. Liquidity, externally, in terms of interest paid (INT) 
Table 5 B-1 Sector Wise Dividend Pay-Outs Versus Controlling Factors 
Under Study. 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
12 yrs parameters averages 
Sectors 
Automotives; 
Auto- components/ancillaries: 
Engineering industry 
Chemical/petro-chemicals/paints 
Consumer durables 
Steel/fero-alloys 
Non-ferrous metals/alloys 
Electronics/tele com/ it hardwares 
AVG DIV 
PAY-OUT 
% 
20.48 
63.54 
74.76 
67.50 
44.56 
53.28 
83.05 
57.53 
AVGE 
N-W 
(Rs. Cr) 
2527.77 
719.39 
303.03 
3837.43 
252.22 
1961.62 
4234.27 
167.73 
AVG MKT 
CAP. (Rs. 
Cr.) 
11787.73 
4033.33 
1236.36 
4147.27 
2729.88 
29334.79 
10973.05 
1020.23 
P&M 
(Rs. Cr.) 
109.07 
33.54 
25.69 
159.08 
22.78 
147.49 
80.07 
37.73 
PROM 
STAKE 
% 
53.82 
49.5 
60.72 
61.17 
57.71 
45.86 
63.22 
40.45 
INST 
HLD 
% 
32.50 
20.80 
17 
22 
18.75 
31.5 
21 
28.5 
N-C 1-F 
(Rs. Cr.) 
82.28 
75.17 
78.56 
-99.37 
-3.86 
80.70 
275.77 
38.82 
INT 
(RsCr.) 
70.22 
7.72 
2.84 
38.66 
0.93 
18.104 
30.77 
1.01 
Table 5-B-l depicts 12 years (94-95 to 05-06), the average of seven 
factors as listed above in all, the eight sectors of the engineering industry, against 
the average dividend payout in percentage. 
S-B-2: Correlation And Regression Analysis Between Dividend Payout And 
Controlling Factors. 
Rigorous statistical analysis have been carried out to extract and highlight 
the influence of these identified factors on dividend as follows: 
1. Co-relation analysis between dividend payout and of these seven factors 
taken separately one by one. 
2. Regression analysis, both linear and exponential depending upon the 
suitability with the observed data have been carried out taking each of 
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these factors separately as independent variable (x) and dividend payout 
as dependent variable (y). 
3. For each of this regression relationship evolved, test of goodness of fit by 
'Chi-square test' have been carried out and the significance at 5% has 
been checked. As shown, in the respective table all the regression 
equations have passed the 'Chi-square test' indicating the goodness of fit. 
4. Multivariate regression analysis taking five of these seven factors as 
independent variables versus dividend payout as the dependent variable 
has been carried out and the corresponding goodness of fit in terms of 
'Chi-square test' has been carried out. 
5. For these regression equations, line graphs have been plotted depicting the 
observed data and those calculated as per the regression equation. 
6. Relevant inferences have been drawn and discussed for each of these 
seven determining variables. 
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Table: 5-B-2: Co-relation & Regression Analysis, Average Dividend Payout 
& Average Net Worth 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
g 
12 YRS PARAMETERS AVERAGES 
SECTORS 
AUTOMOTIVES: 
AUTO- COMPONENTS/ANCILLARIES: 
ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
CHEMICAL/PETRO-CHEMICALS/PAINTS 
CONSUMER DURABLES 
STEEUFERO-ALLOYS 
NON-FERROUS METALS/ALLOYS 
ELECTRONICS/TELE COM/ IT 
HARDWARES 
Regn 
AVG DIV 
(Y„)% 
90.48 
63.54 
74.76 
67.50 
44.56 
53.28 
83.05 
52.53 
AVGNW 
%(X)Rs. Cr 
2527.77 
719.39 
303.03 
3837.43 
252.22 
t%1.62 
4234.27 
167.73 
3ssion Statistics 
CAL DIV 
%(Yc) 
70.22 
60.31 
60.02 
77.41 
57.77 
67.12 
79.58 
57.28 
Yo-Yc 
20.26 
3.23 
14.74 
-9.91 
-13.21 
-13.84 
3.47 
-4.75 
(Y„-Yc)' 
410.4676 
10.4329 
217.2676 
98.2081 
174.5041 
191.5456 
12.0409 
22.5625 
(Y„-Ycr 
Y, 
5 845451 
0 172988 
3.61992 
1268675 
3.02067 
2.853778 
0.151306 
0393898 
17 32669 
IVIultiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.570781 
0.3257909 
0.2134227 
14.132997 
8 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
56.569293 
0.005509 
7.55256787.4900742 
0.00323541.7027378 
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Net Worth versus Avg Div 
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FIG: 5-B-2 
Co-relation between 'x' and 'y' is 0.57 
The regression equation is given by Yc = 56.57 + 0055 X 
The calculated value of'Chi Square' variate is 17.33, cut off value for 7 degrees 
of freedom is 18.66. 
Analysis & Interpretation: We see that these two variables i.e. average dividend 
pay out and net worth are moderately co related and they have fairly linear 
regression relationship with each other. The 't' statistic for the co-relation co-
efficient has been computed and shown. 
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TABLE 5-B-3: Co-relation and Regression Analysis: Average Dividend 
Payout Versus Average Market Capitalization 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
2 YRS PARAMETERS 
AVERAGES 
SECTORS 
AUTOMOTIVES: 
AUTO-
COMPONENTS/ANCILLARIES. 
ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
CHEMIGAL/PETRO-
CHEMICALS/PAINTS 
CONSUMER DURABLES 
STEEL/FERO-ALLOYS 
NON-FERROUS 
METALS/ALLOYS 
ELECTRONICS/TELE COM/ IT 
HARDWARES 
AVG DIV 
(Yo)% 
90.48 
63.54 
74.76 
67.50 
44.56 
53.28 
83.05 
52.53 
W G 
MKT 
Rs.Cr.(X) 
11787.73 
4033.33 
1236.36 
4147.27 
2729.88 
29334.79 
10973.05 
1020.23 
Regression Statistics 
LogYOLogX 
1.96 
1.80 
CAL 
Yc 
4.0772.53 
3.61 61.78 
1.87 3.0964.28 
1.83 
1.65 
1.73 
1.92 
1.72 
3.6267.12 
3.4462.78 
4.4769.26 
4.0470.26 
3.01 59.25 
Yo-Yc 
17.95 
1.76 
10.48 
0.38 
-18.22 
-15.98 
12.79 
-6.72 
(Yo - Yc)' 
322.20 
3.10 
109.83 
0.14 
331.97 
255.30 
163.64 
45.16 
(Yo-
Yc)' 
Yc 
4.44 
0.05 
1.71 
0.00 
5.29 
3.69 
2.33 
0.76 
18.27 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.0221948 
0.0004926 
-0.166092 
17.207983 
8 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
65.908598 
3.725E-05 
8.261119 
0.0006851 
7.9781684 
0.0543795 
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FIG: 5-B-3 
Co-relation between 'x' and 'y' is 0.022 
The regression equation is given by Yc = 65.90 * X 3.725E-05 
The calculated value of 'Chi Square' variate is 18.27, cut off value for 7 degrees 
of freedom is 18.66. 
Analysis & Interpretation: We observe that the average dividend payout in 
engineering industries are very weakly co-related with average market 
capitalization and their regression interrelationship is exponential. The 't' statistic 
for the co-relation co-efficient and the chi-square value for the goodness of 
exponential fit have been shown in the respective table. 
Table 5-B-4: Co-Relation And Regression Analysis: Average Dividend 
Payout Versus Average Plant & Machinery 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
12 YRS PARAMETERS AVERAGES 
SECTORS 
AUTOMOTIVES: 
AUTO-
COMPONENTS/ANCILLARIES: 
ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
CHEMICAL/PETRO-
CHEMICALS/PAINTS 
CONSUMER DURABLES 
STEEL/FERO-ALLOYS 
NON-FERROUS METALS/ALLOYS 
ELECTRONICS/TELE COM/ IT 
HARDWARES 
AVG DIV 
[Yo)% 
90.48 
63.54 
74.76 
67.50 
44.56 
53.28 
83.05 
52.53 
P&M CAL DIV 
Rs.Cr.(X) %(Yc) 
109.07 
33.54 
25.69 
159.08 
22.78 
147.49 
80.07 
37.73 
70.50 
63.39 
65.25 
69.89 
59.56 
58.72 
64.23 
58.23 
Yo-Yc 
19.98 
0.15 
9.51 
-2.39 
-15.00 
-5.44 
18.82 
-5.70 
(Yo - Yc f (Yo - Yc f 
399.20 
0.02 
90.44 
5.71 
225.00 
29.59 
354.19 
32.49 
Yt 
5.66 
0.00 
1.39 
0.08 
3.78 
0.50 
5.51 
0.56 
17.48 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.2272463 
0.0516409 
-0.106419 
16.761905 
8 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
61.214344 
0.0649691 
10.563263 5.795022 
0.11366350.5715918 
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FIG: 5-B-4 
Co-relation between 'x' and 'y' is 0.23 
The regression equation is given by Yc = 61.21+ 0.065 X 
The calculated value o f Chi Square' variate is 17.48, cut off value for 7 degrees 
of freedom is 18.66. 
Analysis and Interpretation: We observe that co-relation between the dividend 
payout and the cost of plant and machinery representing the fixed cost and 
depreciation is very weak, but their mutual regression relationship can best be 
represented by a straight line as found. The fit is good as the chi-square variant 
value is within cut off limit i.e. 18.66. The corresponding values of't ' statistic and 
the co-relation as shows in the computer outputs. 
Table S-B-5: Co-relation and Regression Analysis: Average Dividend Payout 
Versus Average Promoters Stake in Percentage 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
12 YRS PARAMETERS 
AVERAGES 
SECTORS 
AUTOMOTIVES: 
AUTO-
COMPONENTS/ANCILLARIES: 
ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
CHEM1CA17PETR0-
CHEMICALS/PAINTS 
CONSUMER DURABLES 
STEEL/FERO-ALLOYS 
NON-FERROUS 
METALS/ALLOYS 
ELECTRONICS/TELE COM/ IT 
HARDWARES 
AVG DIV 
tYo)% 
90.48 
63.54 
74.76 
67.50 
44.56 
53.28 
83.05 
52.53 
PRO STAKE 1: AL DIV 
%(X) 
53.82 
49.50 
60.72 
61.17 
57.71 
45.86 
63.22 
40.45 
•/o(Yc) 
68.79 
61.91 
72.51 
71.54 
69.67 
59.21 
73.25 
53.35 
Yo-Yc 
21.69 
1.63 
2.25 
-4.04 
-25.11 
-5.93 
9.80 
-0.82 
(Yo - Yc f (Yo - Yc f, 
470.46 
2.66 
5.06 
16.32 
630.51 
35.16 
96.04 
0.67 
Yc 
6.84 
0.04 
0.07 
0.23 
9.05 
0.59 
1.31 
0.01 
18.15 
Regression Statistics 
l\^ ultiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.4836249 
0.233893 
0.1062085 
15.065435 
8 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
Coefficients Standard En-or tStat 
15.123615 
0.945106 
38.1213330.3967231 
0.69829831.3534417 
100 : 
i: 
a 40 
I 20 
Avg DIv Payout vs Promoters Stake (%) 
53.82 49.5 60.72 61.17 57.71 45.86 63.22 40.45 
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Co-relation between 'x' and 'y' is 0.483 
The regression equation is given by Yc = 15.12 + 0.95 X 
The calculated value of'Chi Square' variate is 18.15, cut off value for 7 degrees 
of freedom is 18.66. 
Analysis & Interpretation: We find the co-relation between average dividend 
pay out and promoters take here is moderate and the corresponding regression is 
linear. The fitness is just good as is evident from the near cut off value of the 
computed chi-square variable. The computed value of the co-relation co-efficient 
and the corresponding 't' statistic have been shown. 
Table 5-B-6: Co-relation and Regression Analysis: Average Dividend Payout 
Versus Average Institutional Stake 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
2 YRS PARAMETERS 
AVERAGES 
SECTORS 
AUTOMOTIVES: 
AUTO-
COMPONENTS/ANCILLARIES: 
ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
CHEMICAL/PETRO-
CHEMICALS/PAINTS 
CONSUMER DURABLES 
STEEL/FERO-ALLOYS 
NON-FERROUS 
METALS/ALLOYS 
ELECTRONICS/TELE COM/ IT 
HARDWARES 
AVG DIV 
(Yo)% 
90.48 
63.54 
74.76 
67.50 
44.56 
53.28 
83.05 
52.53 
AVG INST 
STAKE IN % 
tX) 
32.50 
20.80 
17.00 
22.00 
18.75 
31.50 
21.00 
28.50 
CAL DlV 
%(Yc) 
72.65 
62.66 
64.61 
66.55 
63.87 
67.93 
75.28 
64.73 
Vo-Yc 
17.83 
0.88 
10.15 
0.95 
-19.31 
-14.65 
7.77 
-12.20 
(Yo - Yc f 
317.91 
0.77 
103.02 
0.90 
372.88 
214.62 
60.37 
148.84 
(Yo-Yc)-
Yc 
4.38 
0.01 
1.59 
0.01 
5.84 
3.16 
0.80 
2.30 
18.10 
;_S 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.0857785 
R Square 0.0073579 
Adjusted R Square -0.1580824 
Standard Error 17.148783 
Observations 8 
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat 
Intercept 60.705611 26.807162 2.2645295 
X Variable 1 0.229394 1.0877385 0.2108907 
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Co-relation between 'x' and 'y' is 0.085 
The regression equation is given by Yc = 60.71 + 0.23 X 
The calculated value of 'Chi Square' variate is 18.10, cut off value for 7 degrees 
of freedom is 18.66. 
Analysis and Interpretation: We find that the co-relation between the two 
average dividend pay out and institutional stake variables under consideration is 
very feeble and as such the institutional dictates in determining dividend payout is 
virtually non-existent, but their regression relationship is fairly linear with a very 
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high intercept and a low regression co-efficient. The corresponding co-relation co-
efficient and 't' statistics have been shown. 
Table 5-B-7: Co-relation and Regression Analysis: Average Dividend Payout 
Versus Average Net-Cash Flow 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
12 YRS PARAMETERS 
AVERAGES 
SECTORS 
AUTOMOTIVES: 
AUTO-
COMPONENTS/ANCILLARIES: 
ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
CHEMICAL/PETRO-
CHEMICALS/PAINTS 
CONSUMER DURABLES 
STEEL/FERO-ALLOYS 
NON-FERROUS 
METALS/ALLOYS 
ELECTRONICS/TELE COM/ IT 
HARDWARES 
Re 
AVG DIV 
[Yo)% 
90.48 
63.54 
74.76 
67.50 
44.56 
53.28 
83.05 
52.53 
gression 
AVGNC 
IN Rs. Cr. 
(X) 
82.28 
75.17 
78.56 
-99.37 
-3.86 
80.70 
275.77 
38.82 
Statistics 
GALE DIV 
»/.(Yc) 
71.58 
66.86 
67.10 
59.28 
61.27 
67.25 
81.04 
64.29 
Yo-Yc 
18.90 
-3.32 
7.66 
8.22 
-16.71 
-13.97 
2.01 
-11.76 
( Y o - Y c ) ' [ Y o - Y c ) ' 
357.21 
11.02 
58.68 
67.57 
279.22 
195.16 
4.04 
138.30 
Yc 
k.99 
0.16 
0.87 
1.14 
4.56 
2.90 
0.05 
2.15 
16.83 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard Error 
Observations 
0.4672864 
0.2183566 
0.0880827 
15.21743 
8 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
61.546908 
0.0706814 
6.47558089.5044614 
0.05459471.2946561 
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Avg Div Payout vs Net Cashflow (Rs Cr) 
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FIG:5-B-7 
Co-relation between 'x' and 'y' is 0.47 
The regression equation is given by Yc = 61.55 + 0.070 X 
The calculated value of 'Chi Square' variate is 16.83, cut off value for 7 degrees 
of freedom is 18.66. 
Analysis and Interpretation: The observed co-relation between the two average 
dividend pay out and net cash flow variables under consideration is moderate and 
their regression relationship is fairly linear as is evident from the goodness of fit 
quotient i.e. value of the chi-square variable well within the cut off value. The 
corresponding co-relation co-efficient and 't' statistic have been furnished. 
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Table S-B-8: Co-relation and Regression Analysis: Average Dividend Payout 
Versus Average Interest Paid 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
12 YRS PARAMETERS 
AVERAGES 
SECTORS 
AUTOMOTIVES: 
AUTO-
COMPONENTS/ANCILLARIES: 
ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
CHEMICAL/PETRO-
CHEMICALS/PAINTS 
CONSUMER DURABLES 
STEEL/FERO-ALLOYS 
NON-FERROUS 
METALS/ALLOYS 
ELECTRONICS/TELE COM/ IT 
HARDWARES 
AVG DIV 
(Yo)% 
90.48 
63.54 
74.76 
67.50 
44.56 
53.28 
83.05 
52.53 
Regression 
AVG INT 
(Rs. Cr.) 
70.22 
7.72 
2.84 
38.66 
0.93 
18.10 
30.77 
1.01 
Statistics 
CAL DIV 
%(Yc) 
89.91 
59.65 
57.28 
74.63 
56.36 
64.67 
70.81 
56.40 
Yo-Yc 
0.57 
3.89 
17.48 
-7.13 
-11.80 
-11.39 
12.24 
-3.87 
(Yo - Yc 
0.32 
15.13 
305.55 
50.84 
139.24 
129.73 
149.82 
14.98 
(Yo-Yc) ' 
Yc 
0.00 
0.25 
5.33 
0.68 
2.47 
2.01 
2.12 
0.27 
13.13 
Multiple R 
R Square 
Adjusted R Square 
Standard En-or 
Observations 
0.7394567 
0.5467962 
0.4712622 
11.58734 
8 
Coefficients Standard Error tStat 
Intercept 
X Variable 1 
55.908507 
0.4841704 
5.60801719.9693895 
0.1799522.6905532 
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Co-relation between 'x' and 'y' is 0.74 
The regression equation is given by Yc = 55.91 + 0.48 X 
The calculated value of'Chi Square' variate is 13.13, cut off value for 7 degrees 
of freedom is 18.66. 
Analysis and Interpretation: As is evident, out of the seven variables that 
purportedly influence the dividend payout are considered, interest paid has the 
highest positive co-relation co-efficient and their linear regression relationship is 
the best fit in the terms of the chi-square values as seen. The corresponding co-
relation co-efficient't' statistics are shown. 
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Table 5-B-9: Combined and Multi Variate Co-relation And Regression 
SI. 
Mo. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
12 YRS PARAMETERS AVERAGES 
SECTORS 
AUTOMOTIVES: 
AUTO- COMPONENTS/ANCILLARIES. 
ENGINEERING INDUSTRY 
CHEMICAITPETRO-
CHEMICALS/PAINTS 
CONSUMER DURABLES 
STEEL/FERO-ALLOYS 
NON-FERROUS METALS/ALLOYS 
ELECTRONICS/TELE COM/ IT 
HARDWARES 
DIV(Y) 
'A 
»0.48 
S3.54 
74.76 
67.50 
•4.56 
5328 
83.05 
52.53 
AVON 
W(X1) 
[Rs. Cr) 
2527.77 
719.39 
303.03 
3837.43 
252.22 
1961.62 
•234.27 
167.73 
AVG MKT 
CAP. (Rs.Cr.) 
11787.73 
4033.33 
1236.36 
• 147.27 
2729.88 
29334.79 
10973.05 
1020.23 
PL& 
M(X2) 
[Rs.Cr) 
109 07 
33.54 
25.69 
159.08 
22.78 
147.49 
80.07 
37.73 
PRO(X3) 
STAKE 
>A 
5382 
•9 50 
50.72 
61.17 
57.71 
45.86 
63.22 
•045 
INST 
HLD% 
3250 
20 80 
17.00 
22.00 
18.75 
31.50 
21.00 
2850 
NCIN 
FLOW 
(X4) INT(X5) 
;RS Cr )[RsCr) 
8228 
75 17 
7856 
-99 37 
-3.86 
80 70 
275 77 
38 82 
70 22 
772 
284 
3866 
-0 93 
18 10 
30 77 
1 01 
Out of the seven determining variables, it lias been found that the co-
relation coefficient between dividend pay out and maricet capitalization is only 
0.022 and the same between dividend pay out and institutional holding is only 
0.08. Because of this they have not been considered for inclusion in the multiple 
regression model. 
Table 5-B-lO Inter-factor Dependence Analysis in Terms of Co-relation Co-
efficient 
Serial 
Nos. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
Between 
Factors 
X1&X2 
X1&X3 
X1&X4 
Xl&xS 
X2&X3 
X2&X4 
X2&X5 
X3&X4 
X3&X5 
X4&X5 
Co-
relation 
Co-eflf 
( r ) 
0.609 
0.496 
0.256 
0.597 
0.068 
0.183 
0.583 
0.129 
0.255 
0.089 
Co-eff 
Of 
determi 
-nation 
(r2 ) 
0.370 
0.246 
0.065 
0.356 
0.0046 
0.033 
0.34 
0.016 
0.065 
0.008 
' t ' 
statistic 
1.879 
1.39 
0.6483 
1.82 
0.171 
0.455 
1.758 
0.318 
0.5851 
0.22 
Cut-
off 
Value 
@ 
5% 
1.943 
i i 
u 
64 
( 6 
(« 
i i 
U 
6 ( 
«C 
Significance 
Not 
Significant 
( 
t 
t 
i 
t 
i 
i 
4 
i 
Decision 
Mutually 
Independent 
4 ( 
46 
44 
4 i 
4 
44 
44 
44 
44 
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For testing the inter dependence among tiie determining variables, we 
calculate the co-relation co-efficient between a pair of them. As there are totally 
five variables we can have totally combination of five variables taking two at a 
time i.e. ten unique pairs as shown in the table. 
The corresponding co-efTicient of co-relation have been calculated as 
shown. 
The 't' statistic to ascertain the significance of the co-relation co-efficient 
is given by 
t = 
TT? 
X V n - 2 
r = co-efficient of co-relation 
r^  = co-efficient of determination 
n = number of pairs of observations, with 'n-2' degree of freedom. The cut off 
value at 5% level of significance is 1.943, hence, none of the variables is mutually 
co-related with each other and hence considered mutually independent. 
Intercept 
X Vari 1 
X Vari 2 
X Vari 3 
X Vari 4 
X Vari 5 
25.57 
0.002 
-0.06 
0.59 
0.O5 
0,57 
48.12 
0.01 
0.20 
0.85 
0.06 
0.28 
0.53 
-0.18 
-0.27 
0.70 
0.87 
2.04 
0.65 
0.87 
0.81 
0.56 
0.48 
0.18 
-181.47 
-0.04 
-0.92 
-3.04 
-0.21 
-0.63 
232.62 
0.03 
0.81 
4.23 
0.32 
1.76 
-181.47 
-0.04 
-0.92 
-3.04 
-0.21 
-0.63 
232.62 
0.03 
0.81 
4.23 
0.32 
1.76 
YD 
90.48 
63.54 
74.76 
67.50 
44.56 
53.28 
83.05 
52.53 
Yc 
91.93 
60.35 
65.45 
63.97 
57.36 
56.26 
84.55 
49.82 
Yo-Yc 
-1.45 
3.19 
9.31 
3.53 
-12.80 
-2.98 
-1.50 
2.71 
(Yo-Yc)' 
2.11 
10.15 
86.68 
12.45 
163.80 
8.87 
2.26 
7.33 
(Yo-Yc)'/Yc 
0.02 
0.17 
1.32 
p.l9 
2.86 
0.16 
0.03 
0.15 
4.90 
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Multiple Regression: Observed Dividend Versus Calculated Dividend 
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Multiple Regression: Observed Dividend Versus Calculated Dividend 
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The regression equation is given by Yc = 25.57 + 0.002 XI - 0.06X2 + 
0.59X3 + 0.05X4 + 0.57 X5 
The calculated value of 'Chi Square' variate is 4.90, cut off value for 7 
degrees of freedom is 18.66. 
Analysis and Interpretation: As has been found, the multi-variable regression 
relationship involving five variables does absolute justice to the observed dividend 
payout as is evident from the very low value of the 'Chi- Square' variable. 
Concluding Remarks: This multi variant regression relationship evolved 
successfiilly here provides some interesting insight. Out of the five variables 
considered, the promoters stake and interest paid are the most important areas 
while the other three have marginally positive or marginally negative influence on 
the percentage dividend payout. 
SECTION C-A 
This chapter is dedicated to the analysis of primary data to fulfill the first 
of these two objectives mentioned above. For collecting these primary data a 
questionnaire (furnished in annexure 3) consisting of 29 question, 28 close ended 
and one open ended was meticulously designed and copies were sent to the 
finance directors/CEO'S of the selected companies (list is provided in annexure 
5). The responses are summarized question-wise in table 5C-A-1 (furnished in 
annexure 1). 
These questionnaires have been coded and quantized using the scaling 
technique of ordinal scaling of different type. Five numerals for quantizing have 
been used having weights 5,4,3,2 and 1 depending upon the degree of agreement 
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or 1,2,3,4 & 5 depending on the degree of disagreement with reference to the 'null 
hypotheses. 
5-C-A-2 Formation of Hypotheses 
The following hypothesis have been formed according to the objective and 
the consideration keeping in view the fact that the finance bosses in the corporate 
sector are qualified and experienced finance professionals and they take dividend 
decisions purely on professional consideration. 
SI. 
No. 
Ho-A-1 
Ho-A-2 
Ho-A-3 
Ho-A-4 
Ho-A-5 
Ho-A-6 
Ho-A-7 
Ho-A-8 
Ho-A-9 
HYPOTHESES 
Dividend policy is an active residual policy 
reflecting the competence and dexterity of the 
finance manager in managing profitability and 
liquidity together. 
For dividend, stability, continuity and growth are 
more important than the absolute value of the 
payout. 
The cost structure, capital structure and share 
holding pattern of a company significantly 
influence its corporate dividend policy. 
Dividend decision of a company concerns only 
its equity share holders. 
The quantum of dividend payout of a company 
significantly and positively influences the 
liquidity of its share in the market. 
The quantum of dividend payout of a company 
significantly and positively influences its market 
capitalization. 
The products made and the services rendered by 
a company significantly influence its dividend 
policy. 
Within the framework of engineering industry, 
sector specificity of a company significantly 
influences its dividend policy. 
Market performance of a company's share in 
terms of risk and returned is more of a technical 
issue and hence dividend payout dose not 
significantly influence it. 
PERTINENT 
QUESTION 
NUMBERS 
4 
5, 6, & 7 
8,9, 10, 11,12 & 
13 
14, 15, 16, 17 
I8,&20 
19&21 
16,22,23,24,25 
23, 24, 25 & 26 
27&28 
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The respondents of the sample are dominated by the targeted official i.e. 
director finance. In some companies, of course, the corporate financial decisions, 
like the dividend decision are taken by the board headed by the CEO / M.D, but 
they constitute a minority. Possibly, when the director are out of station or as 
have, for a quick responses, the General Manager Corporate Finance may respond 
are has been here in 16% of the cases. 
Composition of the Experience of the Respondent 
SI. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
EXPERIENCE CLASS 
Less then 10 years 
Between 10 & 15 years 
Between 15 & 20 years 
Between 20 & 25 years 
Above 25 years 
Total 
FREQ 
05 
II 
23 
27 
17 
83 
PERCENTAGE % 
6 
13 
28 
33 
20 
100 
Question No-3; The respondents sector and composition in the engineering 
industry: 
SI. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Sector 
Automotives 
Auto Ancillaries/ Components 
Engineering / Machine Building 
Chemical/Petro-Chem/Paints 
Consumer Durable/White Goods 
Steel/Ferro- Alloys 
Non Ferrous Metals/Aluminium 
Electronic/Tele.Com/ It Hard 
Wares 
Total 
Frequency 
06 
15 
19 
16 
04 
14 
04 
05 
83 
Percentage 
7% 
18% 
23% 
19% 
5% 
17% 
5% 
6% 
100% 
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Analysis and Interpretation: The respondents, sector wise, are dominated by 
engineering, auto ancillary/ components, chemical/petro-chemical/paints and steel 
/ Ferro-alloys industries, and the reason is quite obvious. The engineering 
industries are dominated by these sectors, and moreover the respondents from 
these sector may be more in returning their responses than the others. 
Nevertheless, the percentage representation of the various sectors in the sample is 
proportional to their numerical strength in the industry. 
S-C-A-4 : Reliability And Consistency Analysis 
To check the reliability & consistency of the questions that constitute the 
questionnaire, so as to ensure that this is the right instrument for primary data 
collection intended to fulfill the objectives of the research project, a 'Cronbach 
Alpha' test has been conducted using the 'SPSS' package. 
This test measures the consistency of objectives and the reliability of the 
responses. As the questionnaire was designed to test the statistical significance of 
nine pre-formulated null hypothesis, the whole questionnaire was divided into 
nine homogeneous groups and alpha test was conducted separately for each group. 
As the first hypothesis is based on only one question, alpha test was not relevant. 
The average alpha value for the entire questionnaire is 0.7957 which is 
considered fairly adequate in view of the fact that the questions are heterogeneous 
as they address multiple hypotheses. 
5-C-A-5: Test of Hypotheses: 
I. Null Hypothesis: HoAl: "Dividend policy is an active residual policy 
reflecting the competence and dexterity of the finance manager in managing 
profitability and liquidity together." 
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Alternate Hypothesis: HiAl: "Dividend policy is not an active residual 
policy and dose not reflect the competence and dexterity of the finance 
manager in managing profitability and liquidity together." 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov One Sample Test 
This test is concerned with the degree of agreement between a set of 
observed values and the values specified by the null hypotheses. It is similar to the 
'chi square' test of goodness of fit. It is used when the researcher is interested in 
comparing a set of values on an ordinal scale. 
In order to apply Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to our data presented in the 
master table 5-C-l-A first of all we should have the cumulative frequency 
distribution from the sample, secondly we have to establish the cumulative 
irequency distribution which could be expected on the basis of the null 
hypothesis. Thirdly, we have to determine the largest absolute deviation between 
the two distributions mentioned above. Finally this value is to be compared with 
the critical value to ascertain its significance. 
Table : 5-C-A-S Question No-4: Response Analysis 
Dividend 
decision 
reflecting 
management 
competence 
Strongly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Observed 
frequency 
40 
27 
12 
2 
2 
Observed 
proportion. 
0.475 
0.325 
0.145 
0.024 
0.024 
Observed 
cumulative 
proportion 
0.475 
0.80 
0.945 
0.969 
0.993 
Null 
proportion 
0.33 
0.33 
0.33 
0.005 
0.005 
Null 
cumulative 
proportion. 
0.33 
0.66 
0.99 
0.095 
1.00 
Absolute 
diff 
between 
observed 
& null. 
0.145 
0.140 
0.045 
0.26 
0.007 
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From the table we find that the largest absolute difference is 0.145 which 
is known as the Kolmogonov-Smimov 'D' value. For a sample size of more than 
35 the critical value of'D'at a significance level of 5% is 1.36 / Vn where n is 
the sample of size 83 i.e. 
D =1.36/^83 =1.36/9.4 = 0.1492 
And as this critical value of 'D' is higher than the maximum observed absolute 
value, we can't reject the null hypothesis. 
Hence the response shows that according to the finance manager in 
corporates dividend decisions indeed reflect management competence in 
managing profitability and liquidity together. 
II. Null Hypothesis: HoA-2: "For dividends, more than absolute value 
stability, continuity and growth are of prime concern". 
Alternate Hypothesis: HiA-2: "For dividends absolute value is of prime 
concern rather than stability, continuity and growth". 
For this hypothesis, three questions in the questionnaire are designed to 
address this issue, i.e. question nos 5, 6«&7 and we take recourse to 'chi-square' 
test, taking the weighted response for the three question as in the table. 
Table:5-C-A-6: Response Analysis Of Question No 5,6 & 7 
Q. 
No. 
5 
6. 
7. 
Weighted 
observed 
responses Oi 
2.84 
2.63 
3.20 
Weighted 
null 
responses Ei 
4 
4 
4 
Oi-Ei 
1.06 
1.37 
0.80 
(Oi-Ei)2 
1.1236 
1.8769 
0.640 
(Oi - Ei)^  
Ei 
0.28 
0.4692 
0.16 
Chi-
Square 
0.9092 
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With degrees of freedom 3-1=2. at 5% level of significance, the critical 
value of chi-square with 2 degree of freedom is 5.991. hence null hypothesis can't 
be rejected. So we have to accept that as far as dividend is concerned stability 
continuity and moderate growth score over the absolute value for creating 
investors confidence according to the corporate managers. 
III. Null Hypothesis: HoA-3: "The cost structure, capital structure and share 
holding pattern of a company significantly influence its corporate dividend 
policy". 
Alternate Hypothesis: HiA-3: "The cost structure, capital structure and 
share holding pattern of a company do not significantly influence its 
corporate dividend policy". 
For this hypotheses six questions in the questionnaire are designed to 
address this issue i.e. question numbers 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 & 13 and we adopt chi-
square test taking the weighted responses for the six questions as shown in the 
table below. 
Table: 5-C-A-7: Response Analysis Of Question No 8,9,10,11,12 & 13 
Q. 
No. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
Weighted 
observed 
responses Oi 
1.30 
1.25 
1.35 
1.20 
1.22 
1.25 
Weighted 
null 
responses 
Ei 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Oi-Ei 
2.70 
2.75 
2.66 
2.80 
2.68 
2.75 
(Oi-
Ei)2 
7.29 
7.56 
7.10 
7.84 
7.20 
7.53 
(Oi - Ei)^  
Ei 
1.82 
1.89 
1.775 
1.56 
1.80 
1.89 
Chi-
Square 
11.325 
With degree of freedom 6-5=5 at 5 % level of significance the critical 
value of chi square is 11.070 and at 1 % level of significance it is 15.086. So we 
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can say that our null hypotheses is rejected at 5 % but at 1 % it can't be rejected. 
Hence at 95 % level of confidence we can conclude that corporate dividend policy 
is not influenced by cost and capital structure and the share holding pattern of the 
company. 
IV. Null Hypothesis: HoA-4: "Dividend decision of a company concerns 
only its equity share holders". 
Alternate Hypothesis: HiA-4: "Dividend decision of a company dose 
not concern only its equity share holders". 
For this hypotheses four questions have been designed to address this issue 
and they are question numbers 14, 15, 16, & 17 and we apply chi square test 
taking the weighted responses from the respondents as shown in the table. 
Table: 5-C-A-8: Response Analysis Of Question No 14, IS, 16, & 17 
Q. 
No. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Weighted 
observed 
responses Oi 
1.289 
4.602 
3.578 
4.566 
Weighted 
null 
responses 
Ei 
4 
2 
4 
2 
Oi-Ei 
2.711 
2.602 
0.422 
2.566 
(Oi - Ei)^  
7.35 
6.77 
0.178 
6.58 
(Oi-
Ei)^  
Ei 
1.84 
3.38 
0.04 
3.29 
Chi-
Square 
8.56 
With degrees fi-eedom 4 - 1=3 at 5 % level of significance the critical 
value of chi square is 7.815, at 1 % it is 11.345, hence our null hypotheses is 
rejected at 5 % but can't be rejected at 1 %. Hence we can conclude that dividend 
decision not only concerns the equity share holders but it concerns other stake 
holders also. 
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V. Null Hypothesis: HoA-5: "The quantum of dividend payout of a 
company significantly and positively influences the liquidity of its share in 
the market". 
Alternate Hypothesis: HiA-5: "The quantum of dividend payout of a 
company dose not influence the liquidity of its share in the market 
significantly". 
This hypotheses is addressed by the next question numbers 18 & 20 and 
we applied chi square test taking weighted response from the respondents as 
shown. 
Table: 5-C-A-9: Response Analysis Of Question No 18 & 20 
Q. 
No. 
18 
20 
Weighted 
observed 
responses Oi 
1.967 
3.720 
Weighted 
null 
responses 
Ei 
2 
4 
Oi-Ei 
0.033 
0.28 
(Oi - Ei)^  
0.001 
0.08 
(Oi - Ei)^  
Ei 
0.0005 
0.02 
Chi-
Square 
0.0205 
With degrees of freedom 2-1=1, the critical value of chi square at 5 % 
level of significance is 3.841 and our calculated value is almost 0 which only 
indicates the over whelming validity of the null hypotheses. So we have to accept 
that higher dividends according to the corporate managers do indeed add higher 
value to the company. 
VI. Null Hypothesis: HoA-6: "The quantum of dividend payout of a 
company significantly and positively influences its market capitalization". 
Alternate Hypothesis: H|A-6: "The quantum of dividend payout of a 
company dose not significantly and positively influence its market 
capitalization". 
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To address this hypotheses the pertinent question numbers are 19 & 21 and 
we applied chi square test talcing the weighted responses from the respondents as 
shown. 
Table: 5-C-A-lO: Response Analysis Of Question No 19 & 21 
Q. 
No. 
19 
21 
Weighted 
observed 
responses Oi 
3.79 
3.69 
Weighted 
null 
responses 
Ei 
4 
4 
Oi-Ei 
0.21 
0.31 
(Oi - Ei)^  
0.044 
0.096 
(Oi - Ei)' 
Ei 
0.011 
0.024 
Chi-
Square 
0.035 
With degrees of freedom 2-1=1 the critical value of chi square at 5 % level 
of significance is 3.841 and our calculated value is very small compared to the cut 
off value. So our null hypotheses can't be rejected. Hence we can conclude that 
according to the corporate managers higher dividend payments indeed add higher 
value to the company in terms of higher share value and market capitalization. 
VII. Null Hypothesis: HoA-7: "The products made and the services rendered 
by a company significantly influence its dividend policy". 
Alternate Hypothesis: HiA-7: "The products made and the services 
rendered by a company do not significantly influence its dividend policy". 
Only one question i.e. question number 22 is addressing this issue so we 
have to go for 'Kolmogorov - Smimov' one sample test and the responses have 
been analysed as follows. 
146 
Table :5-C-A-ll Response Analysis For Question No-22 
Importance 
of products 
& services 
in 
influencing 
dividend 
decision 
Strongly 
agree 
Moderately 
agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Observed 
frequency 
33 
22 
19 
3 
6 
83 
Observed 
proportion 
0.3975 
0.2650 
0.2289 
0.036 
0.072 
0.09996 
Observed 
cumulative 
proportion 
0.3975 
0.6625 
0.8914 
0.9274 
0.9994 
Null 
proportion 
0.33 
0.33 
0.33 
0.005 
0.005 
Null 
cumulative 
proportion 
0.33 
0.66 
0.99 
0.995 
1.000 
Absolute 
diff 
between 
observed 
&null 
0.0675 
0.0025 
0.0986 
0.0676 
0.006 
We find that the largest absolute differences 0.0986 which is known as the 
'Kolmogorov - Smimov 'D' value'. For a sample size of more than 35 the 
critical value of'D' at a significance level of 5 % is 1.36 / Vn where 'n' is the 
sample size and for us it is 83. 
Therefore, D = 1.36 / V83 = 1.36 / 9.11 = 0.01492 and the critical value of 
'D' is higher than the highest observed value our null hypotheses can't be 
rejected. Hence in the view of the corporate manager the products and 
services rendered by a company are very important determinants of its 
dividend policy. 
VIII. Null Hypothesis: HoA-8: "within the framework of engineering 
industry, sector specificity of a company significantly influences its 
dividend policy". 
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Alternate Hypothesis: HiA-8: "Within the framework of 
engineering industry, sector specificity of a company dose not 
significantly influence its dividend policy". 
Four questions i.e. question numbers 23, 24, 25 & 26 are designed to 
address this issue. We take resource to chi square test and analyse the responses as 
follows. 
Table: 5-C-A-12: Response Analysis Of Question No 23,24,25 & 26 
Q. 
No. 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Weighted 
observed 
responses Oi 
3.65 
3.69 
3.73 
3.77 
Weighted 
null 
responses 
Ei 
4 
4 
4 
4 
Oi-Ei 
0.35 
0.31 
0.27 
0.23 
(Oi - Ei)^  
0.1225 
0.0961 
0.0729 
0.0529 
(Oi - Ei)^  
Ei 
0.030 
0.0240 
0.0182 
0.0132 
CHl-
Square 
0.0854 
With degrees of freedom 4-1=3 and at 5 % level of significance, the cut off 
value is 7.815 and our calculated value is very small compare to this critical value 
and hence the null hypotheses can't be rejected. 
So according to the corporate managers in engineering industry dividend 
decisions / payout will have to be sector specific. 
The plausible reason may be probably that under the engineering industry 
umbrella the challenges in each sectors are different. 
IX. Null Hypothesis: HoA-9: "Market performance of a company's share in 
terms of risk and return is more of a technical issue and hence dividend payout 
dose not significantly influence it". 
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Alternate Hypothesis: HiA-9: "Market performance of a company's share in 
terms of risk and return is more of a fundamental issue and hence dividend payout 
does significantly influence it". 
To address this issue question numbers 27 & 28 are meant. We applied chi 
square test and analysed the responses as followed 
Table: 5-C-A-13: Response Analysis Of Question No 27 & 28 
Q. 
No. 
27 
28 
Weighted 
observed 
responses Oi 
1.22 
1.20 
Weighted 
null 
responses 
Ei 
4 
4 
Oi-Ei 
2.78 
2.80 
(Oi - Ei)^  
7.73 
7.84 
(Oi - Ei)' 
Ei 
1.932 
1.96 
Chi-
Square 
3.891 
With the degrees of freedom 2-1=1 and at 5% level of significance the cut 
off value of chi square is 3.841 and our calculated value of the variate is 3.891 
which is slightly higher then the cut-off value and hence the null hypothesis can't 
be accepted at 5 %. However, at 1% cut off value is 6.635, at which the null 
hypotheses can't be rejected so limiting ourselves at 5 % we can conclude that 
market performance of a company's share is also a fundamental issue and hence 
dividend payout can influence it. 
5C-A-6: Analysis Of The Responses To The Open Ended Question No. 29 
Summary of Responses to the Open-Ended Question 
1. In case of unlisted companies / closely held companies dividend is taken 
by concerned family head who has majority stake, depending upon their 
family requirements. 
2. For MNC's the dividend decision is made by the group holding 
company. 
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3. The firms ability to continue to sustain a level of performance over the 
next few years and its growth plans determine the ability to pay 
dividends. 
4. Unless there is a special need to conserve large reserves as a policy 33% 
is distributed from the available surplus. 
5. In general, 30% of PAT as dividend is given. 
6. Dividend decisions are indeed strategic. 
7. Dividend should be consistent for a period of 3-5 years in line with the 
industry fortunes and prosperity. 
8. Any excess / shortfall compared to previous year should be adequately 
discussed, debated and transparently communicated to the share holders 
for their future reference. 
9. Both majority and minority interest should be viewed holistically every 
year before the dividend declaration decisions are taken. 
10. Dividend decision should be a mix of liquidity to short term holders and 
capital appreciation for long term holders. 
11. In our industry, dividend decisions are mostly governed by: 
a. Trackrecordofpay out ratio. 
b. Track record of dividend amounts. 
c. Liquidity and cap-ex plans. 
d. Shareholders expectations. 
e. Statutory provision / limit and financial covenants. 
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Analysis and Interpretation: These responses both complement and supplement 
the issues raised in the structured and closed ended questions. They also throw 
some new light such as any drastic change in practice has to be thoroughly 
discussed at every pertinent level and communicated to the shareholders. Also 
they indicate how management takes care of the interest and motivations of both 
short-term and long-term holders. 
SECTION C-B 
As is also evident from this objective, fulfillment of the second part of the 
third objective is based on primary data. For collecting these primary data a 
questionnaire (furnished in annexure 2) consisting of 25 close ended questions 
were designed and about 1000 copies were circulated among the investors in the 
Indian capital market. These investors were accessed through professional 
investment bankers like Way to Wealth, Bajaj Capital, Karvy Consultants and 
ICICI Direct who administered the questionnaire among their client base. This 
way, a lot of time and energy could be saved. Out of thousand numbers circulated 
477 came back in time for analysis. 
5-C-B-2: Reliability, Validity and Consistency Test 
Before being administered the questionnaire was circulated among the 
local investors to check the consistency of responses and to conduct the reliability 
and validity test in terms of Chronbach 'ALPHA' test. Cronbach alpha measures 
the co-relatedness among the questions in terms of the consistency of responses 
towards a formulated null hypothesis for statistical validation. 
The first six questions are mostly concerned with the investors background 
in terms of profession, qualification, age and income group and investment habits 
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where consistency in responses towards a hypotheses is not concerned. Hence 
they are not amenable to the 'ALPHA TEST'. Question no.7 is a stand alone 
question addressing a hypothesis and hence is amenable to "kolmogorov 
Smimov" one sample test. The rest of the questions are aimed at testing respective 
formulated hypothesis in groups and hence are amenable to the 'ALPHA TEST'. 
The respective ALPHA values and the responses have been assimilated and 
presented in master table 5-C-B-L 
The average overall ALPHA value for the questionnaire is 0.7365. 
5-C-B-3: Hypotheses Formation 
The investors, by and large, hail from various walks of life. Hence the 
dividend theory most pertinent to them is the 'signaling theory '. The following 
hypotheses are formed keeping in mind the implication of signaling theory. 
Table No.5-C-B-2: Hypotheses Versus Relevant Question Numbers. 
SI. 
No. 
HoB-l 
HoB-2 
HoB-3 
HoB-4 
HoB-5 
HoB-6 
HoB-7 
HYPOTHESES 
A company's fundamentals rather than market 
technicalities and more influence the investors' 
decision significantly. 
A company's constancy of dividend payout in terms 
of its EPS & DPS records influences investors' 
decisions signiflcantly.. 
A company having dividend payout, stable and 
consistently increasing over time is significantly 
favoured by investors inspite of the dividend being 
moderate. 
Investors significantly prefer high dividend payout 
to its consistency. 
Investors significantly disfavour a consistent but 
moderate dividend payout. 
Investors significantly disfavour dividend payout as 
the right yard stick forjudging performance of a 
company in engineering industry while taking 
investment decisions. 
For investing in engineering industry, investors 
significantly prefer other fundamentals to dividend. 
PERTINENT 
QUESTION Nos. 
7 
8,9&10 
11, 12 
13, 14 
15, 16, 17,18&19 
20&21 
22, 23, 24, 25 
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5-C-B-4: Response Analysis for Questions Regarding Investors Back 
Ground: 
Q. 1. Investor's Professional Background: 
Table No.5-C-B-3 
SI. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
Professional category 
Executive in a private corporate 
sector 
Executive in state govt/central 
govt/pubiic sector 
Businessman 
Independent professional 
Any other source 
Total 
Frequency 
159 
67 
59 
111 
81 
477 
Percentage 
34 
14 
12 
23 
17 
100 
FIG 5-C-B-3 
D Executive in a private 
corporate sector 
' • Executive in state 
govt/centra! govt/pubiic 
sector 
n Businessman 
ID Independent 
professional 
i 
• Any other source 
Analysis and Interpretation: The sample is dominated by private sector 
executives and independent professionals, of course, other sources category also 
closely follows. It only indicates that the investor community in the Indian capital 
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market is dominated by these categories because of their higher disposable income 
and investment savvy attitude. 
Q.2 Investors Educational Qualification 
Table No.5-C-B-4 
SL 
NO. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
QUALIFICATION LEVEL 
Under graduate 
Graduate 
Post graduate 
Professional graduate 
Professional post graduate 
Doctoral 
Any others 
total 
FREQUENCY 
25 
91 
79 
141 
63 
27 
51 
477 
PERCENTAGE 
05 
19 
17 
30 
13 
05 
11 
100 
5.C-B-4 
n Under graduate 
• Graduate 
n Post graduate 
D Professional graduate 
• Professional post 
graduate 
D Doctoral 
• Any others 
Analysis and Interpretation: The sample is dominated by professional graduates 
followed by, not so closely graduates and post graduates indicating investor 
community is populated by professionally highly qualified people and 
undergraduates have not taken to the capital market in a big way. Multiple 
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graduate and post graduates may form 'Any other" category how have 
identified with only graduates. 
Q.3 : Respondents Age Group 
Table No.5-C-B-5 
not 
SLNO 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
AGE GROUP 
Below 25 yrs 
Between 25 and 35 yrs 
Between 35 and 45 yrs 
Between 45 and 55 yrs 
Above 55 yrs 
total 
FREQUENCY 
41 
139 
123 
107 
67 
477 
PERCENTAGE 
9 
29 
26 
22 
14 
100 
FIG 5-C-B-5 
n Below 25 yrs 
• Between 25 and 35 yrs 
• Between 35 and 45 yrs 
D Between 45 and 55 yrs 
• Above 55 yrs 
Analysis and Interpretation: The sample is dominated by the age group 25 to 45 
yrs who are of course at the prime of their careers followed by 45 to 55 years. This 
group comprising the senior most professionals had started their careers before the 
economic liberalization set in and might have taken to the capital market 
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comparatively late in their career. Even the senior most group i.e. above 55 yrs 
gives an encouraging percentage . 
Q.4: Respondents Income Group 
Table No.5-C-B-6 
SLNO 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
INCOME GROUP 
With in Rs 2,50,000 
Between Rs.2,50,000 & 
Rs. 5,00,000 
Between Rs. 5,00,000 & 
Rs. 7,50,000 
Between Rs. 7,50,000& 
Rs. 10,00,000 
Above Rs. 10,00,000 
Total 
FREQUENCY 
73 
121 
157 
69 
57 
477 
PERCENTAGE 
16 
25 
33 
14 
12 
100 
FIG 5-C-B-6 
D With in Rs 2.50,000 
• Between Rs.2,50,000 & 
Rs. 5,00,000 
D Between Rs. 5,00,000 & 
Rs. 7,50,000 
D Between Rs. 7,50,000& 
Rs. 10,00,000 
• Above Rs. 10,00,000 
Analysis and Interpretation: The income group is dominated by Rs 2,50,000 
and Rs. 7,50,000 and as the age group is predominantly 25 to 45 yrs and the 
corresponding qualification graduate and post graduate, the regular participants in 
the capital market would be naturally dominated by this income gi\er! the income 
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levels of educated Indian professionals today. To this extent this sample is truly 
representation of Indians annual income level. 
Q.5: Investors' Regularity in the Investment Habit 
Table No.5-C-B-7 
SLNO 
1 
2 
REGULAR OR NOT 
Yes 
No 
Total 
FREQUENCY 
450 
27 
477 
PERCENTAGE 
94 
06 
100 
5-C-B-7 
DYes 
• No 
Analysis and Interpretation : This sample is totally dominated by the regular 
investors and i.e. of course expected . Because, investment consultants were 
approached to tap their client base, mast of the respondents are regular investors 
as they only constitute these company's client base. Of course, the small minority 
are also investors but their investment pattern may not be regular in terms of 
periodicity 
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Q.6: Periodicity of Investment for the Regular Investors 
Table No.5-C-B-8 
SLNO 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
PERIDIOCITY 
3 Months 
6 Months 
1 Year 
3 Years 
5 Years 
Total 
FREQUENCY 
97 
55 
213 
54 
31 
450 
PERCENTAGE 
22 
12 
47 
12 
7 
100 
FIG 5-C-B-8 
D 3 Months 
• 6 Months 
D1 Year 
a 3 Years 
• 5 Years 
Analysis And Interpretation: The percentage distribution of investment 
periodicity clearly indicates that annual investment pattern constitute almost half 
of the respondents. The reason, is of course, the annual tax saving. Moreover, the 
investment companies also put pressure on their client base to make investments 
during the fourth quarter of the year. 
The next majority is for three months periodicity which of course is 
constituted by very active and alert investors who are active on their own. Other 
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periodicities are almost equally distributed including, as long as five years, which 
of course invest on their accord. 
5-C-B-5: Hypotheses Testing: 
I. HoB-1: Null Hypothesis: "A company's fundamentals rather than market 
technicalities and mood influence the investors' decision significantly". 
Alternate Hypothesis: H|B-1: "Market technicalities and mood rather 
than a company's fundamentals influence the investors' decision 
significantly." 
To test this hypothesis, only one question i.e. question number '7' has 
been formulated, and the corresponding responses have been analyzed hereunder. 
Table: 5-C-B-9: Response Analysis For Question No.:7 
Company 
fundamentals 
are more 
inspiring 
than market 
technicalities 
Strongly 
Agree 
Moderately 
Agree 
Neither 
agree nor 
disagree 
Moderately 
disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Observed 
frequency 
190 
126 
92 
52 
17 
Observed 
proportion 
0.3976 
0.2651 
0.1928 
0.1084 
0.361 
Observed 
cumulative 
proportion 
0.3976 
0.6627 
0.8555 
0.9639 
1.0 
Null 
proportion 
0.33 
0.33 
0.33 
0.005 
0.005 
Null 
cumulative 
proportion 
0.33 
0.66 
0.99 
0.995 
1.000 
Diff-
"D" 
0.0976 
0.0027 
0.1345 
0.0311 
0 
From the table 5-C-B-8 we find that the largest absolute difference 'D' is 
0.1345 which is known" as the "Kolmogrov Smirnov D value". For a sample size 
more than 35, the critical value of 'D' at 5 % level of significance is 1.36/ V n , 
when 'n' is the sample size, which is 83 here, and the amounts to 
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xa6 
^83 
X36 =0.145 
9.11 
and the maximum 'D' falls slightly below this critical values, and hence we can't 
reject the null hypotheses at 5 %. So we accept that investor are more impressed 
and inspired by a company's fundamentals than market technicalities and mood 
while investing in the equity of a company. 
II. Null Hypothesis: Ho B-2: A company's constancy of dividend payout in 
terms of its EPS & DPS records influences investors' decisions 
significantly. 
Alternate Hypothesis: Hi-B-2: A company's constancy of dividend 
payout in terms of its EPS & DPS records does not influence investors' 
decisions significantly. 
The questions designed to address this issue are numbers 8, 9, & 10 and 
we take recourse to 'chi-square test' to analyze the responses as follows: 
Table 5-C-B-lO: Response Analysis for Question Numbers 8,9, & 10 
Q. 
No. 
8 
9 
10 
Weighted 
observed 
responses 0, 
3.61 
3.67 
3.77 
Weighted 
null 
responses 
E. 
4 
4 
4 
0.-E, 
0.39 
0.33 
0.23 
(0,-E,)' 
0.1521 
0.1089 
0.029 
(0.-E,)' 
E, 
0.0380 
0.0772 
0.00725 
CHl-
Square 
0.07245 
With the degrees of freedom 3-1=2 at 5 % level of significance, the cut-off 
value is 5.991 and in comparison our calculated value is very meager and to 
indicate that our null hypotheses cannot be rejected. So we accept that investors 
do check the EPS & DPS records of a company before investing. 
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III. Null Hypotheses: HoB-3: A company having dividend payout, stable and 
consistently increasing over time is significantly favoured by investors 
inspite of the dividend being moderate. 
Alternate Hypotheses: HiB-3: A company having dividend payout, 
stable and consistently increasing over time is not favoured by investors if 
the dividend payout is moderate. 
The questions designed to address this hypotheses are question number 11 
& 12 and the corresponding responses from the investors are analysed hereunder 
using chi square test. 
Table S-C-B-11: Response Analysis for Question Numbers 11 & 12 
Q. 
No. 
11 
12 
Weighted 
observed 
responses O, 
3.77 
3.72 
Weighted 
null 
responses 
E, 
4 
4 
0,-E, 
0.25 
0.28 
(0, - E.)' 
0.0529 
0.0784 
(0, - E,)^  
E, 
0.0132 
0.0196 
CHI-
Square 
0.0328 
With the corresponding degree of freedom 2-1=1 at 5 % level of significance the 
chi- square value is 3.841, which is far higher than the calculated value and hence 
we have to accept the null hypotheses that investors do over look the absolute 
quantum of the dividend payment provided it is stable and consistently increasing 
over time. 
IV. Null Hypothesis: HoB-4: Investors significantly prefer high dividend 
payout to its consistency. 
Alternate Hypothesis: H]B-4: Investors significantly prefer consistency 
to high dividend payout. 
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The questions designed to address this hypotheses are question number 13 
& 14 and the corresponding responses from the investors are analysed hereunder 
using chi square test 
Table 5-C-B-12: Response Analysis for Question Numbers 13 & 14 
Q. 
No. 
13 
14 
Weighted 
observed 
responses 0, 
1.22 
3.76 
Weighted 
null 
responses 
E, 
4 
2 
0,-E, 
-2.78 
1.76 
(0,-E,)' 
7.7284 
3.0976 
(0, - E,)' 
E, 
1.9321 
1.5488 
CHI-
Square 
3.48 
The corresponding degree of freedom will be 2-1=1 and at 5 % the critical 
value is 3.841 and our calculated value is just barely below the cut off value. So 
we cannot reject the null hypotheses, but the narrow manner by which it has 
passed only goes to indicate that investors do mind inconsistency even if coupled 
with high dividend payout. In other words high dividend payout can't eliminate 
completely the bad impression of inconsistency. 
V. Null Hypothesis: HQB-S: Investors significantly disfavour a consistent but 
moderate dividend payout. 
Alternate Hypothesis: HiB-5: Investors significantly favour a consistent 
albeit moderate dividend payout. 
As many as 5 questions have been devised to handle this idea as the idea is 
very important for the managers to understand the signalling effect on the 
investors. The responses are analysed as follows: 
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Table 5-C-B-13: Response Analysis for Question Numbers IS, 16,17,18 & 19 
Q. 
No. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
Weighted 
observed 
responses 0, 
3.93 
1.19 
1.17 
1.13 
1.21 
Weighted 
null 
responses 
E, 
2 
4 
4 
4 
4 
0,-E, 
1.93 
2.81 
2.83 
2.89 
2.79 
(0, - E,f 
3.72 
7.89 
8.00 
8.24 
7.78 
(0, - E,)^  
E, 
1.86 
1.97 
2.00 
2.06 
1.94 
CHl-
Square 
9.83 
The corresponding degree of freedom would be 5-1=4 and at 5 % level of 
significance, the cut off value of chi square is 9.438, and the value of our statistic 
is just above that, which implies that we have to reject the null hypotheses and 
conclude that the investors indeed do favour a consistent and moderately high 
dividend payment. 
VI. Null Hypothesis: HoB-6: Investors significantly disfavour dividend 
payout as the right yard stick for judging performance of a company in 
engineering industry while taking investment decisions. 
Alternate Hypothesis: HiB-6: Investors significantly favour dividend payout as 
the right yard stick forjudging performance of a company in engineering industry 
while taking investment decisions. 
To test the validity of either the null or the alternate hypotheses formulated 
here question numbers 20 & 21 have been designed and the corresponding 
responses are analyzed here under. 
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Table 5-C-B-14: Response Analysis for Question Numbers 20 & 21 
Q. 
No. 
20 
21 
Weighted 
observed 
responses 0, 
2.95 
2.63 
Weighted 
null 
responses 
E, 
4 
4 
0,-E, 
1.06 
1.37 
(0, - E,)' 
1.1236 
1.8769 
(0, - E,)^  
E, 
0.2509 
0.4392 
CHI-
Square 
0.7501 
For the relevant degree of freedom i.e. 2-1=1 at 5 % level of significance the cut 
off value of the chi square variant is 3.841 & our calculated value is much below 
that. Hence we cannot reject the null hypotheses that for engineering industry 
dividend payout is not the right yardstick to judge its performance and taking 
investment decision by the investor. 
VII. Null Hypothesis: HoB-7: For investing in engineering industry, investors 
significantly prefer other fundamentals to dividend. 
Alternate Hypothesis: HiB-7: For investing in engineering industry, 
investors significantly prefer dividend to other fiindamentals. 
There are four questions designed to address this hypotheses. Their 
question numbers 22, 23, 24 &. 25 we take recourse to chi square test to analyse 
the responses as shown below. 
Table 5-C-B-15: Response Analysis for Question Numbers 22,23,24 & 25 
Q. 
No. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Weighted 
observed 
responses O, 
3.20 
3.59 
3.69 
3.63 
Weighted 
null 
responses 
E. 
4 
4 
4 
4 
0,-E, 
0.80 
0.41 
0.31 
0.37 
(0,-E,)^ 
0.64 
0.1681 
0.0961 
0.1369 
(0, - E,)' 
E, 
0.16 
0.0420 
0.0240 
0.0342 
CHI-
Square 
0.260 
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For degree of freedom 4-1=3 and level of significance at 5 % we have the 
critical value of chi square variant as 7.815. in comparison the value of calculated 
chi square is only 0.260. Hence we must conclude that the null hypotheses can't 
be rejected and the investors by and large have many considerations other than 
dividends to invest in the equity of engineering industry. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS, 
CONCLUSIONS AND 
SUGGESTIONS 
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6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is dedicated to summarize the salient and important findings 
of the study, presented in the serial order in accordance with the sequences of the 
objective. At the end of each individual analysis in the three sub chapters of the 
main chapter 'Analysis and Interpretation', respective inferences have been drawn 
from the presentation and analysis / processing of the observed data. 
This chapter is a compilation / collection of the salient, important, relevant 
and outstanding inferences drawn and findings obtained, of course, in accordance 
with the objectives. 
In the next section valuable conclusions have been derived from this 
consolidated list of findings, which are required for the fulfillment of the 
objective. These conclusions answer the issues raised in the three objectives of the 
study. 
The chapter next to that endeavours to offer suggestions, wherever there 
are discrepancies & incongruities observed. 
In this research work, in particular, these discrepancies can arise between 
what are being observed in the market place in actuality i.e. external to the 
corporate enterprise and of course to some extent, beyond the control, desire and 
expectation of the investors; what are perceived by the corporate finance 
managers inside the enterprise concerned, and thirdly what is going on in the 
psyche of the investors community at large. 
In this context, it may be worthwhile to reproduce the objectives here, so 
that ready reference can be made. 
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i) To study the trend in dividend payout in the various sectors of the 
engineering industry over a time period. 
ii) To analyze the influence of sector specific characteristics on dividend 
payment pattern. 
iii) a) To study the motivation of the Indian engineering industry for 
adopting/formulating their respective dividend policies. 
(b) To study the perception / attitude of the investing community 
regarding and towards the dividend policies & practices adopted by the 
management. 
6.2 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
All the outstanding findings from all the inferences / interpretations drawn 
in the analysis chapter have been summarized objective wise here under: 
I- Trend and Influence on Dividend Pay-out 
The summary of findings have been divided into three categories which is 
in line with the objectives of the study. The first category of finding is based on 
the secondary data and their analysis which is satisfying the first and second 
objectives of the study. The second category of the findings are based on the data 
collected from higher level of corporate finance managers regarding dividend pay-
out. The third and last category f findings are based on the data collected from the 
equity investors. The last two categories of findings satisfy the third objectives. 
i. Dividend payout pattern has been investigated since the time 
economic liberalization, privatization and globalization had set in i.e. 
1994 and for a period of 12 years (1994-2006) and it has been found 
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that about 40% of Indian engineering industries in numbers which 
have been performing extremely well other wise, do not pay any 
dividend and that constitute the peak of the dividend distribution 
pattern percentage wise. The next highest peak in the slab of 75% -
100% in which about 20% of the top performing industries fall; 
maximum dividend payout has been 3000% (L &. T). 
ii. The highest dividend payout among the eight sectors of the 
engineering industry under study has been automotive followed by 
non ferrous metals and engineering, further followed by chemical / 
petro chemical / paint ; steel / ferro alloys and electronic hardware 
constitute the bottom rank i.e. last but one and the lowest dividend 
payer has been consumer durable. 
iii. Dividend payout in engineering industry has been consistently 
growing over the past 12 years and now, it is about three times what it 
used to be during the turn of the century yielding a compounded 
annual growth rate of about 16%. 
iv. The time series regression for automobile sector indicates a linear 
fitted trend, but it is expected that with the future years this dividend 
may grow exponentially. 
V. For auto component sectors, the fitted trend indicates that over the 
years, dividend payout has grown almost linearly and quite likely to 
continue to grow so. 
vi. For the engineering / machine building sector dividend payout has 
increased exponentially with time, or time, as independent variable. 
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has been a logarithmic function of dividend payments. It only 
indicates that dividend payment in this sector is going to increase in 
leaps and bounds in future. 
vii. For chemical / petro chemical / paint industries, the time series 
regression of dividend payout resemble a linear trend and continue to 
grow moderately. 
viii. For consumer durable sector, dividend payout has been moderate but 
the trend is linear, growth is also moderate. 
ix. For steel / ferro alloys growth is logarithmic / exponential and hence a 
very high growth in future is expected. 
X. For non-ferrous metals / aluminum the dividend growth with the year 
has been fairly linear. 
xi. In electronic / telecom hardware the growth is minimal but 
nevertheless, logarithmic / non linear. 
xii. For the overall engineering industry, the growth has been 
approximated to be fairly linear. 
xiii. Out of the determining factors specific to engineering industry, there 
is no overwhelming support that dividend can be used as a strategic 
weapon to outsmart competition and there is a kind of hesitant support 
as this dividend policy is an active residual policy rather than passive 
one. 
xiv. These findings also support the M-M - hypotheses of dividend 
irrelevance, albeit in Indian conditions. Dividend payout does not 
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positively influence internal or external wealth creation in terms of net 
worth or market capitalization. 
XV. Net worth and market capitalization have got a very weak co-relation 
with dividend. 
xvi. Fixed cost of plant and machinery and the accompanying depreciation 
do not influence dividend payout significantly where as promoters 
holding does effect dividend payment inversely though to a moderate 
extent. 
xvii. Financial institutions stake and dictates do affect dividend payment 
although very mildly and directly. 
xviii. Liquidity, in terms of net cash inflow, positively and significantly 
influence dividend decisions, whereas interest payment has a moderate 
direct influence. 
xix. Out of the seven identified factors, i.e. networth, market cap, plant and 
machinery, promoters stake, institutional stake, cash inflow and 
interest paid that should influence dividend payments, net cash inflow 
and interest payment have got the most potent influence. 
XX. A 'multi variate regression analysis' involving five of the seven 
determining variables i.e. net worth, plant and machinery, promoter's 
stake, net cash in flow and interest paid demonstrate a slightly 
different scenario in the sense that under this models promoter's stake 
and interest payment have the highest regression coefficient. 
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II- Finance Executives on Dividend Pay-out 
i. According to the finance managers, dividend decision indeed reflects 
the competence and dexterity of the finance managers in managing 
profitability and liquidity together. 
ii. As far as dividend payment is concerned stability, continuity and 
moderate growth are more important than the quantum of dividend in 
creating investors confidence. 
iii. Corporate dividend policy is not influenced by cost structure, capital 
structure or the share holding pattern of the company. 
iv. Dividend decision concerns all the stake holders of the company and 
not only the equity share holders. 
V. Higher dividend does add higher value to the company in terms of 
trading volume and liquidity. 
vi. Higher dividend does add higher value to the company in terms of 
share value and market capitalization. 
vii. The products and services manufactured and rendered by the company 
are very important determinants of its dividend policy. 
viii. In engineering industry, dividend payment has to be sector specific. 
ix. Market performance of a company's share is more of a fundamental 
issue and dividend payout can influence it. 
Ill- Equity Investors on Dividend Pay-out 
i. As far as investors are concerned, they are more impressed and 
inspired by a company's fundamentals than market technicalities and 
moods while investing in the equity share of a company. 
ii. Investors do track the DPS & EPS records of a company before 
investing in the company's share. 
iii. Investors do over look the absolute quantum of dividend payments 
provided it is stable and consistently increasing over time. 
iv. Higher dividend payment can't eliminate completely this bad 
impression of inconsistency. 
V. Investors do favour a consistent and moderately high dividend payout. 
vi. For engineering industry dividend payout is not the right yard stick to 
judge its performance and taking investment decision by the investor. 
vii. The investors by and large, have many considerations other than 
dividends to invest in the equity of a company. These considerations 
may be excellent quality and reliability, excellent product 
differentiation and high brand equity, excellent growth and 
diversification record and professional management, highly innovative 
and supportive culture and superb human resources management. 
6.3 CONCLUSIONS 
From the foregoing discussion on the summarized findings and keeping in 
view the objectives of the research study, we can arrive at and consolidate our 
conclusions as follows: 
i / J 
Modigliani and Miller (M-M) hypothesis concerning dividend irrelevance 
is applicable to the Indian capital market as much as it is in its western counterpart 
and a company can be, otherwise, an excellent performer without paying dividend 
and hence dividend payment does not constitute an important dimension of 
excellence, and more so in engineering industry where there are myriad other 
dimensions to constitute yardsticks of excellence. 
As far as dividend performance and trend in the engineering industry is 
concerned, post liberalization, dividend payment in engineering industry in India 
has been consistently growing fairly linearly with time albeit at a moderate pace. 
Notwithstanding, a few commonalities that can be evolved, every constituent 
sector of the engineering industry has its own reasons and peculiarities i.e. 
singularities for its dividend payment. Commonalities, whatsoever, that can be 
identified, do not seem to influence their dividend payment in a significant 
manner. 
As far as the perceptions, view points and outlook of the corporate 
managers are concerned they seem to be under the impression that higher dividend 
add higher value to the company in terms of trading volume, liquidity, share value 
and hence market capitalization, but market behaviour does not seem to subscribe 
to this view. In this sense investors' perceptions are more in tune with the market. 
Otherwise, there is not much of a discrepancy, between what the market 
data throw up and what the corporate managers think and feel. In other words, by 
and large, the corporate managers understanding and outlook towards dividends 
are in tune with the market. 
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As far as dividend payments are concerned, managers in otherwise 
brilliantly performing companies are rendered passive functionaries comparatively 
and a new incumbent finance manager has to get accustomed with the dividend 
payment culture of his company and then try to innovate. 
Sound dividend decisions really demand agility, dexterity and ability to 
manage liquidity and profitability together as the compulsion of maintaining 
liquidity in the face of huge expansion / capital expenditure plans do affect 
dividend respectively as much as the abilities to sustain and grow. 
When promoters stake is high in a closely held company, dividend payout 
seems to be limited disregarding the interest of the minority stake holders and it is 
also limited some times governed by statutory provisions and restrictive covenants 
of the financial institufions when they have a significant stake. 
As far as the investors' perceptions and preferences are concerned in a 
monopolistic competitive market in which the Indian engineering industry 
functions, dividend decision is not a strategic weapon to beat the competition and 
dividend payment is not the right yard stick to judge the performance and 
dimensions of excellence for engineering industry. There are myriad more potent 
yard sticks like product differentiation, market leadership, product and services 
quality, reliability, brand equity, growth and diversification record, innovation, 
supportive culture, excellent human resources management etc. 
Investors also derive positive signals from consistency and growth rather 
than the absolute amount of dividends and they do track the company's EPS & 
DPS records along with the myriad other dimensions of excellence before putting 
their hard earned money into a company's equity. 
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6.4 SUGGSESTIONS 
As far as this section of this chapter is concerned, it is addressed to 
corporate finance managers and the investor community at large, to whomsoever, 
out of these, it may concern. 
Keeping in view the ultimate fact that the aim of corporate finance is to 
create value and hence, wealth for all the stake holders in the society e.g. the 
corporate with its employee base at any level, customers, investors and the 
regulators i.e. government, any misunderstanding in the stakes involved, on the 
part of the stake holders will only hamper the process of wealth and value 
creation. Dividend decisions are no exception to this dictum. The following 
suggestions are humbly offered: 
i. Many of the companies in engineering industry in India are more than 
thirty years old and during this period, have built-up an established 
traditions and trend in dividend payments. So, it is suggested that any 
drastic change in dividend payment under exigencies of circumstances 
should be avoided. 
ii. Corporate manager should use dividend as a strategic weapon to win 
over the competitor only after all other strategic avenues are tested and 
exhausted. We have found in this research study that, in the almost 
perfect and highly developed Indian capital market, fundamental 
strengths like innovation, product differentiation, brand equity, product 
range expansion and diversification, excellent human relations 
management track record are far more impressive in creating value 
than dividend. So, value creation should be attempted in any of the 
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areas where a company has core competence rather than dividend 
payment. 
iii. When the mobility of the company's share is suddenly sluggish due to 
unforeseen shifts in market mood, declaration of interim dividend may 
bring about a higher mobility. 
iv. Despite having high and some times out of tune profits, it is more 
advisable to declare a lower dividend only to maintain continuity in 
growth even when this out of tune profit disappears. 
v. To extract the maximum benefit of signaling effect the management 
should publicize fimdamental strengths and highlight how the dividend 
declared supplement and compliment rather than substitute the 
fundamental parameters. 
vi. For closely held companies the majority may have their way, but 
nevertheless the minority must have their say, hence their interest 
should not be over looked while declaring dividend. Hence, by 
adopting dividend policy minority share holders should be protected. 
vii. If a particular company's shares enjoy a higher price-earning ratio in 
the market, for a company under engineering industry perennially 
suffering from liquidity and cash flow problem, can, as well declare 
scrip dividends / bonus shares as a viable alternative rather than 
skipping dividend. 
viii. Finance managers in a particular sector of the engineering industry 
should identify the market leader in that segment and establish a 
benchmark dividend practice in keeping with that of the leader. 
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ix. To give credence to the 'bird in the hand theory' despite there being a 
huge capital expenditure forthcoming, best efforts should be made to 
maintain dividend payments, however meager and thorough publicity 
should be given to the importance and necessity of the capital 
expenditure. 
X. Maintenance of liquidity and capital investment plans do affect 
dividend restrictively. As capital investment is needed for growth and 
liquidity is needed for day to day running a balance between the two 
should be maintained to continue dividend payment as far established 
tradition. 
xi. For dividend payout consistency is important rather than the absolute 
amount for signaling effect. For dividend payment, consistency should 
be given priority over absolute amount for signaling effect. 
6.5 SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
After objective analysis of the work done so far in the research project, 
there are many more areas related with dividend payment that can be undertaken. 
In the following few areas have been identified for further research. 
1. This study is engineering sector specific. There are a number of other 
sectors for which the study may be extended further namely, construction, 
refractory, and service sector. 
2. This study is mainly concerned with large engineering organizations. 
There is a further scope to study small and medium size companies. 
3. Non dividend paying companies have not been studied. A similar study 
can be conducted to probe into the motivation of the management as to 
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why they do not declare dividend and also the attitude and perception of 
investors towards these categories of companies under engineering and 
other industries. 
4. The companies dividend and inter-relationship with the P-value of its share 
can be studied. A regression relation can be evolved between the P-value 
of the company's share in the market and its dividend payment. 
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ANNEXXHE-l 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR CORPORATE MANAGERS(\TRS10N IV) 
Q.l) Please indicate your professional status/designation in the organization you work: 
i) Chief Finance Officer (CFO)/Director Finance 
ii) Chief Executive Officer (CEO)/ Managing Director 
iii) Position other than the two above (Please specify) 
Q.2) Kindly indicate your length of experience in corporate management, particularly in finance: 
i) Less than 10 years 
ii) Between 10 & IS years 
iii) Between 15 & 20 years 
iv) Between 20 & 25 years 
v) Above 25 years 
Q.3) Which of the following sectors of engineering industry your organization exactly belongs to? 
i) Automotive 
ii) Auto ancillary/ components 
iii) Pure engineering/ machine building 
iv) Chemical/ petrochemical/ paints 
v) Consumer durable/ vMie goods 
vi) Steel/ ferro-alloys 
vii) Non- ferrous metals/ aluminiiim 
viii) Electronic/Tele-com/IT hardware 
Hereunder, there is a series of statements regarding corporate dividend policy and its impact and 
implications. Kindly choose the most suitable alternative indicating your degree of agreement or otherwise 
with the idea expressed in the statement. Under each question, your degree of agreement or disagreement 
has been abbreviated and graded as follows: 
Strongly agree: S/A 
Moderately agree: M/A 
Neither agree nor disagree: NA-ND 
Moderately disagree: MD 
Strongly disagree: SD 
Q.4) "Dividend policy is an active residual policy reflecting the competence and dexterity of the 
management in managing profitability and liquidity together." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.5) " A policy of paying a stable dividend, albeit at a lower and safe level, is always wise and prudent 
on the part of the company's management." 
1) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.6) "However meager the dividend pay-out be, there has to be a continuity coupled with an increase, 
otherwise, the company will loose its image and confidence among the investor community." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.7) "Earning per share (EPS) and Dividend per share (DPS) should be synchronized with each other and 
the dividend pay-out ratio should be maintained fairly uniform." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.8) "Dividend decisions in engineering industry are easier to take owing to high depreciation which is a 
notional cash outflow." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.9) "In engineering industry, dividend decisions are mostly affected by high fixed cost in the respective 
company's cost structure." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.IO) "The capital structures of engineering industries are heavily loaded with debt, bearing fixed interest 
charges, and that affects dividend payment adversely." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.ll) " In engineering industry, dividend decisions are dictated by the term lending financial 
institutions." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.12)" Even in engineering industry, if it is closely held, irrespective of its size and diversification, 
dividend payments are comparatively irrelevant and inunaterial in creating value for the company." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.13) "In family held engineering industry, however big or diversified, dividend payments do not add 
value to the company." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.14) " Dividend decisions concern only the equity share holders and no other stake holders of the 
company concerned." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv. NID M S D 
Q.15) "Equity share holders are a floating community and keep changing and hence the> are not exactly 
bothered about dividends." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v)SD 
Q.16)" In engineering industry, as debt mostly dominate the capital structure, debt suppliers are more 
concerned with dividend payments rather than equity share holders." 
i)S/A ii)M/A ui) NA-ND iv)MD v) SD 
Q.17) "For the equity share holders, the primary motivation for investing in equity is capital gain, hence 
dividends are comparatively unmaterial." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.18) "Once the other fundamentals are very strong, dividend payments may not have any significant 
influence in creating higher value for the company." 
i) S/A, ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.!9) "Management should always pay higher dividends, as higher the dividend, higher the market value 
of the company's share." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.20) "Higher the dividend, higher the trading volume. Dividends boost market liquidity." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.21) "Higher dividend payment creates higher market capitalization and hence higher value creation for 
the company concerned." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.22) "Higher dividend payment is virtually ruled out for a company whose products and services are 
highly innovative and continuously evolving." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.23) " Among the engineering industry, process chemical industry can pay higher dividends than 
machine building industry." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.24) " In I.T hardware industry, dividend payment is the most difficult due to contmuously falling output 
product price." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND i\)MD v) SD 
Q,25) " In chemical, petrochemical & paint industry, the rate of innovation should be very high and hence, 
dividend payment may be a bigger challenge." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.26) " In Automotive, auto-component, and auto-ancillary industries dividend payment is less 
challenging due to the ever increasing product demand coupled wath higher and higher prices." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv)MD v)SD 
Q.27) "Corporate dividend policy aimed at xmduly influencing the market, is not likely to succeed with the 
competent professional fund managers." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.28)" Market value of a company's share depends more upon the technicalities and manipulations in the 
market place and the market mood, dividends may not make any difference." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.29) "After all, apart from the foregoing theoretical considerations, we have our own way of deciding on 
the dividend issue, which is ,of course, our strategic prerogative. However, in order to some justice to the 
questionnaire, we summarize them as follows: 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
V) 
ANNEXURE-II 
Questionnaire For The Investors 
(Kindly provide a few professional/personal details as answers to the following questions) 
Q.l) professionally you are engaged as: 
i) Executive in a private corporate sector 
ii) Executive in a state govt./central govt./ public sector 
iii) Businessman 
iv) Independent Professional: CA/ICWA/Iawyer/doctor/architect/mgmt. consultant/any other (specify) 
v) Any other source of income like property rental etc. 
Q.2) Your educational qualification: 
i) Undergraduate 
ii) Graduate 
iii) Post-graduate 
iv) Professional graduate 
v) Professional post-graduate 
vi) Doctoral 
vii) Any other(specify) 
Q.3) The age group you belong to: 
i) Below 25 years 
ii) Between 25 & 35 years 
iii) Between 35 & 45 years 
iv) Between 45 & 55 years 
v) Above 55 years 
Q.4) Kindly indicate your approximate aimual income: 
i) Within Rs. 2,50,000 
ii) Between Rs. 2,50,000 & Rs 5,00,000 
iii) Between Rs. 5,00,000 & Rs. 7,50,000 
iv) Between Rs. 7,50,000 & Rs. 10,00,000 
v) Above Rs 10,00,000 
Q.5) Are you a regular investor in the Indian coital market? 
i)Yes 
ii)No 
Q.6) If the answer to the previous question is 'yes', kindly categorize the periodicity of > our investment: 
Once in : i) three months 
ii) six months 
iii) a year 
iv) three years 
v) five years 
The following questions are in the form of a statement expressing an idea. Kindly indicate your choice 
of the most suitable alternative based on your degree of agreement, indifference or disagreement with 
the idea expressed in the statement. Under each question, your degree of agreement or disagreement has 
been abbreviated and graded as follows: 
i) Strongly agree: S/A 
ii) Moderately agree: M/A 
iii)Neither agree nor disagree: NA-ND 
iv) Moderately disagree: MD 
v) Strongly disagree: SD 
Q.7) "To attract equity investment, a company should build up strong fundamentals rather than 
depending upon techiucalities or market mood." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv)MD v)SD 
Q.8) "Earning per share and Dividend per share are the most important fundamental strengths of 
a company." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.9)" An equity investor should track the dividend payment records of the target company for a 
few years before investing in it." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.IO) To build up investors' confidence a company's earning per share and dividend per share 
should be consistent with each other i.e. the company should maintain a constant dividend pay-
out ratio." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q. 11) "A company may pay a moderate dividend, but it must be stable over a long period of 
time," 
i) S/A ii)M/A iii)NA-ND iv)MD \ j SD 
Q.12) "A company's dividend pay-out may be moderate, but it must be consistently increa^in^ 
over time." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii)NA-ND iv)MD v)SD 
Q.13) "However inconsistent a company's dividend pay-out may be, what matters is, it must be 
very high." 
i) S/A ii)M/A iii)NA-ND iv)MD v)SD 
Q.14) "However high a company's dividend pay-out may be, what matters is, it must be very 
consistent." 
i) S/A ii)M/A iii)NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.15) "A consistent and moderately high dividend pay-out over the years indicates that all is 
well with the company and nothing can go wrong." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii)NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.16) "A consistent and moderately high dividend pay-out over the years indicates that the 
company has no major and promising capital expenditure and hence growth plan." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii)NA-ND iv)MD v)SD 
Q.17) " A consistent and moderately high dividend pay-out over the years indicates that the 
company's management is not irmovative and is blindly following its predecessor's track 
records." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii)NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.18) "A consistent and moderately high dividend pay-out over the years indicates that the 
company's management is trying to create a false sense of reliability and confidence among the 
investors." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii)NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.19) " A consistent and moderately high dividend pay-out over the years indicates that the 
company's management is trying to cover up other deficiencies and malfunctioning that the 
investors may overlook or ignore." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii)NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.20) "As far as engineering industry is concerned, dividend pay-out alone can't be the 
yardstick of its performance." 
i)S/A ii)MA iii)NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.21)" As an investor, you don't mind investing in the equity of an engineering company, even 
if it is paying nil or meager dividend." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii)NA-ND iv)MD v) SD 
Q.22)" As an investor, you won't mind investing in the equity capital of an engineering 
company with almost nil or dismal dividend payment record because the company is a maricet 
leader with products of excellent quality and reliability." 
i) S/A ii)M/A iii)NA-ND iv) MD v)SD 
Q.23) "As an investor, you won't mind investing in the equity capital of an engineering 
company with almost nil or dismal dividend payment record because the company's product 
differentiation is excellent and its brand equity very high." 
i) S/A ii) M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.24) " As an investor, you won't mind investing in the equity capital of an engineering 
company with almost nil or dismal dividend payment record because the company's growth and 
diversification track record is excellent." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv) MD v) SD 
Q.25) As an investor, you won't mind investing in the equity capital of an engineering company 
with almost nil or dismal dividend payment record because the company is professionally 
managed with a highly innovative and supportive culture and is superb in managing its human 
resources." 
i)S/A ii)M/A iii) NA-ND iv)MD v) SD 
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ANNEXURE III 
SUMMARY OF SELECTED INDUSTRIES TAKEN FROM ET-500 
SI. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
. 
AUTOMOTIVE 
INDUSTRIES 
HERO HONDA MOTORS 
BAJAJ AUTO 
TATA MOTORS 
MARUTHIUDYOG 
MAHENDRA & MAHENDRA 
EICHER MOTORS 
ASHOK LAYLAND 
PUNJAB TRACTORS 
TVS MOTORS CO. 
SWARAJ MAZDA 
-HINDUS i"HAN 
MOTORS/PREMIER AUTO 
FORCE MOTORS 
ESCORTS 
PREMIER AUTO 
SI. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
AUTO COMPONENTS OR 
ANCILLARIES 
MOTOR INDUSTRIES 
(MICO) 
MOTHERSON SUMI 
SYSTEMS 
TUBE INVESTMENTS 
SUNDARAM PARTNERS 
SKF INDIA (BEARINGS) 
SUNDARAM CLAYTON 
RICO AUTO 
WHEEI^ INDIA 
EXIDE INDUSTRIES 
MRF 
KALYANI BRAKE'^  
TIMKEN 
APOLLO TYRES 
AUTOMOTIVE AXLES 
PRICOL 
MUNJALAUTO 
INDUSTRIES 
FAG BEARINGS 
OMAX AUTOS 
GOETZ INDIA 
RANE MADRAS 
SONA KOYO STEERING 
SUNDRAM BRAKE 
LININGS 
ZF STEERING 
NRB BEARINGS 
VCAL FUEL SYSTI MS 
CEATTYERS 
SUBROS 
DEN SO INDIA 
LUMAX INDUSTRIES 
MUNJALSHOWA 
AUTO CORPORATION OF 
GOA 
RANE ENGINE VALVES 
AMTEK AUTO 
. 
SI. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
2X 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
ENGINEERING INDUSTRIES 
BHEL 
ABB 
BHARAT FORGE 
CROMPTON GRIEVES 
LARSEN& TURBO 
LAKSHMI MACHINE WORKS 
ALFA LAVAL 
BHARAT EARTH MOVERS 
THERMAX 
CUMMINS INDIA 
KIRLOSKAROIL 
KIRLOSKAR BROTHERS 
HAVELL'S INDIA 
FNGERSOLLKANL) 
CARBORUNDUM 
UNIVERSAL 
ALSTOM 
PRAJ INDUSTRIES 
ELECTRO STEEL CASTINGS 
KSB PUMPS 
ATLAS COPCO 
KENNAMETAL WIDIA 
ENGINEERS INDIA 
HBL NIFR POWER SYSTEMS 
BHARATHBIJLEE 
MANUGRAPH INDIA 
ENNORE FOUNDRIES 
JAYASWALS NECO 
r,R nsrowFJ i. WORTON 
GRAPHITE INDIA 
TEXMACO 
AMFORGE INDUSTRIES 
HEG 
EMCO 
LG BALAKRISHNAN 
AHMEDNAGAR FORCINGS 
WARTSILA INDIA 
HINDUSTAN POWER PLUS 
ELGI EQUIPMENTS 
SI. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
^8. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
CHEMICAL PETRO-
CHEMICAL PAINTS 
CHENNAI PETROLEUM 
ASIAN PAINTS 
JUBILANT ORGANOSIS 
MRPL 
BONGAIGAON REFINERRIES 
RELIANCE INDUSTRIES 
UNITED PHOSPORUS 
GOODLASS NEROLAC 
TATA CHEMICALS 
KOCHI REFINERIES 
IPCL 
GUJARAT ALKALIES AND 
CHEMICALS 
SYNGENTA INDIA 
INDIAN OIL 
SUPREME PETROCHEM 
FINOLEX INDUSTRIES 
BHARATH PETROLEUM 
HPCL 
INDIA GLYCOLS 
ICl INDIA 
CIBA SPECIALITY 
CHEMICALS 
SCHENECTADY HERDILLIA 
HICAL 
SAVITHA CHEMICALS 
GHCL 
BECK INDIA 
IBP 
FOSECO INDIA 
CHEMPLAST SANMAR 
HINDUSTAN ORGANIC 
CHEMICALS 
MANALIPETRO 
PUNJAB ALKALIES 
THIRUMALAI CHEMICALS 
BERGER PAINTS 
AARTI INDUSTRIES 
39. 
40. 
SI. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
KIRLOSKAR PhRJEMATIC 
HMT 
ELECTRONICS /TELECOM / 
IT HARDWARE 
MRO-TEK 
ASTRA MICROWAVE 
PRODUCTS 
AVAYA GLOBAL CONNECT 
BHARAT ELECTRONICS LTD 
SAMTEL COLOUR 
HFCLINFOTEL 
TATA ELXSI 
8. IMOSERBAER 
9. 
10. 
SALORA INTERNATIONAL 
HCL INFO SYSTEM 
SI. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
Si. 
No. 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
n. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
CONSUMER DURABLES 
AND WHITE GOODS 
VIDIOCON INTERNATIONAL 
SIEMENS 
TITAN INDUSTRIES 
VOLTAS 
OPTO CIRCUITS 
MIRC ELECTRONICS 
HONEYWELL AUTOMATION 
INDL\ 
LLOYD ELECTRICAL AND 
ENGINEERING 
HITACHI HOME AND LIFE 
SOLUTIONS 
STEEL INDUSTRIES/FERRO 
ALLOYS 
TATA STEEL 
SAIL 
ESSAR STEEL 
ISPAl INDUSTRIES 
JINDAL VIJAYNAGAR STEEL 
JINDAL STEEL AND POWER 
MUKAND IRON AND STEEL 
BHUSHAN STEEL AND 
STRIPS 
UTTHAM GALVA STEELS 
JINDAL STAINLESS 
MAHARASTRA SEAMLESS 
MONNETISPAT 
KALYANI STEELS 
JINDAL SAW 
MAHENDRA UGINE STEEL 
TATA METALLIKS 
SHAH ALLOYS 
SUANFLAG IRON 
USHA MARTIN 
LLOYDS' STEEL 
SHREE PRE COATED STEEL 
LANCO INDUSTRIES 
TATA SPONGE IRON 
INDL\N CHARGE CHOROME 
WELSPUN-GUJ STAHL 
i 
I 
t 
1 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
SI. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
ROHREN 
KIRLOSKAR FERROUS 
NATIONAL STEEL 
SOUTHERN IRON AND STEEL 
SATHAVAHANA ISPAT 
GMR INDUSTRIES 
NON FERROUS METALS / 
ALLOYS 
HINDUSTAN ZINC 
STERLITE INDUSTRIES 
NATIONAL ALLUMINIUM 
COMPANY 
INDULCO INDUSTRIES 
HINDUSTAN COPPER 
GUJARAT NRE COKE 
SOLTHINDLA CORPORATION 
AGENCIES 
MAN INDUSTRIES (INDIA) 
MADRAS ALLUMINIUM 
COMPANY 
TIN PLATE COMPANY OF 
INDIA 
